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PART A: OPTIONS 
Introduction 
The present study, 'Development of  surveillance technology and risk of  abuse of  economic information' 
presents the interim results from a survey of  the opinions of  experts, together with additional research and 
analytical material by the authors. It has been conducted by ZEUS E.E.I.G. as part of  a technology 
assessment project on this theme initiated by STOA in 1998 at the request of  the Committee on Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs of  the European Parliament. This STOA project is a follow-up to an earlier 
one entitled: "An appraisal of  technologies of  political control" conducted for the same Committee. The 
earlier project resulted in an Interim Study (PE 166.499) written by OMEGA Foundation, Manchester, and 
published by STOA on January 1998 and later updated (September 1998). 
In the earlier study it was reported that within Europe all fax, e-mail and telephone messages are routinely 
intercepted by means of  what is called the ECHELON global surveillance system. The monitoring was said 
to be "routine and indiscriminate". The ECHELON system formed part of  the UKUSA system, but unlike 
many of  the electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON was said to be designed for 
primarily non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses in virtually every country. 
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In the present study the authors were requested to investigate the use of  surveillance technology systems, 
for the collection and possible abuse of  sensitive economic information. 
The principal method selected was a procedure of  data collection and processing based on a modified 
DELPHI method (to be referred to here as "the survey"). Under this method, a list of  potential sources of 
data was prepared. These were some 49 experts from universities, industrial and commercial undertakings 
in the informations and telecommunications technology sector, as well as a smaller number of  persons in 
international or governmental organisations. The experts were drawn from 11  Member States of  the 
European Union, plus Cyprus, Norway and Switzerland. 
The next step was the collection of  the data. This was mostly achieved by direct interviews of  the experts, 
with the use of  a questionnaire. The views (data) were processed and a convergence examination 
performed. The convergence procedure was based on a recursive approach for the exclusion of  the 
non-reliable data. The last step was the drawing of  the analytical results. 
General overview of  the outcome of  the survey 
The predominant view among the experts was that since nowadays almost all economic information is 
exchanged through electronic means (telephone, fax, e-mail), and, in addition, all digital 
telecommunication devices and switches have enhanced wiretapping capabilities, for these reasons they 
suggested that we must focus on the protection of  the data when transmitted (using encryption products), on 
the use of  government-approved encryption products and on the adoption of  common standards concerning 
encryption and key-recovery products. The position could be summed up in the statement that 'since it is 
difficult to prove that economic information has been captured by ECHELON system and passed on by the 
NSA, we have to consider privacy protection in a global international networked society'. 
In summary, therefore, we see that two perceptions of  this question emerge: (1) a concern about the 
possible threat to privacy and economic and civil rights potentially posed by global clandestine electronic 
surveillance systems operated by large and powerful secret government agencies, and (2) anxiety about the 
problems of  commercial and personal privacy which arise now that so much commercial and other 
communications traffic is conducted over the Internet. Managers of  businesses engaged in electronic 
commerce may perhaps be concerned about global clandestine surveillance systems: what is certain is that 
they are worried in a more familiar way about threats to commercial security posed by the nature of  the new 
electronic business media and their possible vulnerability to interception by competitors and fraudsters. 
Reflecting the feedback from the survey, the present study tends to reflect Perception 2, whereas the earlier 
one of 1998 tended to reflect Perception 1. 
Advances in information and communication technologies have fostered the development of  complex 
national and international networks which enable thousands of  geographically dispersed users to distribute, 
transmit, gather and exchange all kinds of  data. Trans  border electronic exchanges -- private, professional, 
industrial and commercial-- have proliferated on a global scale and are bound to intensify among 
businesses and between businesses and consumers, as electronic commerce develops. 
At the same time developments in digital computing have increased the capacity for accessing, gathering, 
recording, processing, sorting, comparing and linking alphanumeric, voice and image data. This substantial 
growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have arisen the need at 
securing privacy protection in trans  border data flows. 
Today, it is not necessary to define new principles for the protection of  data (and privacy) in an expanding 
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global electronic environment. It is necessary to define the appropriate means of  putting the established 
principles into practice, particularly on the information and communication networks. 
An active education strategy may be one of  the ways to help achieve on-line and privacy protection and to 
give all actors the opportunities to understand their common interests. 
Common technological solutions can assist in implementing privacy and data protection guidelines in 
global information networks. The general optimism about technological solutions, the pressure to collect 
economic information and the need for political and social policy decisions to ensure privacy must be 
considered. 
The growth in international networks and the increase in economic data processing have arisen the need at 
securing privacy protection in trans  border data flows and especially the use of  contractual solutions. Global 
E-Commerce has changed the nature of  retailing. There were great cultural and legal differences between 
countries affecting attitudes to the use of  sensitive data (economic or personal) and the issue of  applicable 
law in global transaction had tope resolved. Contracts might bridge the gab between those with legislation 
and the others. 
Since Internet symbolised global commerce, faced with a rapid expansion in the numbers of  transactions, 
there is a need to define a stable lasting framework for business. Internet is changing profound the markets 
and adjusting new contracts. To that reality is a complex problem. 
Views on privacy collected  from the survey 
In this section the experts' views on the various privacy issues are reported. The information was mostly 
collected by direct interviews of  the experts, based on a predefined questionnaire. 
General privacy issues 
•  Privacy can be a contentious subject because it means different things to different people. The 
definition given is: "Privacy is the claim of  individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves how, when and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" 
•  A clear problem expressed is that in an electronic environment, it becomes hard to differentiate 
between a private and public place and therefore what should be protected and what should not. 
•  It was argued that is unreasonable for the society to subsidise the cost of  individuals to maintain their 
privacy, pointing out that most people will choose utility over security (and consequently privacy) 
•  It was suggested that privacy in many ways sacrifices other goods (time, effort and energy among 
them) in order to obtain it. 
•  Three basic tools necessary for privacy protection were outlined: notice (to the data supplier), consent 
(to the consumer), and accountability. 
•  Although accountability may be essential to ensuring privacy, it unfortunately conflicts with the 
anonymity, privacy implies. For any commerce to take place on the Internet, therefore, some level of 
anonymity and therefore privacy must be sacrificed. The question to be answered is " how much and 
who will decide". 
The market for privacy 
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•  When the European Commission adopted the privacy directive (95/46/EC), it stated that privacy 
protection is a central precondition to consumers' acceptance of  electronic commerce. Accordingly, a 
critical issue experts argued, was whether there was a "market failure' in the electronic environment 
that required some sort of  government intervention to ensure data privacy. 
•  Some experts responded that data privacy is not purely a public good, and so at some point someone 
will have a market incentive to protect it. Some corporations that have tried to market their strong 
privacy protection have yet to see any results and have concluded that: "privacy doesn't sell". Other 
industries have marketed privacy successfully (such as the cellular telephone industry) which could 
mean that the public demands for privacy are forthcoming and will eventually be profitable. 
•  They feel that a question to be answered is: Who governs the responsibility of  the information 
collector, or does society have to impose a sense of  responsibility?" 
The role of  industry 
•  Most experts expressed the view that the information industry should be primarily self-regulated: the 
industry is changing too rapidly for government legislative solutions, and most corporations are not 
simply looking at National or European but at global markets, which national governments cannot 
regulate. 
•  Indeed several experts expressed the fear that any European attempt to allow USA to oversee (via 
global surveillance systems) data would lead to abuses by the government or other competitive 
companies. 
•  They noted that many companies (such as Citibank) already inform consumers and clients that, unless 
told otherwise, they will disclose information to their affiliates. They suggested that a simple seal on 
the home page of  a Web site, declaring that a company adheres to certain industry privacy standards 
might cease the fears of  the public and offer some level of  accountability. 
•  Alternatively, they suggested that the media could act as an effective watchdog, informing consumers 
and companies of  what information is being collected about them and how that information is being 
used. 
•  They also noted that multinational companies could better negotiate for themselves across national 
boundaries than governments can. Electronic commerce is unlikely to gain popularity until the issues 
of  notice, consent and recourse have been resolved. The market will force companies wishing to 
participate in this medium to address and solve these concerns. 
The need  for European legislation 
•  Experts took the view that the European Parliament must now ask how, in a world of  the Internet, one 
reconciles the objectives of  protecting both: privacy and free flow of  information. 
•  In recent years there have been disclosures that unauthorised individuals have examined financial 
information from the Internal Revenue Service in USA. Several experts pointed to the flap over the 
decision by the Social Security Administration in USA to provide companies account information 
on-line. Each of  these examples suggests that protecting data privacy may be a great challenge for the 
European Parliament. 
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•  Experts agreed that the European Parliament should play a role in creating a standard for disclosure. 
Several experts went further and argued the need of  a privacy agency within the European Union to act 
as an ombudsman and to represent privacy interests, so that in debates between European Union and 
USA there is someone whose responsibility would be to protect privacy. 
•  Whatever several experts believe the appropriate role for national governments to be in ensuring 
privacy in an electronic environment, some "private regulation" is already occurring on the Internet by 
the computer engines, who write code and decide computer standards. In fact experts suggested that 
when encryption software becomes ubiquitous it will push Internet commerce because it allows for 
potentially anonymous transactions, which will solve privacy issues by default. 
•  It was pointed out that a group of  high-tech companies in co-operation with standardisation 
organisations should agree on a web-based standard that would allow companies and consumers to 
interact with data collectors and inform them of  what information they would be comfortable having 
disclosed to other parties. 
Options for action on surveillance and  privacy 
The policy options for consideration by the committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of  the 
European Parliament which emerged from the survey are: 
•  Authorities in the EU and Member States should: 
engage in a dialogue involving the private sector and individual users of  networks in order to learn 
about their needs for implementing the privacy guidelines in the global network; 
undertake an examination of  private sector technical initiatives; 
encourage the development of  applications within global networks, of  technological solutions that 
implement the privacy principles and uphold the right of  users, businesses and consumers for 
protection of  their privacy in the electronic environment. 
•  Drafting methods for enforcing codes of  conduct and privacy statements ranging from standardisation, 
labelling and certification in the global environment through third-party audit to formal enforcement 
by a regulatory body. 
•  Definitions of  the transactions which must remain anonymous, and technical capabilities for providing 
anonymity need to be specified. 
•  Enforcement for the adoption of  adequate standards (cryptography and key encryption) from all E.U. 
member states. Multilateral agreements with other countries could then be negotiated. 
•  Drafting of  common guidelines of  credit information use (in each member state of  the E. U. different 
restriction policies exist). It must be dear how those restrictions could apply to a globally operating 
credit reference agency. 
•  Drafting of  common specifications for cryptography systems and government access key recovery 
systems, which must be compatible with large scale, economical, secure cryptographic systems. 
•  Enforcement for the adoption of  special authorisation schemes for Information Society Services and 
supervision of  their activities by National Authorisation Bodies. 
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•  Drafting of  a common responsibilities framework for on-line service providers, who transmit and store 
third party information. This could be drafted and supervised by National PTTs. 
•  The European Parliament should examine critically proposals from the US for the elimination of 
cryptography and the adoption of  encryption controls supervised by US Agencies. 
•  Annual statistics and reporting on abuse of  economic information by any means must be reported to 
the Parliament of  each member state of  the E. U. 
•  Measures for encouraging the formal education systems of  each member state of  the E. U. or the 
appropriate European Training Institute/Organisation to take up the general task of  educating users in 
the technology and their rights. 
PART B: ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE 
General 
Nowadays almost all economic information is exchanged through electronic means (telephone, fax, e-mail). 
In addition, all digital telecommunication devices and switches have enhanced wiretapping capabilities. As 
a conclusion we have to consider privacy protection in a global international networked society. And when 
we speak about electronic protection and privacy in the exchange of  economic information, we actually 
speak for electronic commerce over the Internet. 
The information society promises economic and social benefits for all: citizens, companies and 
governments. Advances in information and communication technologies have fostered the proliferation of 
private, professional, industrial and commercial trans  border electronic exchanges on a global scale which 
are bound to intensify among businesses and between businesses and consumers as electronic commerce 
develops. New methods for processing the vast accumulation of  data -such as data mining techniques-
make it possible, on the basis of  demographic data, credit information, details of  on-line transactions etc, to 
identify new kinds of  purchasing patterns or unusual relationships. 
Indeed, compliance with rules governing the protection of  privacy and personal data is crucial to 
establishing confidence in electronic transactions, and particularly in Europe, which has traditionally been 
heavily regulated in this area. The development of  the global information society makes the convergence of 
government policies, the transparency of  rules and regulations and their effective implementation on 
economic and social life. In particular, in the context of  electronic commerce, the development of  on-line 
commercial activities hinges to a large extent, not only on the faith consumers have in business in terms of 
guaranteed product delivery or security payment systems, but also on the confidence that users and 
consumers will have in the ways that businesses handle their personal data. 
To operate with confidence on the global networks, most consumers need assurance that their on-line 
activities and electronic transactions will not be collected or used without their knowledge or made 
available to parties other than their initial correspondents. Neither linked to other data about them in order 
to compile behavioural profiles without their consent. 
The importance of  information and communication systems for society and the global economy is 
intensifying with the increasing value and quantity of  data that is transmitted and stored on those systems. 
At the same time those systems and data are also increasingly vulnerable to a variety of  threats such as 
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unauthorised access and use, misappropriation, alteration and destruction. Proliferation of  computers, 
increased computing power, interconnectivity, decentralisation, growth of  networks and the number of 
users, as well as the convergence of  information and communication technologies, while enhancing the 
utility of  these systems, also increase system invulnerability. 
Cryptography is an important component of  secure information and communication systems and a variety 
of  application have been developed that incorporate cryptographic methods to provide data security. 
Although there are legitimate governmental, commercial and individual needs and uses for cryptography, it 
may also be used by individuals or entities for illegal activities, which can affect public safety, national 
security, the enforcement of  laws, business interests, consumers interests or privacy. Governments together 
with industry and the general public, are challenged to develop balanced policies to address these issues. 
Cryptography uses an algorithm to transform data in order to render it unintelligible to anyone who does 
not possess certain secret information (the cryptographic "key"), necessary for decryption of  the data. 
Within the new concept of  cryptography, rather than sharing one secret key, the new design uses two 
mathematically related keys for each communication party: a "public key" that is disclosed to the public 
and a corresponding "private key", that is kept secret. A message that is encrypted with a public key can 
only be decrypted by the corresponding private key. 
An important application for public key cryptography is "digital signature", which can be used to verify the 
integrity of  data or the authenticity of  the sender of  data. In this case, the private key is used to "sign" a 
message, while the corresponding public key is used to verify a "signed" message. 
Public key cryptography plays an important role in developing information infrastructure. Much of  the 
interest in information and communication networks and technologies centres on their potential to 
accommodate electronic commerce; however open networks such as the Internet present significant 
challenges for making enforceable electronic contracts and secure payments. 
Since Electronic Commerce on one hand is one of  the key strategies of  the European Union and the privacy 
protection on the other hand, one of  its main principles, E.U. in 1998 released three "key" working 
documents: 
•  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of  Electronic 
Commerce in the internal market [ COM(1998) 586 final]. 
•  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on a common framework for electronic 
signatures [COM (1998)297 final]. 
•  Ensuring security and trust in electronic communication: "Towards a European framework for digital 
signatures and Encryption" [COM(1997) 503 final]. 
Increasing the number of  people with authorised access to the critical infrastructure and to business data, 
will increase the likelihood of  attack, whether through technical means, by exploitation of  mistakes or 
through corruption. Further "key-recovery" requirements to the extent that they made encryption can have 
the effect of  discouraging or delaying the deployment of  cryptography in increasingly vulnerable computing 
and communication networks. 
As the Internet and other communications systems reach further into everyday lives, national security, law 
enforcement and individual privacy have become perilously intertwined. Governments want to restrict the 
free flow of  information; software producers are seeking ways to ensure consumers are not bugged from the 
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very moment of  purchase. The US is behind a world-wide effort to limit individual privacy and enhance the 
capability of  its intelligence services to eavesdrop on personal conversations. The campaign has had two 
legal strategies: the first made it mandatory for all digital telephone switches, cellular and satellite phones 
and all developing communication technologies to build in surveillance capabilities; the second sought to 
limit the dissemination of  software that contains encryption, a technique which allows people to scramble 
their communications and files to prevent others from reading them. The first effort to heighten surveillance 
opportunities was to force telecommunications companies to use equipment designed to include enhanced 
wiretapping capabilities. The end goal was to ensure that the US and its allied intelligence services could 
easily eavesdrop on telephone networks anywhere in the world. In the late 1980s, in a programme known 
internally as 'Operation Root Canal', US law enforcement officials demanded that telephone companies alta 
their equipment to facilitate the interception of  messages. The companies refused but, after several years of 
lobbying, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994. 
CALEA requires that terrestrial carriers, cellular phone services and other entities ensure that all their ' 
equipment, facilities or services' are capable of  expeditiously ...  enabling the government. .. to intercept. .. all 
wire and oral communications carried by the carrier  ... concurrently with their transmission.' 
Communications must be interceptable in such a form that they could be transmitted to a remote 
government facility. 
Manufacturers must work with industry and law enforcement officials to ensure that their equipment meets 
federal standards. A court can fine a company US$10,000 per day for each product that does not comply. 
The passage of  CALEA has been controversial but its provisions have yet to be enforced due to FBI efforts 
to include even more rigorous regulations under the law. These include the requirement that cellular phones 
allow for location-tracking on demand and that telephone companies provide capacity for up to 50,000 
simultaneous wiretaps. 
While the FBI lobbied Congress and pressured US companies into accepting a tougher CALEA, it also 
leaned on US allies to adopt it as an international standard. In 1991, the FBI held a series of  secret meetings 
with EU member states to persuade them to incorporate CALEA into European law. The plan, according to 
an EU report, was to 'call for the Western World (EU, US and allies) to agree to norms and procedures and 
then sell their products to Third World countries. Even if  they do not agree to interception orders, they will 
find their telecommunications monitored by the UK-USA signals intelligence network the minute they use 
the equipment.' The FBI's efforts resulted in an EU Council of  Ministers resolution that was quietly adopted 
in January 1995, but not publicly released until20 months later. The resolution's text is almost word for 
word identical to the FBI's demands at home. The US government is now pressuring the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to adopt the standards globally. 
The second part of  the strategy was to ensure that intelligence and police agencies could understand every 
communication they intercepted. They attempted to impede the development of  cryptography and other 
security measures, fearing that these technologies would reduce their ability to monitor the emissions of 
foreign governments and to investigate crime. 
These latter efforts have not been successful. A survey by the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) 
found that most countries have either rejected domestic controls or not addressed the issue at all. The GILC 
found that 'many countries, large and small, industrialised and developing, seem to be ambivalent about the 
need to control encryption technologies'. 
The FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) have instigated efforts to restrict the availability of 
encryption world-wide. In the early 1970s, the NSA's pretext was that encryption technology was 'born 
classified' and, therefore, its dissemination fell into the same category as the diffusion of  A-bomb materials. 
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The debate went underground until 1993 when the US launched the Clipper Chip, an encryption device 
designed for inclusion in consumer products. The Clipper Chip offered the required privacy, but the 
government would retain a 'pass-key' - anything encrypted with the chip could be read by government 
agencies. 
Behind the scenes, law enforcement and intelligence agencies were pushing hard for a ban on other forms 
of  encryption. In a February 1993 document, obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), 
they recommended 'Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if  they are incorporated into all 
encryption products'. 
To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the use of  government-approved encryption products, or 
adherence to government encryption criteria, is required.' The Clipper Chip was widely criticised by 
industry, public interest groups, scientific societies and the public and, though it was officially adopted, 
only a few were ever sold or used. 
From 1994 onwards, Washington began to woo private companies to develop an encryption system that 
would provide access to keys by government agencies. Under the proposals - variously known as 'key 
escrow', 'key recovery' or 'trusted third parties'- the keys would be held by a corporation, not a government 
agency, and would be designed by the private sector, not the NSA. The systems, however, still entailed the 
assumption of  guaranteed access to the intelligence community and so proved as controversial as the 
Clipper Chip. The government used export incentives to encourage companies to adopt key escrow 
products: they could export stronger encryption, but only if  they ensured that intelligence agencies had 
access to the keys. 
Under US law, computer software and hardware cannot be exported if  it contains encryption that the NSA 
cannot break. The regulations stymie the availability of  encryption in the USA because companies are 
reluctant to develop two separate product lines-- one, with strong encryption, for domestic use and another, 
with weak encryption, for the international market. Several cases are pending in the US courts on the 
constitutionality of  export controls; a federal court recently ruled that they violate free speech rights under 
the First Amendment. 
( ..  The NSA is one of  the shadowiest of  the US intelligence agencies.  Until a few years ago,  it 
existence was a secret and its charter and any mention of  its duties are still classified. However, 
it does have a Web site (www.nsa.gov:8080) in which it describes itself  as being responsible for 
the signals intelligence and communications security activities of  the US government. One of  its 
bases, Menwith Hill, was to become the biggest spy station in the world. Its ears -- known as 
radomes -- are capable of  listening in to vast chunks of  the communications spectrum throughout 
Europe and the old Soviet Union 
In its first decade the base sucked data from cables and microwave links running through a 
nearby Post Office tower,  but the communications revolutions of  the Seventies and Eighties gave 
the base a capability that even its architects could scarcely have been able to imagine.  With the 
creation of  Intelsat and digital telecommunications, Menwith and other stations developed the 
capability to eavesdrop on an extensive scale on fax,  telex and voice messages. Then,  with the 
development of  the Internet, electronic mail and electronic commerce, the listening posts were 
able to increase their monitoring capability to eavesdrop on an unprecedented spectrum of 
personal and business communications. 
This activity has been all but ignored by the UK Parliament.  When Labour MPs raised questions 
about the activities of  the NSA,  the Government invoked secrecy rules. It has been the same for 
40years  .... ) 
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(Simon Davis report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk) 
The FBI has not let up on efforts to ban products on which it cannot eavesdrop. In mid-1997, it introduced 
legislation to mandate that key-recovery systems be built into all computer systems. The amendment was 
adopted by several congressional Committees but the Senate preferred a weaker variant. A concerted 
campaign by computer, telephone and privacy groups finally stopped the proposal; it now appears that no 
legislation will be enacted in the current Congress. 
While the key escrow approach was being pushed in the USA, Washington had approached foreign 
organisations and states. The linchpin for the campaign was David Aaron, US ambassador to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), who visited dozens of  countries in 
what one analyst derided as a programme of  'laundering failed US policy through international bodies to 
give it greater acceptance'. 
Led by Germany and the Scandinavians, the EU has been generally distrustful of  key escrow technology. In 
October 1997, the European Commission released a report which advised: 'Restricting the use of  encryption 
could well prevent law-abiding companies and citizens from protecting themselves against criminal attacks. 
It would not, however, totally prevent criminals from using these technologies.' The report noted that 
'privacy considerations suggest limit the use of  cryptography as a means to ensure data security and 
confidentiality'. 
Some European countries have or are contemplating independent restrictions. France had a longstanding 
ban on the use of  any cryptography to which the government does not have access. However, a 1996 law, 
modified the existing system, allowing a system of  "tiers du confidence", although it has not been 
implemented, because of  EU opposition. In 1997, the Conservative government in the UK introduced a 
proposal creating a system of  trusted third parties. 
It was severely criticised at the time and by the new Labour government, which has not yet acted upon its 
predecessor's recommendations. The debate over encryption and the conflicting demands of  security and 
privacy are bound to continue. The commercial future of  the Internet depends on a universally-accepted and 
foolproof method of  on-line identification; as of  now, the only means of  providing it is through strong 
encryption. That put the US government and some of  the world's largest corporations, notably Microsoft, 
on a collision course. (Report of  David Banisar, Deputy director of  Privacy International and Simon 
Davies, Director General of  Privacy International). 
The issue of  encryption divides the member states of  the European Union. Last October the European 
Commission published a report entitled: "Ensuring security and Trust in Electronic Commerce", which 
argued that the advantages of  allowing law enforcement agencies access to encrypted messages are not 
clear and could cause considerable damage to the emerging electronic industry. It says that if  citizens and 
companies "fear that their communications and transactions are being monitored with the help of  key 
access or similar schemes unduly enlarging the general surveillance possibility of  government agencies, 
they may prefer to remaining in the anonymous off-line world and electronic commerce will just not 
happen". 
However, Mr Straw said in Birmingham (JHA Informal JHA Ministers) that: "It would not be in the public 
interest to allow the improper use of  encryption by criminals to be totally immune from the attention of  law 
enforcement agencies". The UK, along with France (which already has a law obliging individuals to use 
"crackable" software) and the USA, is out on a limb in the EU. "The UK presidency has a particular view 
and they are one of  the access hard-liners. They want access: "them and the French", commented an 
encryption expert. They are particularly about "confidential services" which ensure that a message can only 
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be read by the person for whom it is intended who has a "key" to access it. The Commission's report 
proposes "monitoring" Member States laws' on "confidential services" to ensure they do not contravene the 
rules of  the single market. 
Examples of  Abuse of  Economic Information 
In the course of  collecting the data for and preparing this Interim Study various examples were cited of 
abuse of  privacy via global surveillance telecommunication systems. A number of  them is given in [54]. 
For the final version of  the study, we shall see whether the experts have further comments to make on these 
examples, or whether they have new examples to suggest. 
The consultation of  experts in our survey so far yielded the following comments: 
•  Since Internet has come to play a significant role in global commerce, then (as in Examples 1,  2,  3 
and 4 cited below) Internet also became a tool of  misleading information and a platform for deceitful 
advertisement. 
•  On the positive side, Internet is a "golden highway"  for those interested in the process of  information. 
•  However, apart from global surveillance technology systems, additional tools have been developed 
for surveillance. The additional tool used  for information transferred via Internet or via Digital 
Global telecommunication systems is the capture of  data with Taiga software. Taiga software has the 
possibility to capture, process and analyse multilingual information in a very short period of  time (I 
billion characters per second), using key-words. 
The examples given below are taken from the sources named: 
Example 1 
On January 15, 1990, the telephone network of  AT&T company, in all the North-east part of  USA faced 
serious difficulties. The network NuPrometheus had illegally owned and distributed the key-code of  the 
operational system of  AT&T Macintosh computer (Apple company). 
J.P. Barlow: "A not terribly brief  history of  the Electronic Frontier Foundation," 8 November 
1990 
Example 2 
On January 24, 1990, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in USA, accused a huge police operation 
under the encoded name "Sun Devil", in which 40 computers and 23,000 diskettes were seized from 
teenagers, in 15 towns within USA. Teenager Craig Neidorf supported by EFF, not to be punished in 60 
years prison and 120,000 USD penalty. Craig Neidorfhad published in Phrack (a hackers magazine) part of 
the internal files of  a telephone company. 
M.  Godwin: "The EFF and virtual communities," 1991 
Example3 
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On June 25, 1998, in Absheim, an aircraft A-320 of  the European Company "Airbus Industries" crashed 
during a demonstration flight. The accident was reportedly caused by dangerous manoeuvres. One person 
died and 20 were injured. 
Very soon afterwards, and before the announcement of  the official report, in the aerospace and transport 
Internet news  groups there appeared many hostile messages against the Airbus undertaking and against the 
French company Aerospatiale as well, with which Airbus had close cooperation. Messages declared that the 
accident was to be expected because European engineers are not so highly qualified as American engineers. 
It was also clearly stated, that in the future similar accidents were to be expected. 
Aerospatiale's representatives took these hostile messages very seriously. They tried to discover the sources 
of  messages and they finally realised that senders' identification data, addresses and nodes were false. The 
source messages came from USA, from computers with misleading identification data and transferred from 
anonymous servers in Finland. 
B. Martnet and Y.M. Marti: "L 'intelligence econimique. Les yeux et les oreilles de 1' 
enterprise, Editions d'organisation". Paris 1995 
Example4 
In October 31, 1994, in USA, an accident occurred to an ATR aircraft (ofthe European Consortium 
Aeritalia and Aerospatiale  ). Owing to this accident, a ban on A  TR flights for two months was imposed. 
This decision became catastrophic on a commercial level for the company, because ATR was obliged to 
carry out test flights in fog conditions. 
During this period, in Internet newsgroups (and especially in the AVSIG forum, supported by 
Compuserve  ), the exchange of  messages was of  vital significance. The messages supporting the European 
company were few, while the messages against ATR were many. 
At the beginning of  January 1995, there appeared a message from a journalist in this forum asking the 
following: "I have heard that A  TR flights will begin soon. Can anybody confirm this information?" The 
answer came very soon. Three days after, unexpectedly, permission to continue ATR flights was given. The 
company learned this, as soon as the permission announced. But if  they had actively participated in the 
newsgroups, they would have gained some days to inform their offices and their clients. 
"Des langages pour analyser Ia poussiere d' info", Liberation, 9 June 1995 
ExampleS 
The government ofBrasil in 1994, announced its intention to assign an international contract (Amazonios). 
This procurement was of  great interest since the total amount available for the contract was 1  ,4 billion 
USD. From Europe, the French companies Thomson and Alcatel expressed their interest and from USA, 
the huge weapon industry Raytheon. Although the offer of  the French companies was technically excellent 
and allegedly better documented, the contract was eventually assigned to the USA company. It was reported 
in the press that this was achieved with a new offensive strategy used by USA. When the government of 
Brazil was about to assign the contract to the French companies, American Officials (allegedly with the 
personal involvement of  President Bill Clinton) readjusted their offer, according to the offer of  the 
European companies, and asserted that French companies influenced the committee, an accusation which 
was never proved. On the other hand, the European companies were reported to have indications that the 
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intention of  the government of  Brazil to assign the contract to the European companies became known to 
Americans with the use of  FBI's surveillance technologies. 
"La nouvelle machine de querre americaine", LeMonde du reseingnement no 158, 16 
February 1995 
Example6 
In January 1994 Edouard Balladur, French Prime Minister, went to Ryadh (Saudi Arabia), feeling certain to 
bring back a historic contract for more than 30 million francs in sale of  weapons and, especially, Airbus. He 
returned disappointed. The contract went to the McDonnell-Douglas American company, rival of  Airbus. 
The French were report to believe that this was at least in part due to electronic surveillance by the 
ECHELON system, which had given to the Americans the financial conditions and incentives authorised by 
Airbus. 
French press reports said the National Security Agency is the most secret and most significant of  the 
thirteen secret agencies of  the United States. It receives about a third of  the appropriations allocated with 
clandestine intelligence: 8 of  the 26,6 billion dollars (160 18 billion francs) registered appropriations in the 
1997 budget. With its 20.000 employees in United States and some thousands of  agents throughout the 
world, the NSA (which forms part of  ministry for Defence since its creation in 1956) is more important 
than the CIA, even if  the latter is better known to the public. Its site at Fort Meade contains, according to 
sources familiar with the place, the greatest concentration of  data processing power and mathematicians in 
the world. They are employed to sort and analyse the flood of  data acquired by ECHELON on the networks 
of  international telecommunications. 
"Echelon est au service des interets americains ", Liberation, 21 Apri/1998 
PART C: TECHNICAL FILE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance and Privacv 
Surveillance is the systematic investigation or monitoring of  the actions or communications of  one or more 
persons. It has traditionally been undertaken by physical means (e.g. prison guards on towers). In recent 
decades it has been enhanced through image amplification devices such as binoculars and high-resolution 
satellite cameras. 
The basic born [sic} physical surveillance comprises watching (visual surveillance) and listening (aural 
surveillance). Monitoring may be undertaken remotely in space, with the aid of  image amplification devices 
like field glasses, infrared binoculars, light amplifiers and satellite cameras and sound amplification devices 
like directional microphones; and remotely in time with the aid of  image and sound recording devices. 
Electronic devices have been developed to augment physical surveillance and offer new possibilities such 
as closed-circuit TV (CCTV), VCR, telephone bugging, Proximity cards, Electronic Database, etc. 
In addition to physical surveillance, several kinds of  communications surveillance are practiced, including 
mail covers and telephone interception. 
• 
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The popular term electronic surveillance refers to both augmentations to physical surveillance (such as 
directional microphones and audio bugs) and to communication surveillance, particularly telephone taps. 
The recent years have seen the emergence and refinement of  a new form of  surveillance no longer of  the 
real person, but of  the person's data shadow or digital persona. Data surveillance or Dataveillance is the 
systematic use of  personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of  the actions or communications 
of  one or more persons. Dataveillance is significantly lees expensive than physical and electronic 
surveillance, because it can be automated. As a result, the economic constraints on surveillance are 
diminished and more individuals and larger populations are capable of  being monitored. Like surveillance, 
more generally, Dataveillance is of  two kinds: "personal Dataveillance", where a particular person has been 
previously identified as being of  interest, "mass Dataveillance", where a group or large population is 
monitored, in order to detect individuals of  interest, and I or to deter people from stepping out of  line. 
Surveillance technology systems are mechanisms, which can identify, monitor and track movements and 
data. During the last few decades since information technology has become immensely sophisticated real 
benefits have been achieved in the development of  surveillance technology systems. 
On the other hand, negative impacts have been considerable: 
The application of  IT to the surveillance of  people through their data. 
IT technology may have substantial implications in privacy. 
People often think of  privacy as some kind of  right. Unfortunately, the concept of  a "right" is a problematic 
way to start, became a right seems to be some kind of  absolute standard. What's worse, is very easy to get 
confused between legal rights on one hand and natural or moral rights on the other. It turns out to be much 
more useful to think about privacy as one kind of  thing (among many kinds of  things) that people like to 
have lots of. 
Privacy the interest that individuals have in sustaining a "personal space" free from interference by other 
people and organizations. 
To a deeper level privacy turns out not to be a single interest but rather has several dimensions: 
•  privacy of  the person 
•  privacy of  personal behavior 
•  privacy of  personal communications 
•  privacy of  personal data 
With the close coupling that has occurred between computing and communications, particularly since the 
1980's the last two aspects have become closely linked, and are commonly referred as information privacy. 
Information privacy is the interest an individual has in controlling, or at least significantly influencing the 
handling of  data about themselves. 
The term 'data privacy' is sometimes used in the same way. 'Data' refers to inert numbers, where 
information implies the use of  data by humans to extract meaning; hence 'information privacy' is arguably 
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the more descriptive way of  the two alternatives. 
'Confidentiality' is an incidental and wholly inadequate substitute for proper information privacy, 
protection, where: 
'Confidentiality is the legal duty of  individuals who come into the procession of  information 
about others, especially in the course of  particular kinds of  relationships with them'. 
Dataveillance Techniques 
A variety of  Dataveillnce techniques exists. Front-end verification (FEV), for example, comprises the 
checking of  data supplied by an applicant (e.g. for a loan or government benefit) against data from a variety 
of  additional sources, in order to identify discrepancies. 
FEV may be applied as a person dataveillance tool where responsible grounds exist for suspecting that the 
information the person has provided may be unreliable; where, on the other hand, it is applied to every 
applicant, mass dataveillance is being undertaken. Data matching is a facilitative mechanism of  particular 
value in mass dataveillance. It involves trawling through large volumes of  data collected for different 
purposes, searching for discrepancies and drawing influences from them. 
Personal dataveillance of  previously identified individuals 
•  integration of  data hitherto stored in various locations within a single organization 
•  screening or authentication of  transactions against internal norms 
•  front-end verification of  transactions that appear to be exceptional, against data relevant to 
the matter at hand. and sought from other databases or from third parties. 
•  front-end audit of  individuals who appear to be exceptional against data related to other 
databases or from third parties. 
•  cross-system enforcement against individuals, where a third party reports that the individual 
has committed a transgression in his or her relationship with the third party. 
Mass dataveillance of  groups of  people. 
•  screening or authentication of  all transactions, where or not they appear to be exceptional, 
against internal norms 
•  front-end verification of  all transactions, whether or not they appear to be exceptional 
against data relevant to the matter at hand, as sought from other internal databases or from 
third parties. 
•  front-end audit of  individuals, whether or not they appear to be exceptional against data 
relevant to the matter at hand, as sought from other internal databases or from third parties. 
•  single-factor file analysis of  all data held or able to be acquired, whether or not they appear 
to be exceptional, variously involving transaction data compared against a norm, permanent 
data or other transaction data. 
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•  profiling or multi-factor file analysis of  all data held or able to acquire, whether or not they 
appear to be exceptional, variously involving singular profiling of  data held at a point in 
time, or aggregative profiling of  transaction trails over time. 
Facilitative mechanisms could be: 
•  computer data matching, in which personal data records relating to many people are 
compared in order to identify cases of  interest 
•  data concentration, homely the combination of  personal data interchange networks and hub 
systems. 
Risks inllerent in Data Surveillance 
Data surveillance's broader social impacts can be grouped as follows: 
In personal dataveillance 
•  low data quickly decisions [sic] 
•  lack of  subject knowledge of, and consent to, data flows 
•  blacklisting 
•  denial ofredemsion [sic} 
In mass surveillance 
a. Risks to the individuals: 
•  arbitrariness 
•  a contextual data merger 
•  complexity and incomprehensibility of  data 
•  witch hunts 
•  ex-ante discrimination and guilt prediction 
•  selective advertising 
•  inversion of  the onus of  proof 
•  covert operations 
•  unknown accusations and accusers 
•  denial of  due process 
b. Risks to society: 
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•  prevailing climate of  suspicion 
•  adversarial relationships 
•  focus of  law enforcement on easily detectable and provable offences 
•  inequitable application of  the law 
•  decreased respect for the law and low enforcers 
•  reduction in the meaningfulness of  individual actions 
•  reduction in self-reliance and self-determination 
•  stultification of  originality 
•  increased tendency to opt out of  the official level of  society 
•  weakening of  society's moral fibre and cohesion 
•  destabilization of  the strategic balance of 
•  power repressive potential for the totalitarian government. 
By way of  example, individuals can suffer as a result of  misunderstandings about the meaning of  data on 
the file, or because the file contains erroneous data, which the individual does not understand and against 
which he I she has little or not chance of  arguing without the help of  a specialized lawyer. 
Such seemingly small, but potentially very frustrating and infuriating personal problems can escalate into 
widespread distrust by people of  government agencies and the legal system as a whole 
Of  course, many of  the risks referred are diffuse. On the other hand, there is a critical economic difference 
between conventional forms of  surveillance and Dataveillance. 
Physical surveillance is expensive because it requires the application of  considerable resources. Although 
(with few exceptions), this expense has been sufficient to restrict the use of  surveillance. Admittedly the 
selection criteria used by the surveillance agencies have not always accorded with what the citizenry might 
have preferred, but at least its extent was limited. The effect was that in most countries the abuses affected 
particular individuals who had attracted the attention of  the state, but were not so pervasive that artistic and 
potential freedoms were widely constrained. 
DataveUlance changes all that. Dataveillance is relatively very cheap and getting cheaper all the time, 
thanks to progress in information technology. The economic limitations are overcome and the digital 
persona can be monitored with thoroughness and frequency and surveillance extended to whole 
populations. Nowadays, a number of  particular populations have attracted the bulk of  the attention, because 
the state already processed substantial data - holdings about them. There are social welfare recipients and 
employers of  the state. Now that techniques have been refined, they are being pressed into more general 
usage, in the private as well in the public sector. 
Controls 
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If  dataveillance is burgeoning, controls are needed to ensure that its use is not excessive or unfair. There is 
a variety of  natural or intrinsic controls, such as self-restraint and morality. Unfortunately morality has been 
shown many times to be an entirely inadequate influence over people's behaviour. There is also the 
economic constraint, whereby work that isn't worth doing tends not to get done, because people perceive 
better things to do with the same scarce resources. Regrettably this too is largely ineffective. Cost/benefit 
analysis of  dataveillance measures is seldom performed, and when it has been the quality has generally 
been appalling. This reflects the dominance of  political over economic considerations -- both politicians 
and public servants want action to be seen to be being taken, and are less concerned about its effectiveness 
than its visibility. 
If  intrinsic controls are inadequate, extrinsic measures are vital. For example, the codes of  ethics of 
professional bodies and industry associations could be of  assistance. Regrettably, these are generally years 
behind the problems, and largely statements of  aspiration rather than operational guidelines and actionable 
statements of  what is and is not acceptable behaviour. Over twenty years after the information privacy 
movement gathered steam, there are few and very limited laws which make dataveillance activities illegal, 
or which enable regulatory agencies or the public to sue transgressing organisations. A (limited) statute 
exists at national level, but none at all at the level of  State Governments. In any case, statutory regimes are 
often weak due to the power of  data-using lobbies, the lack of  organisation of  the public, and the lack of 
comprehension and interest by politicians. The public has demonstrated itself as being unable to focus on 
complex issues; public apathy is only overcome when a proposal is presented simply and starkly, such as 
'the State is proposing to issue you with a plastic card. You will need to produce it whenever anyone asks 
you to demonstrate that you have Permission to breathe'. 
There is a tendency for dataveillance tools to be developed in advanced nations, which have democratic 
traditions and processes (however imperfect). There is a further tendency for the technology to be exported 
to less developed countries. 
Many of  these have less well-developed democratic traditions, more authoritarian and even repressive 
regimes. The control mechanisms in advanced western democracies are inadequate to cope with 
sophisticated dataveillance technologies; in third world countries there is very little chance indeed of  new 
extrinsic controls being established to ensure balance in their application. It appears that some third-world 
countries may be being used as test-beds for new dataveillance technologies. 
~--------------
2. SURVEILLANCE: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES - Current technologies 
Surveillance is using some of  the most advanced and sophisticated technology to keep track of  individuals; 
where they go, what they do and even what they say. 
Visual and audio surveillance are almost everywhere, and, modem electronic technology gives the 
possibility of  keeping track of  individual's moments without cameras or microphones, just with surveillance 
of  their .data (Dataveillance ) 
1.  Visual Surveillance 
Closed-circuit TV (CCTV) is the most common electronic visual surveillance technique. 
Recording can be in two modes: real-time or time-lapse. Real-time is regular TV (at 30 frames (second) 
showing full motion). Time-lapse selects only a few frames per time period, perhaps one or two per second, 
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to record. The advantage of  time-lapse is that it allows one tape to record for a much longer time than real 
time recording 
Video electronics can be very sophisticated indeed and the recent trend is digital video. This allows using 
the QUAD recording system, a method of  compressing four separate camera images into a single frame, so 
that the guard could see all four views on the monitor screen and record them on a VCR (Video Cassette 
Recorder) at the same time. These systems allow detailed surveillance and plant monitoring, so that 
responsibles can observe everything happening within the facility. 
In the previous years may be, only the entrance (or specific spaces) would be under video surveillance. 
Now it is possible to have surveillance everywhere. Using hard disks instead of  videotape allows keeping a 
record of  several month's worth of  time-lapse video. 
Cameras also are much more sophisticated today than years ago. New circuits allow the camera to ignore 
bright, light-emitting objects within their fields of  view. Miniaturization allows easier concealment, 
infra-red cameras allow surveillance in darkness. Video surveillance is portable as well. The old days of 
concealing a camcorder in a briefcase or duffel bag have given way to subminiature cameras concealed in 
neckties and other items. Decoy items (items containing the surveillance equipment) include baseball caps, 
belt buckles, briefcases, eyeglasses and wristwatches. 
CCTV is very quickly becoming an internal part of  crime control policy, social control theory and 
Community consciousness. It is promoted by police and politicians as primary solution for urban 
dysfunction. 
They are now used in many areas, including roads, trains, railway platforms, car parks, loading docks, 
shopping centers, individual retail stores, banks, automatic teller machines, petrol stations, lifts, lobby 
areas, cash handling and storage areas and employee recreation rooms. 
Within the aims of  the contract, this study looks at its usage in five main industrial contexts: retail stores, 
financial services, manufacturing, warehousing and distribution, larger office buildings and leisure and 
entertainment complexes. 
Video surveillance is used in these industries for several reasons: 
•  to minimize the risk of  theft, especially in the retail industry for purposes of  deterring and detecting 
crime 
•  protect premises from threats to property such as sabotage, arson and vandalism 
•  to monitor individual employee work performance 
•  to improve customer service by observing peak periods and planning the allocation of  staff  throughout 
the day 
•  to assist in staff  training 
•  to enhance health and safety standards 
•  to ensure that employees comply with legal obligations 
•  to protect employers from liability claims 
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•  to monitor production processes. 
Most surveillance systems are being installed to prevent theft, either by outsiders or employees, but, video 
surveillance systems often are used for a range of  purposes beyond what was originally intended. 
Surveillance systems which are initially installed for the purpose of  protecting property against an external 
security threat can be used for other purposes, such as to monitor employees' productivity and work 
behavior. 
The routine use of  video surveillance has the potential to undermine employees' sense of  privacy and 
dignity in the workplace. Surveillance is associated with increased levels of  stress, undermining morale and 
creating distrust and suspicion between employees and management. While it may be an effective 
instrument to protect an employer from external security threats, it is not appropriate as a means of 
monitoring individual employee performance. 
Covert surveillance with a smaller number of  hidden cameras may in fact be a much popular and at the 
same time cheaper option than a general security system. 
Some of  the justifications offered for covert video surveillance are: 
•  employers have a right to protect their business interests 
•  covert surveillance affect fewer employees than overt surveillance and is much cheaper 
•  if  employees are unaware of  surveillance, there is less risk of  individual disputation 
•  covert surveillance is often the most effective means of  detecting unlawful activity. 
2. Audio Surveillance 
Audio surveillance is no longer merely an arcane art practiced by spies and private detectives. Today, it's 
common place and spreading. Tape recorders are a fact of  life, and they're often used to document a 
transaction. Trying to telephone some companies and some government agencies there is a recording sign 
says: "This transaction is being recorded to help us assure ... ". 
In some companies the real purpose of  tape recording conversation is to check how may the handle an hour, 
and to have evidence in case the customer says something that can used against him. 
In prisons, officials often use electronic equipment to record all telephone conversations. Some of  these are 
between lawyer and client, but all they go onto tape. It depends on the ethics of  the guards whether they 
listen or not. 
They are "hi2h tech voice recorders" that put every conversation on a CD disk. A model made for 
correctional use is the "Laser voice", using optional disk voice recording. 
"Tube mike" is an electric device for "bugging" a room, motor vehicle, or other premises. It is a plastic 
tube passed through a small hole in a wall to conduct sound from the room to a small microphone at the 
other end. 
This could be characterized as "non- access surveillance". 
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"Tube microphones" come in all sizes. Some are relatively large plastic tubes (about 1/2" in diameter), but 
for tight spaces or maximum concealment there are "needle microphones" pressed against a wall to hear 
sounds in the next room. 
If  there is access to a room, a bug could be planted almost anywhere, even in the subject's clothing. "Radio 
mikes" transmit whatever they pick up to a nearby receiver eliminating the need for tell-tale wires. Their 
only drawback, if  they're totally self-contained, is battery life. Other models fit into wall plugs, and take 
their power from the house current 
One type of  portable radio mike is the size and shape of  a credit card, with a range of  several hundred feet 
and a 30-hour battery life. Placed into the beast pocket of  the subjects jacket, it permits monitoring a 
conversation held outdoors. The value of  this is that many people think its possible to overhear a 
conversation held on the street or in a park, and that walking will defeat any prospect of  a bug planted 
nearby. 
In the open market there are several models of"2immicked telephones" that use in the built in microphone 
to pick up any conversation in the room even when the telephone is not in use. 
All the types of  audio surveillance with miscellaneous bugging devices described before, are used today 
mainly in police and internal security agencies (such as FBI, NSA etc) or in companies security 
departments. 
Telephone tapping still exists, but with today's Electronic Switching System (ESS) its no longer necessary 
to go out and physically tap a person's telephone line. 
3. Phone Taopine and EncO!J!Iion 
Whenever a telephone line is tapped the privacy of  the persons at both ends of  the line is invaded and all 
conversations between them upon any subject and although proper, confidential and privileged rna be 
overheard. 
The phone tapping normally used for surveillance of  communications to combat "serious crime" and to 
protect "national security". 
On the other hand often companies keep records of  phone numbers calls and the duration of  such calls. In 
some companies these records are used to gauge job performance, while in others it simply allows 
employees to review calls and reimburse the employer for calls of  a purely personal nature. 
4.  Voice and Word Pattern Recoenition 
Since it is no possible for an Agency or organization to employ a staff large enough to listen to all 
telephone conversations, read all faxes, etc, word recognition has to be computerized. 
In this case a central computer could monitor all (or a group) of  telephone conversations and recognize 
those in which the agency had an interest by using voice patterns and key words. 
A wide variety of  techniques are used to perform speech recognition. Typically speech recognition starts 
with the digital sampling of  speech. The next stage is acoustic signal processing. Most techniques include 
spectral analysis e.g. LPC (Linear Predictive Coding), MFCC (Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients) 
cochlea modeling and many more. 
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The next stage is recognition of  phonemes, groups of  phonemes and words. This stage can be achieved by 
many processes such as DTW (Dynamic Time Warping), HMM (Hidden Markov modeling), expert 
systems and combination of  techniques. 
Most systems utilize some knowledge of  the language to aid the recognition process. Some systems try to 
"understand" speech. That is try to convert the words into a representation of  what the speaker intended to 
mean or achieve by what they said. 
Voice and pattern recognition used as an advanced tool and a helpful technique (thanks to the IT) for 
surveillance of  communications to combat "serious crime" or to protect "national security" 
5. Proximity Smart Cards 
Originally, electronic cards were substitutes for keys, which were too easy to reproduce. A metal key blank 
and a file where all that were necessary to duplicate a key, but more sophisticated equipment is necessary to 
duplicate even the simplest sort of  electronic card. 
The first type of  electronic card used barium ferrite as magnetic dots embedded in the magnetic layer. This 
was a significant advance over punched cards, that were relatively easy to duplicate. 
In the early 1970s, magnetic stripe cards were produced (by IBM), which are still used in credit cards and 
are somewhat more secure. However, they're still too easy to forge and should pass through a magnetic 
stripe reader. 
In the early 1980s, the advent of  Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) technology, resulted in 
what quickly become known as "smart card" which could hold a variety of  codes and information to make 
misuse or duplication almost impossible. This was the first "proximitv card", which did not require direct 
contact through a card recorder. 
The proximity card is basically a "transponder" an electronic device that replies to a radio signal that 
"interrogates" it. The extended range model doesn't require even placing it near the card reader, as it 
transmits to a receiver several feet away. 
Use of  proximity smart card as Transport card I E-purse 
•  Transportation companies use the proximity smart cards to replace metro, bus, train tickets and 
boarding cards, etc. 
•  The proximity smart card results in considerable time saving by greatly increasing passenger flow 
without diminishing security 
•  With the contact part of  the card, the proximity smart card is perfectly suited to financial transactions 
involving small amounts of  money: automatic vending cafeterias, local shops, parking fees, cinemas, 
recreation I amusement parks, cultural and sports centers etc. 
Use of  proximity smart card as Access control I ID card 
•  The company Proximity smart card contains data used to identify cardholders, as well as his own 
different access rights. The contactless part of  the card is used to access building and other protected 
areas. 
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•  The contact portion can be used for network access, such as the Internet. With the electronic purse 
function it can be used in the company restaurant, at automatic vending machines, just like a 
traditional multi  -service card. 
One application, although, extends the proximity card's usefulness by turning it into a tracking device. 
Proximity readers installed along the walls of  a building allow tracking each card within the facility. If 
somebody is carrying one of  these cards within a building so equipped, the central computer can sense 
exactly where he (she is at all times). There is a record of  which area the employee (or visitor) is in, when 
he leaves, and where else within the building he may go. If  the employee goes to the cafeteria, the computer 
will log when he lefts his work station, how long it took him to get to the cafeteria, which root he took, how 
long he remained in the cafeteria, when he started back and by which route, and when he arrived back in his 
work area. Likewise if  he went to the bathroom. The computer can record whether he/she went to the men's 
room or the ladies' room. 
Many countries are actively considering adopting national ID cards for the variety of  functions. These 
include the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. 
There are ID cards (credit cards) used for digital cash service which is supposed to be "anonymous". But, it 
appears that the bank and the merchants could find the identity of  the users. 
The customer is identified to the trader and ultimate to the bank by the 300 previous transactions. Each of 
these will soon be superseded by further transactions and drop off  end of  the list. 
These can be monitored by the bank and could be used for marketing purposes. This is the audit trail and 
could be sold to business users for third party marketing. 
6.  Transmitter Location 
When a telephone or mobile phone used, the location of  the user could be identified. The science of 
location radio uses three methods of  finding a transmitter. The oldest is triangulation, in which several 
receiving stations with directional antennas take bearing on a transmission and communicate the bearing to 
a central plotting room. 
Technicians trace each bearing on a map of  the area and the intersection of  the bearing pinpoints the 
location of  the transmitter. 
The second method requires several receives as well, and works by measuring the relative strengths of 
signals received. A computer analyses the strengths and determines the location of  the transmitter 
The third method also requires a computer-controlled chain of  receives and measures the minute 
differences in the time the signal arrives at each receiver. 
Formerly classified, these techniques are now available on the civilian market for law enforcement and 
private security. One application is locating stolen cars by pinpointing radio transmitters installed in the 
vehicle for this purpose. 
Location of  cellular phones in another application. Police today are using (in some countries) this 
application to pinpoint the location of  cellphone users. Purportedly, this is to speed emergency response 
when a citizen calls for help (at home or in the road). Once the equipment is in place, it can, and must, 
serve other purposes. Criminal investigators will be able to pinpoint a specific cellphone each time the 
caller uses it, this will help an investigation into a stolen cell  phone, or help locate wanted persons unwise 
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enough to use cellphone or mobile phone. 
Another device, sold only to police, is the "cellphone ESN Reader", which reads the numbers of  the 
targeted cellphone. This detects and records the cellular phone number, called number and ESN of  the 
target phone of  a ranges of  up to two miles. 
Theoretically, the technology can locate every cell  phone and every mobile phone in the country every time 
someone makes a call on it (for cellphones) or just open it (for mobile phones). 
7.  E-mail at workplace 
Personal messages the employee sent over his company's e-mail are not private. They are not, and court 
decisions have held that they're not. 
It is a safe assumption that companies will keep an increasingly watchful eye on their internal email, and 
scrutinize what employees are saying to each other. It is easy to see that some companies may find that 
scrutinising staff e-mail can have more than one advantage for a company management. Originally 
instigated to avoid liability, reading employee's e-mail can also serve to alert management of  dishonesty, 
disloyalty or even matters like union activity. 
8. Electronic Databases 
The computer age has brought surveillance into a new era in which information about almost anybody is 
available to almost anybody. 
Databases from Human Identification 
There are a lot of  government databases containing information about almost every resident in United 
States and in many European Countries as well. 
A variety of  person identification techniques are available, which can assist in associating data with them. 
Important examples of  these techniques are: 
•  names (what the person is called by other people) 
•  codes (what the person is called by the organization) 
•  knowledge (what the person knows) 
•  biometrics (what the person is, does, or looks like e.g. appearance, natural physiography, etc.) 
Data bases for financial surveillance 
Financial records are gathered privately by several giant companies that specialize in this sort of 
information. These "credit reporting bureaus" purportedly maintain credit records, but in fact keep far more 
than credit information in their databases. 
Other databases for human identification 
There exist specialized databases available mainly to private investigators. These call information from 
telephone directories, city directories, voter registration records and many other public and private records 
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to provide a profile of  the person being investigated. 
9.  The Internet 
The Internet, which began as a Computer communication network between Universities and laboratories 
decades ago, has turned into a vast public forum accessible to anyone with a computer. 
International organizations, Public authorities, Companies, Universities, Research centers and individuals 
have access and exploit the Internet. 
On the other hand Internet became: 
•  an entertainment tool 
•  a huge Information source 
•  an important marketing tool 
•  a big virtual electronic market with a considerable number of  economic transactions every second 
IT technology at the same time, restricted the individuals' right to privacy since they could be identified 
through their ID number or through their records or transactions. 
The growing rift between the needs of  Internet Commerce and the individual's right to privacy gave rise to 
the development of  new tools. 
In January 1999 Intel announced its plans for the development of  a microchip containing embedded 
electronic serial numbers that allow individual computers to be readily identified. 
The identities, similar to the unique vehicle identification numbers on cars and trucks would be a caller ID 
technology for computer. 
But critics see it is on an ominous development, ushering in a new period of  electronic surveillance. 
Privacy experts fear the new Intel chip could mean the death of  anonymity on the Internet. 
But this would appear to really variously endanger privacy on the Internet by creating a permanent ID 
number for every Intel user on the Net. 
3. THE USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS FOR THE 
TRANSMISSION AND COLLECTION OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION 
As the Internet and other communication systems reach further into the everyday lives, national security, 
low enforcement and individual privacy have become perilously intertwined. Governments want to restrict 
the free flow of  information and software producers are seeking ways to ensure consumers are not bugged 
from the moment of  purchases. 
All developing communication technologies, digital telephone switches cellular and satellite phones HAVE 
SURVEILLANCE CAP  ABILITIES. On the other hand the development of  software that contains 
encryption, a telephone which allows people to scramble their communications and files to prevent others 
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from reading them gourd earth [sic]. 
3.1 CALEA svstem 
The first effort to heighten surveillance opportunities (made by USA) was to force telecommunication 
companies to use equipment desired to include enhanced wiretapping capabilities. 
In the late 1980s in a program known internally as "Operation Root Canal" US low enforcement officials 
demanded that telephone companies alter their equipment to facilitate the interception of  messages. The 
companies refused but, after several years of  lobbying, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement ACT (CALEA) in 1994. 
CALEA requires that terrestrial cellular phone services and other entities ensure that all their equipment, 
facilities or services are capable of  expeditiously, enabling the government to intercept all wire and oral 
communications varied by the carrier concurrently with their transmission. 
Communications must be interceptable in such a form that they could be transmitted to a remote 
government facility. Manufactures must work with industry and low enforcement officials to ensure that 
their equipment meets federal standards. 
The passage of  CALEA has been controversial, but its provisions have yet to be enforced due to FBI efforts 
to include even more rigorous regulations under the law. These include: the requirement, the cell phones 
allow for location- tracking on demand and that telephone companies provide capacity for up to 50.000 
simultaneous wiretaps. 
CALEA finally has been accepted as an International standard in US. In 1991 the FBI contacted EU 
member states in order to propose to them do incorporate CALEA into European Law. This plan according 
to an EU report, was to call for the Western World (EU, US and allies) to agree to norms and procedures 
and then sell their products to Third World countries. There is a council resolution that was adopted on 17 
January 1997 on the lawful interception of  communications (961C329/a). The US government is now in 
negotiations with the International Telecommunications Unit (ITU) to adopt the standards globally. 
3.2 ECHELON Connection 
The previous STOA Interim Study (PE 166.499) entitled "An Appraisal of  technologies of  poLitical control" 
made certain statements concerning the ECHELON global surveillance system. This is reported to be a 
world-wide surveillance system designed and coordinated by the US NSA (National Security Agency) that 
intercepts e-mail, fax, telex and international telephone communications carried via satellites and has been 
operating since the early 1980s- it is part of  the post Cold War developments based on the UK-USA 
agreement signed between the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1948. 
The five agencies said to be involved are: the US National Security Agency (NSA), the Government 
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) in New Zealand, Government Communications Headquarters 
Signals Directorate (DSD) in Australia. The system was brought to light by the author Nicky Hager in his 
1996 book Secret Power: New Zealand's role in the International Spy Network. For this, he interviewed 
more than 50 people who work or have worked in intelligence who are concerned at the uses of 
ECHELON. It is said that "The ECHELON system is not designed to eavesdrop on a particular individual's 
e-mail or fax link. Rather, the system works by indiscriminately intercepting very large quantities of 
communications and using computers to identify and extract messages from the mass of  unwanted ones". 
According to Interim Study (PE 166.499) of 1998, there are reported to be three components to ECHELON: 
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1. The monitoring of  Intelsats, international telecommunications satellites used by phone 
· companies In most countries. A key ECHELON station is at Morwenstow in Cornwall 
monitoring Europe, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. 
2. ECHELON interception of  non-Intelsat regional communication satellites. Key monitoring 
stations are Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Bad Aibling in Germany. 
3. The final element of  the ECHELON system is the surveillance of  land-based or under-sea 
systems, which use cables or microwave tower networks. 
At present it is thought ECHELON's effort is primarily directed at the "written form" (  e-mails, fixes, and 
telexes) but new satellite telephones system which take over from old land-based ones will be as vulnerable 
as the "written word". 
Each of  the five centres supply to the other four "Dictionaries" of  keywords, phrases, people and places to 
'stag" and tagged intercept is forwarded straight to the requesting country. 
It is the interface of  the ECHELON system and its potential development on phone calls combined with the 
standardisation of'tappable" telecommunications centres and equipment being sponsored by the EU and the 
USA which presents a truly global threat over which there are no legal or democratic controls. 
The earlier study (PE 166.499) identified a number of  options for the European Union, centred round the 
proposition that: 
"All surveillance technologies, operations and practices should be subject to procedures to ensure 
democratic accountability and there should be proper codes of  practice to ensure redress if 
malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit criteria should be agreed for deciding who should be 
targeted for surveillance and who should not, how such data is stored, processed and shared. 
Such criteria and associated codes of  practice should be made publicly available." 
Other points included: 
- All requisite codes of  practice should ensure that new surveillance technologies are brought 
within the appropriate data protection legislation. 
- Given that data from most digital monitoring systems can be seamlessly edited, new guidance 
should be provided on what constitutes admissible evidence. This concern is particularly relevant 
to automatic identification systems which will need to take cognizance of  the provisions of 
Article 15, of  the 1995 European Directive on the Protection of  Individuals and Processing of 
Personal Data. 
- Regulations should be developed covering the provision of  electronic bugging and tapping 
devices to private citizens and companies, so that their sale is governed by legal permission rather 
than self  regulation. 
-Use of  telephone interception by Member states should be subject to procedures of  public 
accountability referred to in (1) above. Before any telephone interception takes place a warrant 
should be obtained in a manna prescribed by the relevant parliament. In most cases, law 
enforcement agencies will not be permitted to self-authorise interception except in the most 
unusual of  circumstances which should be reported back to the authorising authority at the 
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earliest opportunity. 
- Annual statistics on interception should be reported to each member states' parliament. These 
statistics should provide comprehensive details of  the actual number of  communication devices 
intercepted and data should be not be aggregated. (This is to avoid the statistics only identifying 
the number of  warrants, issued whereas organisations under surveillance may have many 
hundreds of  members, all of  whose phones may be subject to interception). 
-Technologies facilitating the automatic profiling and pattern analysis of  telephone calls to 
establish friendship and contact networks should be subject to the same legal requirements as 
those for telephone interception and reported to the relevant member state parliament. 
- The European Parliament should reject proposals from the United States for making private 
messages via the global communications network (Internet) accessible to US Intelligence 
Agencies. Nor should the Parliament agree to new expensive encryption controls without a wide 
ranging debate within the EU on the implications of  such measures. These encompass the civil 
and human rights of  European citizens and the commercial rights of  companies to operate within 
the law, without unwarranted surveillance by intelligence agencies operating in conjunction with 
multinational competitors. 
3. Inhabitant identification Schemes 
Inhabitant identification schemes are schemes, which provide all, or most people in the country with a 
unique code and a token (generally a card) containing the code. 
Such schemes are used in many European Countries for a defined set of  purposes, typically the 
administration of  taxation, natural superannuation and health insurance. In some countries, they are used 
for multiple additional purposes. 
-----·----
4. THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION SELECTED BY 
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 
A. From telecommunication svstems 
Concerning public authorities and organizations: 
•  secret telephone conversations, fax messages and electronic mail 
•  sensitive information concerning taxation 
•  information concerning various fund transfers especially from one service to the other and financial 
transactions 
•  data used in the critical banking infrastructure systems 
Concerning business: 
•  private business communication, including telephone conversations, fax messages and electronic mail 
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•  order from fund transfers and other financial transactions (e.g. payments by credit cards by fax) 
•  sensitive business information and trade secrets 
Concerning individuals: 
•  private conversations, fax messages, e-mail 
•  payments by credit cards 
•  secret information concerning taxation 
B. From new information technoloeies (Internet) 
Concerning public authorities and organizations: 
•  sensitive information and state secrets 
•  tele-banking 
•  tax records and other financial information 
•  data used. in the operation of  critical infrastructure systems 
•  public contracts received by electronic mail 
Concerning business: 
•  contracts 
•  invoices and other official documents 
•  secret electronic transactions 
•  risk of  international property and license in secret transactions 
•  payment orders by credit cards 
•  payments received on-line 
Concerning consumers and individuals: 
•  payment by credit cards 
•  payment on-line 
•  contracts and agreements 
•  electronic financial transactions (e.g. tele-banking). 
C. Some examples of  data collection on tSe Internet 
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Data can be collected over the Internet either directly or indirectly; in other words, it can be collected either 
at the time of  contact with a correspondent or without the knowledge of  the person concerned, often 
automatically. The nature of  the data collected varies according to the protocol used on the network i.e. 
according to the type of  service. In practice, different protocols are very often used in combination to 
augment the profitability or quality of  exchanges. For example, a Web page may propose an exchange of 
correspondence or a transfer of  documents via links with the e-mail protocol and the protocol used for 
transferring files, which is more powerful. 
When electronic messaging is used (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol -- SMTP, and Network News Transfer 
Protocol -- NNTP), communication is established from one personal mailbox to another, or between a 
personal mailbox and a mailbox common to a number of  correspondents. The information transmitted 
consists of  the name and e-mail address, the server address and the signature file (sig.file) if  created by the 
user of  the machine. If  a communication is addressed to a joint mailbox, this information is given out to an 
indeterminate number of  correspondents, participation in a discussion group being theoretically free. As a 
result, any person listed on a distribution list can at the very least obtain the e-mail addresses of  all other 
listed parties, since this information is provided automatically for purposes of  communication on a given 
topic. 
While most downloading (File Transfer Protocol-- FTP) is done anonymously, with only the network's 
Internet Protocol -- IP -- address being revealed, the same cannot be said for document presentation (World 
Wide Web-- WWW, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol-- HTTP). The minimum information revealed at each 
step in the Web is the name of  the network machine making the request and the type of  browser being used. 
Browsers contain an identification-- ID --file which, is configured by the user or at the user's request, 
stores various personal data such as the user's name or e-mail address. If  a Web server requests this 
information, it can be automatically given out. 
A Web server can also send out information, which is stored by the user's navigator (so-called 'cookies') 
and retrieved at a subsequent connection to the server. This system indicates that a visitor has been there 
before, but without revealing his identity: identification requires matching with other information. As a 
result, when linked to the ID file incorporated into the browser and transmitted to a server, the information 
recorded in cookies c-an yield valuable user profiles. It can be noted, however, that some navigations-- to a 
varying and often inadequate extent -- allow use of  these cookies to be blocked. 
5. PROTECTION FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
A. EncTf]Jtion (CIJ!pto~raph£) 
Finally, new information technologies include the privacy of  individuals, the security of  data in the 
computer or on the network, and the availability of  encryption software to protect data in the event they are 
intercepted. In this context, privacy refers to controlling the dissemination and use of  data, including 
information that are unintentionally revealed as a by-product of  the use of  the information technologies 
themselves. 
Security refers to the integrity of  the data storage, processing, and transmitting systems and includes 
concerns about the reliability of  the hardware and software, the protections against intrusion into the theft 
of  the computer equipment, and the resistance of  computer systems to infiltration by unpermitted users, that 
is, "hacking". Encryption is the practice of  encoding data so that even if  a computer or network is 
compromised, the data's content will remain secret. Security and encryption issues are important because 
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they are central to public confidence in networks and to the use of  the systems for the sensitive or secret 
data, such as the processing of  information touching on national security. These issues are surpassingly 
controversial because of  governments' interest in preventing digital information from being impervious to 
official interception and decoding for low enforcement and other purposes. 
Private sector initiatives 
A large number of  private sector interests, in the United States in particular, are attempting, a view to 
fostering electronic commerce, to promote technological solutions that will provide a al practical response 
to consumers concerns while still preserving business interests. In other words, they are starting to explore 
ways and means of  making privacy work in communication networks. These initiatives go in the right 
direction and it would be worthwhile for governments to engage in a dialogue on the basis. 
As an example, Netscape joined by Microsoft, is leading an industry initiative (  40 companies) to cope with 
privacy issues and proposes standard software intended to enable computer users to control what personal 
information is obtained when they visit Internet sites and how the information is used, as well as avoid 
unwanted e-mail. The proposal, called the OPS -- Open Profiling Standard --, which has been submitted to 
the World Wide Web Consortium-- W3C, provides the users with a way to pre-package the personal 
registration information Web sites may require. At the same time, OPS lets users control when and how 
much of  their personal profiles can be passed to a third party. OPS would have users fill out profiles and 
preference information in a standard that could be identified by a digital certificate (that would give a 
guarantee from a trusted third party that the person is really who they say they are). The standardized 
format and brand names associated with the profile forms would be incorporated, in the case ofNetscape, 
into the Communicator browser. According to some specialists, OPS is an addition to rather than 
replacement for the intrusive cookie method of  tracking user information. 
Another project is the new W3C Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3) Project developed by the W3C. The 
P3 Project is a platform on which other technological, market and regulatory solutions can interoperate and 
build. The P3 prototype allows Web sites to easily describe their privacy practices as well as users to set 
policies about the collection and use of  their personal data. A flexible 'negotiation' between the Web site's 
practices and the user's preferences allows service to offer the preferred level of  service and data protection 
to the user. If  there is a match, access to the site is seamless; otherwise the user is notified of  the difference 
and is offered other access options to proceed. With P3, users can download 'recommended' settings 
established by organizations such as industry associations and consumer advocacy groups. According to 
some privacy specialists, P3 requires users to disclose privacy preferences when good privacy policies 
should provide meaningful information for users about Web site practices and not require users to disclose 
personal information. 
Techniques to provide users with more information about privacy practices are also being developed. For 
instance, a number of  companies and service operators have a privacy Icon which appears either when the 
user enters a site, or when the user starts to provide information. The Icon can either lead by hyper-link to a 
sophisticated service providing details of  the company's (service operator) data protection policies and a 
tick box(  es) allowing the user to opt out of  having his/her data used foe specific purposes, or the icon can 
lead to page referring the user, for example, to an address from which further details are available. 
Another example is the development of  services and branding techniques, which intend to provide, dear 
meaningful designations for privacy practices such as TRUSTe, formerly eTRUST. 
The TRUSTe program will focus on addressing privacy issues concerning data collection on the Internet. 
With an emphasis on analysing consumer fears surrounding electronic commerce, the program will utilise 
Web site icons (trustmarks) to alert online consumers to the uses of  their personal information. 
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To further consumer privacy the TRUSTe program will utilise a standardised method of  informed consent. 
A branded system of'trustmarks' or logos, representing the Web site's information privacy policy for users' 
personal information, will alert consumers to how the information they reveal online will be used. 
The three trustmarks will be: 
•  No Exchange - no personally identifiable information is used by the site. 
•  One-to-one Exchange is collected only for the site owner's use. 
•  Third Party Exchange - data is collected and provided to specified third parties but only with the user's 
knowledge and consent. 
The TRUSTe initiative was launched in July 1996 by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and a group 
of  pioneering Internet companies. Commerce  Net and the EFF then partnered in October 1996 to move 
forward in implementing the initiative. 
TRUSTe is a global, non-profit initiative to establish trust and confidence in electronic communication by 
creating an infrastructure to address online privacy issues. Comprised of  premier members from the 
electronic commerce industry, the program assures consumer privacy through a progressive policy of 
informed consent utilising a branded system of'trustmarks', which represent a company's online 
information privacy policy. 
Finally, systems for implementing on-line E-mail Preference Services (EPS) or 'E-mail Robinson Lists' are 
also under consideration (EPS allow consumers who do not wish to receive e-mails to be excluded from 
lists, the common database used to register opt out demands being then used to clean marketing lists). As 
an example, a software package is being developed in the USA which would allow consumers to register 
on-line; would be secure from intruders, and yet user-friendly for industry to clean their E-mail marketing 
lists; and which could be serviced easily by the operator (the Direct Marketing Association (DMA-US)). A 
similar system will be developed in the United Kingdom, and it is planned that these two countries would 
then spearhead a Global Convention on EPS inviting other DMSs to join. Another proposal, which has yet 
to be fully considered by industry, comes from the UK data protection Registrar, which has suggested a 
mechanism enabling the consumers to indicate if  they do not wish to be contacted be e-mail in their e-mail 
address. A universally agreed character (a marker) would indicate that the user does not want to receive any 
marketing solicitations. The user would also be free to make different choices: i.e. to use the marker when 
visiting one site and not to use it when visiting another. This system should be combined with others, such 
as the proposed E-mail Preference Service. 
B. Key-recovery 
Cryptography is a complex area, with scientific, technical, political, social, business, and economic 
dimensions. 
For the purpose of  this report, 'key recovery' systems are characterized by the presence of  some mechanism 
for obtaining exceptional access to the plain text of  encrypted traffic. Key recovery might serve a wide 
spectrum of  access requirements, from a backup mechanism that ensures a business' continued access to its 
own encrypted archive in the event keys are lost, to providing covert law enforcement access to wiretapped 
encrypted telephone conversations. Many of  the costs, risks, and complexities inherent in the design, 
implementation, and operation of  key recovery systems depend on the access requirements around which 
the system is designed. 
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Access without end-user knowledge or consent-- Few commercial users need (or want) covert 
mechanisms to recover keys or plain text data they protect. On the contrary, business access rules are 
usually well known, and audit is a very important safeguard against fraud and error. Government 
specifications require mechanisms that circumvent this important security practice. 
Ubiquitous adoption -- Government seeks the use of  key recovery for all encryption, regardless of  whether 
there is benefit to the end-user or whether it makes sense in context. In fact, there is little or no demand for 
key recovery for many applications and users. For example, the commercial demand for recovery of 
encrypted communications is extremely limited, and the design and analysis of  key recovery for certain 
kinds of  communications protocols is especially difficult. 
Fast paths to plain text-- Law enforcement demands fast (near real-time), 24-hour-a-day, 365-day-a-year 
access to plain text, making it impossible to employ the full range of  safeguards that could ameliorate some 
of  the risks inherent in commercial key recovery systems. 
Encryption and the global information infrastructure 
The Global Information Infrastructure promises to revolutionize electronic commerce, reinvigorate 
government, and provide new and open access to the information society. Yet this promise cannot be 
achieved without information security and privacy. Without a secure and trusted infrastructure, companies 
and individuals will become increasingly reluctant to move their private business or personal information 
online. 
The need for information security is widespread and touches all of  us, whether users of  information 
technology or not. Sensitive information of  all kinds is increasingly finding its way into electronic form. 
Examples include: 
•  Private personal and business communications, including telephone conversations, fax messages, and 
electronic mail; 
•  Electronic funds and other financial transactions; 
•  Sensitive business information and trade secrets; 
•  Data used in the operation of  critical infrastructure systems such as air traffic control, the telephone 
network or the power grid; and 
•  Health records, personnel files, and other personal information. 
Electronically managed information touches almost every aspect of  daily life in modem society. This rising 
tide of  important yet unsecured electronic data leaves our society increasingly vulnerable to curious 
neighbors, industrial spies, rogue nations, organized crime, and terrorist organizations. 
Paradoxically, although the technology for managing and communicating electronic information is 
improving at a remarkable rate, this progress generally comes at the expense of  intrinsic security. In 
general, as information technology improves and becomes faster, cheaper, and easier to use, it becomes less 
possible to control (or even identify) where sensitive data flows, where documents originated, or who is at 
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the other end of  the telephone. The basic communication infrastructure of  our techniques more and more 
frequently will become the only visible approach to assuring the privacy and safety of  sensitive information 
as these trends continue. 
Encryption is an essential tool in providing security in the information age. Encryption is based on the use 
of  mathematical procedures to scramble data so that it is extremely difficult -- if  not virtually impossible --
for anyone other than authorized recipients to recover the original 'plain text'. Properly implemented 
encryption allows sensitive information to be stored on insecure computers or transmitted across insecure 
networks. Only parties with the correct decryption 'key' (or keys) are able to recover the plain text 
information. 
Highly secure encryption can be deployed relatively cheaply, and it is widely believed that encryption will 
be broad} y adopted and embedded in most electronic and communications products and applications for 
handling potentially valuable data. Applications of  cryptography include protecting files from theft or 
unauthorized access, securing communications from interception, and enabling secure business 
transactions. Other cryptographic techniques can be used to guarantee that the contents of  a file or message 
have not been altered (integrity), to establish the identity of  a party (authentication), or to make legal 
commitments (non-repudiation). 
In making information secure from unwanted eavesdropping, interception, and theft, strong encryption has 
an ancillary effect: it becomes more difficult for law enforcement to conduct certain kinds of  surreptitious 
electronic surveillance (particularly wiretapping) against suspected criminals without the knowledge and 
assistance of  the target. This difficulty is at the core of  the debate over key recovery. 
Kev-Recovery: Requirements and proposals 
The United States and other national governments have sought to prevent widespread use of  cryptography 
unless 'key recovery' mechanisms guaranteeing law enforcement access to plain text are built into these 
systems. The requirements imposed by such government-driven key recovery systems are different from the 
features sought by encryption users, and ultimately impose substantial new risks and costs. 
Key recovery encryption systems provide some form of  access to plain text outside of  the normal channel 
of  encryption and decryption. Key recovery is sometimes also called 'key escrow'. The term 'escrow' 
became popular in connection with the U.S. government's Clipper Chip initiative, in which a master key to 
each encryption device was held 'in escrow' for release to law enforcement. Today the term 'key recovery' is 
used as generic term for these systems, encompassing the various 'key escrow', 'trusted third party', 
'exceptional access', 'data recovery', and 'key recovery' encryption systems introduced in recent years. 
Although there are differences between these systems, the distinctions are not critical for our purposes. In 
this report, the general term 'key recovery' is used in a broad sense, to refer to any system for assuring 
third-party (government) access to encrypted data. 
Key recovery encryption systems work in a variety of  ways. Early 'key escrow' proposals relied on the 
storage of  private keys by the U.S. government, and more recently by designated private entities. 
Other systems have 'escrow agents' or 'key recovery agents' that maintain the ability to recover the keys for 
a particular encrypted communication session or stored file; these systems require that such 'session keys' 
be encrypted with the key known by a recovery agent and included with the data. Some systems split the 
ability to recover keys among several agents. 
Many interested parties have sought to draw sharp distinctions among the various key recovery proposals. 
It is certainly true that several new key recovery systems have emerged that they can be distinguished from 
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the original'Clipper' proposal by their methods of  storing and recovering keys. However, our discussion 
takes a higher-level view of  the basic requirements of  the problem rather than the details of  any particular 
scheme; it does not require a distinction between 'key escrow', 'trusted third-party', and 'key recovery'. All 
these systems share the essential elements that concern us for the purposes of  this study: 
•  A mechanism, external to the primary means of  encryption and decryption, by which a third party can 
obtain covert access to the plain text of  encrypted data. 
•  The existence of  a highly sensitive secret key (or collection of  keys) that must be secured for an 
extended period of  time. 
Taken together, these elements encompass a system of'ubiquitous key recovery' designed to meet law 
enforcement specifications. While some specific details may change, the basic requirements most likely 
will not: they are the essential requirements for any system that meets the stated objective of  guaranteeing 
law enforcement agencies timely access, without user notice, to the plain text of  encrypted communications 
traffic. 
6. SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS IN LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
CONTEXT 
As a conclusion from this present Interim Study is the principle that WE HAVE TO CONSIDER 
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF A GLOBAL NETWORKED SOCIETY. And when we 
speak about electronic privacy in the exchange of  economic information, we are speaking about one single 
thing above all others: Electronic Commerce over the Internet. 
A. Privac.y re~ulation 
Multinational data protection measures 
Enactment of  data protection laws by individual European nations has been paralleled and, in some cases 
anticipated, by multinational actions. In 1980 the Committee of  Ministers of  the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued Guidelines on the Protection of  Privacy and Trans  border 
Flows of  Personal Data (guidelines). The guidelines outline basic principles for both data protection and 
the free flow of  information among countries that have laws conforming with the protection principles. The 
guidelines, however, have no blinding force and permit broad variation in national implementation. 
One year after the OECD issued its guidelines, the Council of  Europe promulgated a convention, For the 
Protection of  Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of  Personal Data. The convention, which 
took effect in 1985, is similar to the guidelines, although it focuses more on the importance of  data 
protection to protect personal privacy. The convention specifies that data must be obtained and processed 
fairly; used and stored only for legal purposes; adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose for which they are processed; accurate and up-to-date; and stored no longer than necessary. The 
document gives individuals the right to inquire about the existence of  data files concerning them; obtain a 
copy of  that data; and have false or improperly processed data corrected or erased. 
The convention requires each of  the member countries (now twenty-six) to enact conforming national laws. 
By 1992, however, when debate over the more detailed European Union data protection directive, 
discussed below, overtook the convention, only ten countries-- Austria, Denmark France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain Sweden and the United Kingdom-- had ratified the convention, while 
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eight-- Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Island, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey-- had signed without 
ratification. The Council of  Europe subsequently urged all European Union member states to ratify and 
implement the convention when it endorsed the European Commission's proposal for a data protection 
directive. By 1997, all of  the fifteen EU member states (except Greece, which is currently considering a 
privacy bill) and Switzerland have national legislation consistent with the convention. 
Nevertheless, the resulting protection for personal privacy is far from uniform, for at least three reasons. 
First, some of  the national data protection legislation existed before the adoption of  the convention. 
Second, the convention was not self-executing and therefore permitted each country to implement its 
national laws conforming to the government's terms in very different ways. Finally, the convention did not 
include definitions for important terms, such as what constitutes an 'adequate' level of  data protection; as 
result, member countries were left free to adopt their own, inconsistent definitions in their national 
legislation. 
Data protection directive in Europe 
Although, legal protection for a 'right of  privacy' originated in the United States, Europe was the site of  the 
first privacy legislation and has been the source of  most comprehensive privacy regulation. 
Europe is the site of  the first privacy legislation, the earliest national privacy statute, and now the most 
comprehensive protection for information privacy in the world. That protection reflects on apparent 
consensus within Europe that privacy is a fundamental human right which few in any other rights equal. In 
the context of  European history and civil law culture, that consensus makes possible extensive, detailed 
regulation of  virtually all activities concerning 'any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person'. It is difficult to imagine a regulatory regime offering any greater protection to information 
privacy, or greater contrast to U.S. law. 
As a result of  the variation and uneven application among national laws permitted by both the guidelines 
and the convention, in July 1990 the commission of  the then-European Community (EC) published a draft 
Council Directive on the Protection of  Individuals with Regard to the Processing of  Personal Data and on 
Free Movement of  Such Data The draft directive was part of  the ambitious program by the countries of  the 
European Union to create not merely the 'common market' and 'economic and monetary union' 
contemplated by the Treaty of  Rome, but also the potential union embodied in the Treaty on European 
Union signed in 1992 in Maastricht. 
The shift from economic to broad-based political union brought with it new attention to the protection of 
information privacy. On March 1 1, 1992, the European Parliament amended the commission's proposal to 
eliminate the distinction in the 1990 draft between public and private sector data protection and then 
overwhelmingly approved the draft directive. On October 15, 1992, the commission issued its amended 
proposal; on February 20, 1995, the Council of  Ministers adopted a Common Position with a View to 
Adopting Directive 95/46/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of  Personal Data and on the Free Movement of  Such Data. The 
directive was formally approved on October 24, 1995, and took effect three years later. 
Privacv regulation in the United States 
The protection for the information privacy in the United States is disjoined, inconsistent, and limited by 
conflicting interests. There is no explicit constitutional guarantee of  a right to privacy in the United States. 
Although the Supreme Court has fashioned a variety of  rights out of  the Bill of  Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 'information privacy' has received little protection, primarily based on the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In the Fourth Amendment arena, the Court has found constitutional violations 
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when the police have searched for or seized records without a warrant or meeting one of  the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. The Court, however, has written that the Fourth Amendment privacy right has 
little application outside of  the context of  the investigation and prosecution of  criminal activity. Moreover, 
this protection against such searches does not extend to information controlled by a third person. Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has recognized a constitutional right restricting the government from 
compelling individuals to disclose certain personal information. This right protects only the interest of  an 
individual in not disclosing certain information, and that right is evaluated under intermediate scrutiny, as 
opposed to the strict scrutiny required when fundamental rights are at stake 
As with all constitutional rights, these apply only against the government, not private actors. The 
requirement for state action and the 'negative' nature of  constitutional rights require only that the 
government refrain from taking actions that impermissibly invaded individuals' information privacy rights, 
not that the government take steps to affirmatively protect those rights. The Constitution also requires, 
however, that the government avoid actions that infringe other rights enumerated therein, such as the 
protection for expression in the Fifth Amendment, the government cannot take private property, whether by 
physical occupation or extensive regulation, without according due process and paying just compensation 
to the owner. 
Outside of  the constitutional arena, protection for information privacy relies on hundreds of  federal and 
state laws and regulations, each of  which applies only to a specific category of  information user (such as the 
government or retailers of  videotapes), context (applying for credit or subscribing to cable television), type 
of  information (criminal records or financial information), or use for that information (computer matching 
or impermissible discrimination). PrivacY laws in 49 the United States most often prohibit certain 
disclosures, rather than collection, use, or storage, of  personal information. When those protections extend 
to the use of  personal information, it is often as a by-product of  legislative commitment to another goal, 
such as eliminating discrimination. And the role provided for the government in most U.S. privacy laws is 
often limited to providing a judicial form for resolving disputes. 
Passage of  the privacy provisions in the Cable Communications Policy Act, and recent passage of  the 
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act and the CPNI provision of  the Telecommunications Act, 
demonstrate that Congress can enact serious privacy protection, even if  limited to narrow sectoral 
environments. The later two acts and the expanding debate in Washington over the privacy evince the 
growing attention to the development of  laws and regulations to protect privacy. 
However, as the limits and exceptions within existing privacy laws indicate, privacy protection in the 
United States is fundamentally in tension with other cherished values. The legal regulation of  privacy is 
significantly influenced by the importance placed by society on the prevention of  crime and prosecution of 
criminals, free expression and an investigatory press, the acquisition and use of  property, and a limited role 
for government involvement in daily life. A comparison of  the legal regimes of  the EU and the United 
States suggests that the Europe privacy is more valued and less in conflict with other widely shared values. 
B. Protgction ofPrivacv in the telecommunications sector 
Directive 97/66/EC ofthe European Parliament and the Council of  the 15 December 1997 concerns the 
processing of  personal data and the protection of  privacy in the telecommunications sector. 
This directive provides for the harmonisation of  the provisions of  the member states required to ensure an 
equivalent level of  protection of  fundamental rights and freedom, and in particular the right to privacy, with 
respect to the processing of  personal data in the telecommunications sector and to ensure the free 
movement of  such data and telecommunications equipment and services in the Community. 
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This directive shall not apply to the activities which fall outside the scope of  Community law, such as those 
provided for by titles V and VI of  the treaty on European Union, and in any case to activities concerning 
public security, defence, state security (including the economic well being of  the state when the activities 
relate to state security matters) and the activities of  the state in areas of  criminal law. 
C.  Crmtoeraphv 
CryptographY policy in USA 
It is part of  the strategy to ensure that police and intelligence agencies could understand every 
communication they intercepted. 
They attempted to impede the development of  cryptography and other security measures, fearing that these 
technologies would reduce their ability to monitor the emissions of  foreign governments and to investigate 
crime. 
A survey by the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) found that most countries either rejected 
domestic controls or not addressed the issue at all. The GILC found that many countries, large and small, 
industrialised and developing, seem to be ambivalent about the need to control encryption technology. 
The FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) have instigated efforts to restrict the availability of 
encryption world-wide, in the early 1970s, the NSA's pretext was that encryption technology was 'born 
classified' and, therefore, it dissemination fell into the same category as the diffusion of  A-bomb materials. 
The debate went underground until 1993 when the US launched the Clipper Chip, an encryption device 
designed for inclusion in consumer products. The Clipper Chip offered the required privacy, but the 
government would remain a 'pass- key' -- anything encrypted with the chip could be read by government 
agencies. 
Behind the scenes, law enforcement and intelligence agencies were pushing hard for a ban on other forms 
of  encryption. In a February 1993 document, obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC), 
recommended 'Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if  they are incorporated into all 
encryption products. To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the use of  government-approved 
encryption products, or adherence to government encryption criteria'. The Clipper Chip was widely 
criticised by industry, public interest groups, scientific societies and the public and, though it was officially 
adopted, only a few were ever sold or used. 
From 1994 onwards, USA began to woo private companies to develop an encryption system that would 
provide access to keys by government agencies. Under the proposals -- variously known as 'key recovery' or 
'trusted third parties'-- the key would be held by a corporation, not a government agency, and would be 
designed by the private sector, not the NSA. The systems, however, still entitled the assumption of 
guaranteed access to the intelligence community and so proved as controversial used export incentives to 
encourage companies to adopt key escrow products: they could export stronger encryptions but only if  they 
ensured that intelligence agencies had access to the keys. 
Under US law, computer software and hardware cannot be exported if  it contains encryption that the NSA 
cannot break. The regulations stymie the availability of  encryption in the USA because companies are 
reluctant to develop two separate product lines- one, with strong encryption, for domestic use and another, 
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with weak encryption, for the international market. Several cases are pending in the US courts on the 
constitutionality of  export controls; a federal court recently ruled that they violate free speech rights under 
the First Amendment. 
The FBI has not let up on efforts to ban products on which it cannot eavesdrop. In mid-1997, it introduced 
legislation to mandate that key-recovery systems be built into all computer systems. Several congressional 
committees adopted the amendment but the Senate preferred a weaker variant. A concerted campaign by 
computer, telephone and priyacy groups finally stopped the proposal; it now appears that no legislation will 
be enacted in the current Congress. 
CQ!Ptow;aphv policv guidelines (rom OECD 
The organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1997 issued a report on cryptography 
policy entitled: CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY: THE GUIDELINES AND THE ISSUES (OCOE I GD (97) 
204). The basic principles (each of  which addresses an important policy concern) are independent and 
should be considered as a whole so as to balance the various interests. The principles are: 
•  Trust in cryptographic methods: Users should be trustworthy in order to generate confidence in the use 
of  information and commercial data. 
•  Choice of  Cryptographic methods: Users should have a right to choose any cryptographic method, 
subject to applicable law. 
•  Market driven development of  cryptographic methods: Cryptographic methods should be developed in 
response to the needs, demands and responsibilities of  individuals, business and governments. 
•  Standards for cryptographic methods: Technical standards, criteria and protocols for cryptographic 
methods should be developed and promulgated at the national and international law. 
•  Protection of  privacy and Personal data: the fundamental rights of  individuals, to privacy, including 
secrecy of  communications and protection of  personal data, should be respected in national 
cryptography policies and in the implementation and use of  cryptographic methods. 
•  Lawful access: National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to plain text, or cryptographic 
keys, of  encrypted data. These policies must respect the other principles contained in the guidelines to 
the greatest extent possible. 
•  Liability: whether established by contract on legislation, the liability of  individuals and entities that 
offer cryptographic services or hold or access cryptographic keys should be clearly stated. 
•  International co-operation: Governments should cooperate to coordinate cryptography policies. As 
part of  this effort, governments should remove, or avoid creating in the name of  cryptography policy, 
unjustified obstacles to trade. 
Given the role of  cryptography in the information and communications infrastructure and in developing 
electronic commerce, cryptography policy has the broader perspective to overlap with economic, legal and 
political aspects of  a number of  information systems, protection of  privacy and personal data and 
intellectual property protection. 
E. U C1J!.I!tographv policv 
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Led by the Germany and the Scandinavians, the EU has been generally distrustful of  key escrow 
technology. In October 1997, the European Commission released a report entitled: 'Towards a European 
Framework of  Digital Signatures and Encryption', ensuring security and trust in electronic communications 
(COM (97)503 final) which advised: 'Restricting the use of  encryption could well prevent law-abiding 
companies and citizens from protecting themselves against criminal attacks. It would not, however, totally 
prevent criminals from using these technologies'. The report noted that 'privacy considerations suggest limit 
the use of  cryptography as a means to ensure data security and confidentiality'. 
Some European countries have or are contemplating independent restrictions. France had a longstanding 
ban on the use of  any cryptography to which the government does not have access. However, a 1996 law, 
modifying the existing system, allows a system of  tiers du confidence, although it has not been 
implemented because ofEU opposition. In 1997, the Conservative government in the UK introduced a 
proposal creating a system of  trusted third parties. It was severely criticised at the time and by the new 
Labour government, which has not yet acted upon its predecessor's recommendations. 
0 The debate over encryption and the conflicting demands of  security and privacy are bound to continue. 
The commercial future of  the Internet depends on a universally-accepted and foolproof method of  on-line 
identifications; as of  now, the only means of  providing it is through strong encryption. This put the US 
government and some of  the world's largest corporations, notably Microsoft, on a collision course. 
Other national and international activities related to cryptographY policv 
Cryptographic products and technologies have historically been subject to export controls. The current 
basis for export controls in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (agreed on 13 July 1996), which includes cryptography products on its 
control lists for export. The Agreement is implemented in national regulations. Regulation [(EC) 3381/94] 
and Decision [94/942/PESC] of  the Council of  the European Union of 19 December 1994 on the control of 
the export of  dual-use goods are also applicable to the export of\cryptographic products. 
The CoWlcil of  Europe has developed considerable resources to studying the subject of  computer-related 
crime, issuing the Recommendation [R(95)13] of  the Council of  Europe of 11  September 1995 concerning 
problems of  criminal procedural law connected with information technology, and is considering suggesting 
an international convention to address the issue. Such a convention could address matters such as exchange 
of  information among government agencies in case involving the use of  cryptography. 
At the 07 Summit meeting on anti-terrorism in July 1996, G7 governments announced that consultations 
would be accelerated, 'in appropriate bilateral or multilateral for a, on the use of  encryption that allows, 
when necessary, lawful government access to data and communication in order, inter alia, to prevent or 
investigate acts of  terrprism, while protecting the privacy of  legitimate communications'. 
In May 1996 the US National Research Council's Computer Science and Telecommunications Board 
published the report 'Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society'. This interagency study 
assesses the effect of  cryptographic technologies on US national security, law enforcement, commercial and 
privacy interests, and reviews the impact of  export controls on cryptographic technologies. This 
authoritative report provides a comprehensive review of  the cryptography policy issues faced by the US 
Government. 
C. Kev tecoverv 
As of  mid-1998 a wide range of  government, industry, and academic efforts toward specifying, prototyping, 
and standardising key recovery system that meet government specifications have been implemented. Some 
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of  industry's efforts were stimulated by U.S. government policies that offer more favorable export treatment 
to companies that commit to designing key recovery features into the future products, and by U.K. 
government moves to link the licensing of  certification authorities to the use of  key recovery software. 
Yet despite these incentives, and the intense interest and effort by research and development teams, neither 
industry nor government has yet produced a key recovery architecture that universally satisfies both the 
demands of  government and the security and cost requirements of  encryption users. 
The commercial key recovery products in existence today do not reconcile the conflict between commercial 
requirements and government specifications. In the absence of  government pressure, commercial key 
recovery features are by their nature of  interest primarily to business operations willing to pay a significant 
premium to ensure continued access to stored data maintained only in applications of  encryption (such as 
communication traffic) are known in advance not to require recoverability and therefore would not be 
designed to use a key recovery system. 
Another problem is that the most secure and economical commercial key recovery do not support the 
real-time, third-party, covert access sought by governments in order to support surveillance. In particular, 
'self-escrow' by an individual does not meet government access demands. The third-party nature and global 
reach implied by these government demands make key recovery systems a much more> 
Transfer interrupted! 
osition than a facility for internal, off-line recovery in business enterprise. For example, most organizations 
keep backups in the form of  plain text on magnetic media in physically protected premises. Similarly, 
organizations that keep encrypted data might naturally be best served by storing backup keys in a bank safe 
deposit box. A requirement for near-real-time access would preclude this approach, however prudent or 
appropriate. 
Any access-time requirement carries with it special risks. In particular, some sort of  network technology 
will generally be required. Such a network, which must link a large number of  law enforcement agencies 
with different key recovery centers, would be extraordinarily difficult to secure. The current attention in the 
U.S. on the problem of  securing critical infrastructure, such as telephone networks, power grids, national 
banking networks and air traffic control systems, underscores the problem of  managing risk in key 
recovery. The system that support critical infrastructure, which are increasingly reliant on open networks 
and information systems, are among the most important current and future applications of  cryptography. 
The complexity and increased risk introduced with key recovery would make critical infrastructure 
protected by cryptography more vulnerable to the kinds of  sophisticated attackers that pose the most serious 
threats to these systems. 
Government specifications for key recovery systems for export approval are focused on the easier problem 
of  ensuring that keys are recoverable when authorized. They do not address or give techniques for the far 
harder problem of  ensuring against unauthorized disclosure of  data. The design and construction of 
prototype key recovery systems that satisfy government specifications for export, therefore, are not 
sufficient to demonstrate that these systems can be operated securely, in an economical manner, on a large 
scale, or without introducing unacceptable new risks. Any assessment of  a proposed system must take into 
account a broad range of  design, implementation, operation, and policy considerations. 
As of  mid-1998, we are aware of  no key recovery proposals that have undergone analysis of  the kind 
required. On the other hand, as our report notes, there are compelling reasons to believe that, given the state 
of  the art in cryptography and secure systems engineering, government-access key recovery is not 
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compatible with large scale, economical, secure cryptography systems. 
D. European Initiatives 
DLM-FORUM --Electronic Records 
The first multidisciplinary European DLM-Forum (DLM-Forum'96) on electronic records which took place 
in Brussels between the 18th and 20th December 1996 was a major event in the investigation of 
possibilities for wider co-operation in this area both between Member States and at Community level. It 
was initiated by the experts' report Archives in the European Union (Report of  the Group of  Experts on the 
Coordination of  Archives. Brussels- Luxembourg: OPOCE 1994) and confirmed by the EU-Council 
Conclusions of  June 1994 (94/C 235/03). 
Organised by the European Commission in close co-operation with the EU member states it hosted more 
than 300 experts and decision-makers from public administration, archives, industry (hard- and software 
suppliers) and research. The multidisciplinary approach and the aim to publish guidelines on machine 
readable data as a concrete result as well as the high quality of  the presentations were the attractions that 
turned this inaugural event into a European forum of  international interest in the field of  electronic records 
administration and storage. Participants came from all the EU member states, from other European 
countries (including the Russian Federation and Poland), as well as from Canada and the USA. 
First reviews that have been published by specialised journals are unanimously enthusiastic. The forum's 
success owed a lot to the Programme Committee's preparations and should also be attributed to the 
undivided and continuous support of  the Irish and Dutch presidencies of  the EU-Council. 
The forum was opened by the Secretary General of  the European Commission, David Williamson who 
emphasised that archives, including increasingly electronic documents, are our collective memory and how 
important it is to retain that memory and to insure that it remains accessible in the future. In their keynote 
addresses the Deputy Director General of  the Directorate General for Science, Research and Development, 
Hendrik Tent and the Permanent Representative of  Ireland to the European Union, H. E. Ambassador Denis 
O'Leary laid out the political and technical framework of  the DLM-Forum'96. Mr Tent described the 
importance of  the forum with respect to innovation in the digital era and the Commission's approach 
towards this challenge. Mr·O'Leary stressed the role of  archives in our society and the citizens' right of 
access to information. In his closing speech the Head of  Commissioner Bangemann's Cabinet, Paul 
Weissenberg, pointed to the importance of  electronic archives in the European Union's concept of  the 
Information Society as set out in the Bangemann report and subsequent documents. He stressed the 
necessity of  concrete measures as an immediate consequence to the DLM-Forum. 
The 'life-cycle'-concept of  electronic records guided the three parallel sessions. Thus the speakers in those 
sessions reflected on electronic documents in the different phases of  their administrative life. The multitude 
of  topics ranged from discussions of  norms and standards for data interchange to the presentation of  new 
electronic storage material. Surveys on the 'state of  the art' in Europe completed this first interdisciplinary 
approach to retaining the collective memory of  the Information Society. 
It  was the balance between working sessions and spontaneous and informal discussions outside those 
sessions that produced a most agreeable working atmosphere in which experts' debates led to the kind of 
mutual understanding and the establishment of  personal ties and relations needed to solve problems that 
concern all the disciplines represented at the forum. Thus the catalyst effect, which was hoped for, was 
achieved: experts from industry and research became sensitive to the concerns of  archives and 
administrations. 
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The forum will lead, as foreseen, to amendments to the first draft of  multidisciplinary guidelines Best 
practices for using Machine Readable Data which had been distributed to the participants. 
Furthermore a document for follow-up measures, the so-called '10 points', was agreed on by the 
participants. One major topic for follow-up activities is the establishment of  national focal points to 
improve co-ordination and networking and to establish functional requirements for electronic records 
management in the public and private sectors. Another topic concerns the urge for establishing training 
programmes for archivists and administrators. 
In a world of  continuous and rapid change modern archives services are an element of  continuity, stability 
and a solid base for essential information and indispensable records. Modern management in public and 
private institutions has to be dynamic, active and innovative, and above all has to cover the entire 
continuum of  the life of  documents. 'The DLM-Forum'96 demonstrated that the issues posed by the 
preservation and re-use of  electronic records are central not only to the work of  archivists, but also form the 
cornerstone of  future economic growth and development within the European Union.' as Seamus Ross 
points out in his presentation. In short: the problem of  preserving electronic records concerns even more 
people and areas than have been covered by the forum's participants. Further activities should include 
among others legal advisors, system designers and application developers, auditors and insurance 
providers. Contacts with existing working groups (e.g. the European Commission's Legal Advisory Board 
for the information market) have to be established or intensified. A first step to co-ordinate these activities 
is the installation of  the DLM-Monitoring Committee in April1997. 
Promoting safe Use oflnternet 
To prevent illegal and harmful content being distributed on the Internet the European Commission is 
promoting initiatives which are aimed at increasing the general awareness among parents, teachers, public 
sector and the information industry about how to deal with the issue in practical terms. 
This action accompanies the Green Paper on Protection of  Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and 
Information Services, the Communication on Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet, and the Action 
plan on promoting safe use of  the Internet. 
~-- ~---------- ------- ----------------
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Abstract 
Protection of  privacy; fundamental human right; UN Declaration, European Convention on Human Rights; 
EU Directives and Recommendations; National laws; lawful interception of  communications; data 
protection; encryption; duties of  telecommunications network operators; interception by foreign 
governments; possible action by EU to require telecommunications network operators to protect users' 
privacy. 
Executive summary 
Privacy of  communications is one of  the fundamental human rights. The UN Declaration, International 
Covenant and European Convention all provide that natural persons should not be subject to unlawful 
interference with their privacy. The European Convention is legally binding and has caused signatories to 
change their national laws to comply. 
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Most countries, including most EU Member States, have a procedure to permit and regulate lawful 
interception of  communications, in furtherance of  law enforcement or to protect national security. The 
European Council has proposed a set of  technical requirements to be imposed on telecommunications 
operators to allow lawful interception. USA has defined similar requirements (now enacted as Federal law) 
and Australia has proposed to do the same. 
Most countries have legal recognition of  the right to privacy of  personal data and many require 
telecommunications network operators to protect the privacy of  their users. All EU countries permit the use 
of  encryption for data transmitted via public telecommunications networks (except France where this will 
shortly be permitted). 
Electronic commerce requires secure and trusted communications and may not be able to benefit from 
privacy law designed only to protect natural persons. 
The legal regimes reflect a balance between three interests: 
•  privacy; 
•  law enforcement; 
•  electronic commerce 
Legal processes are emerging to satisfy the second and third interests by granting more power to 
governments to authorise interception (under legal controls) and allowing strong encryption with secret 
keys. 
There do not appear to be adequate legal processes to protect privacy against unlawful interception, either 
by foreign governments or by non-governmental bodies. 
A course of  action open to the EU is to require telecommunications operators to take greater precautions to 
protect their users against unlawful interception. This would appear to be possible without compromising 
law enforcement or electronic commerce. 
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1 Context 
This study has been prepared by Dr Chris Elliott1 for the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment 
programme of  the European Parliament. It is a contribution to the project on "Development of  surveillance 
technology and risk of  abuse of  economic information". This study examines the legality of  the interception 
of  electronic communications. 
The study is intended to be brief  and concise. It concentrates on instruments that exist and not on the debate 
that led to them. It also avoids speculation as to the evolution of  law in this field or the moral and ethical 
challenges that it poses. 
Three levels of  instrument are considered: 
•  International agreements 
•  EU Decisions and Directives 
•  National laws (of  EU Member states and significant third countries) 
Legislation in this field attempts to reconcile three conflicting pressures: 
•  Respect for privacy - Privacy is a fundamental human right. International agreements and national 
laws are more concerned with the rights of  natural persons than with those of  legal persons 
(companies). 
•  Capabilities for law enforcement - The lawful interception of  communications is important for law 
enforcement agencies and most countries have legal procedures to authorise and regulate interception. 
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•  Needs of electronic commerce- Secure communication is essential to permit electronic commerce to 
develop and may require the use of  encryption which might conflict with the requirements of  law 
enforcement. 
The study extends beyond interception to consider encryption, since this is an important potential counter 
to interception and is also subject to some legal control. It also considers data protection law regarding the 
storage and manipulation of  personal information where it applies to the transmission of  that information 
1 Dr Elliott is an English barrister and an engineer specialising in telecommunications and computing technology. 
Contact: Chambers of  Marie-Claire sparrow, 95A Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1 DT 
chris. elliott@pitchill.demon.  co. uk 
2 International agreements 
2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Article 12 states that 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, .... or correspondence, ... 
Everyone has the right to the protection of  the law against such interference ... 
A key word in this Article is "arbitrary". Lawful interference is not excluded. 
2.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
This UN Covenant2 builds on the Universal Declaration and is legally binding. By Art. 2.1, the Contracting 
Parties are obliged to respect and ensure all of  the rights recognised by the Covenant, and by Art. 2.2 they 
are required to take steps to meet their obligations within their own legal systems. Art. 4 allows Contracting 
Parties to derogate from some of  the specific Articles (ie Rights) in a Public Emergency. 
Article 17 states that: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy ... and that: 
Everyone has a right to the protection of  the law against such interference  ... 
This appears to address only natural, not legal, persons and reinforces the idea that lawful interference is 
permitted. 
2 came into effect in 1976, 129 states are parties to the Covenant. 
2.3 European Convention of Human Rights 
Article 8 ofthe Convention3 states: 
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1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of  this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of  the country, for the prevention of  disorder or crime, for the protection 
of  health or morals, or for the protection of  the rights and freedom of  others. 
It is not clear whether this offers any protection to legal persons. It has been used to test the legality of 
national procedures for the official interception of  communications (  eg Klass4) and to force European states 
to introduce a legal procedure (  eg Malone5). 
3 European Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950. 
4 Klass v Germany [ 1978] 2 EHRR 214. 
5 Malone v UK [1984] 7 EHRR 14. 
2.4 OECD Guidelines 
OECD has adopted guidelines6 which, although primarily concerned with encryption, have a bearing on 
interception. Recommendation 5 states: 
The fundamental rights of  individuals to privacy, including secrecy of  communications ... , should 
be respected in national cryptographic policies and in the implementation and use of 
cryptographic methods. 
2.5 Council of Europe 
Article 7 of  the Data Protection Convention  7 requires that appropriate security measures shall be taken for 
the protection of  personal data against unauthorised access or dissemination. 
Recommendation R(95)13 of  the Committee of  Ministers (adopted September 11  1995) "concerning 
criminal procedural law connected with information technology" recommended: 
•  that criminal laws should be modified to allow interception in the investigation of  serious offences 
against telecommunications or computer systems; and 
•  that measures should be considered to minimise the negative effects of  cryptography without affecting 
its use more than is strictly necessary. 
6 Recommendation of  the OECD Council Concerning Guidelines for the Security of  Information Systems, adopted 
on November 26-27 1993 C(92) 188/Final. 
7 Council of  Europe Convention for the protection of  individuals with regard to automatic processing of  personal 
data. 
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3 EU legislation and agreements 
3.1 INFOSEC Green Paper 
The Commission resolved to prepare a Green Paper on the security of  information systems8 but, although 
several drafts were prepared, none has been adopted. The drafts dealt with issues of  encryption, digital 
signatures and privacy enhancement. 
8 Council Decision March 13  1992 in the field of  information security, [1992] OJ L 123. 
3.2 Council Resolution 
The Council Resolution on the lawful interception oftelecommunications9 notes a list of  Requirements of 
Member States to allow them to conduct the lawful interception of  telecommunications. The Resolution 
continues that Member States should take these Requirements into account when defining national 
measures and in relation to network operators. 
The set of  Requirements appears to cover of  all aspects of  interception. It requires telecommunications 
network operators or service providers to make available details of  the addresses and contents of 
communications, to do so in a way which is not apparent to the users being monitored and, where the 
operators use encryption, to provide decrypted (en clair) versions of  intercepted communications. 
The Requirements closely match those identified by the FBI in the USA, which led to CALEA (see section 
4.2 below), and by the Barrett Review in Australia (also section 4.2). 
9 Council Resolution OJ 4111/96 C329 pages 1 -6. 
3.3 Directive 95/46/EC 
This Directive was primarily concerned with the protection of  data stored in databases and is of  only 
indirect relevance to interception of  communications. However, the Preamble includes 
(2) Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they must, whatever the 
nationality or residence of  natural persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably 
the right to privacy, and contribute to economic and social progress, trade expansion and the 
well-being of  individuals; 
and the Directive starts: 
Article 1: Object of  the Directive 
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of  natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of  personal data. 
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3.4 Directive 97  /66/EC 
The preamble makes it clear that this Directive, like 95/46, does not address issues of  protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms related to activities which are not governed by Community law. It does 
not affect the right of  Member States to take such measures as they consider necessary for the protection of 
public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of  the State when the activities 
relate to State security matters) and the enforcement of  criminal law 
However, Article 5 states that Member States shall ensure via national regulations the confidentiality of 
communications by means of  a public telecommunications network and publicly available 
telecommunications services. In particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of 
interception or surveillance of  communications, by others than users, without the consent of  the users 
concerned, except when legally authorised. 
~-·-.------
4 National legislation 
4.1 EU member states 
There are broadly similar legislative regimes in all countries of  the EU. Rather than repeating the analysis 
of  each of  them, the regime in the UK will be described in detail and any significant differences of  principle 
in other countries will be noted. The information given here for the UK has been taken from primary 
sources; less reliable and less up-to-date secondary sources have been used to derive the corresponding 
information for other EU Member States. The Author would be grateful for any primary information or 
better secondary information on the legal regime in those countries 
United Kingdom 
The starting point is section 5 of  the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, which makes it illegal to use any 
wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the contents, sender or addressee of 
any message which the user is not authorised to receive, or to disclose any information obtained in that 
way. This does not apply to interception authorised by the government and to disclosure in legal 
proceedings. 
The Interception of  Communications Act 1985 was passed following the case ofMalone before the ECHR 
(see section 2.3 above). Section 1 maintains the rule of  section 5 WTA '49. Section 2 permits the Secretary 
of  State to issue a warrant authorising interception of  post or a public telecommunications system if  he 
considers it necessary: 
•  in the interests of  national security 
•  for the purpose of  preventing or detecting serious crime; or 
•  for the purpose of  safeguarding the economic well-being of  the UK. 
This Act provides a procedure to authorise interception of  Internet messages but not messages being 
transmitted within private networks. Interception of  the signal from a cordless telephone to its base is 
excluded  10, as are the signals emitted by a cellular telephone (but the subsequent transmission of  those 
signals via the cellular network is included because that is a public telecommunications network). 
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1  0 R v Efflk & Mitchell [ 1994] 3 All ER 45 8 
S 1 of  the Computer Misuse Act 1990 makes it a crime knowingly to cause a computer to perform any 
function with intent to secure unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer. Although it 
is primarily intended to criminalise "hacking", it would appear to apply to the use of  a computer (including 
one embedded inside interception equipment) to intercept data being transmitted between two other 
computers. 
The Data Protection Act 1984 gives legal effect to eight data protection principles which follow those of 
the Council of  Europe Convention. Principle 8 requires data users to take appropriate security measures 
against unauthorised access to personal data. "Personal data" refers to living natural persons, not legal 
persons. 
There are no legal restrictions in the UK on the importation, possession or use of  encryption equipment. 
However, in criminal proceedings, section 20 of  the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 permits the 
authorities, where they may demand evidence derived from a computer, also to require it to be made 
readable. 
Austria 
There is a general data protection law11  and further detailed rules which govern the transmission of 
personal data. The general legal framework for telecommunications (TKG)12 does not provide specific 
sanctions for breaching these rules. It does however impose a criminal sanction of  up to 3 months 
imprisonment for illegal interception of  transmissions. Telecommunication network operators are required 
to set up systems to allow the criminal courts to make interceptions (TKG Art 89) and to warn users that 
the network may not be secure (TKG 90). 
11  Datenschutzgesetz. 
12 Telekommunikationsgesetz BGBL 1997/100. 
Belgium 
There are criminal sanctions  13 against the ownership or use of  equipment for the interception of  private 
communications, other than by an officer of  the state. Similar sanctions apply to such an officer who abuses 
the right to intercept communications or divulges any material that has been lawfully obtained by 
interception. 
13 Art 259 Code Penal, 30 June 1994. 
Denmark 
Danish law provides specific penalties for passing on or exploiting third party communications by network 
operators or their employees14. A further law15 requires mobile communications licensees to keep 
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confidential any communications through their networks. 
Operators are required to take all precautions necessary to prevent unauthorised persons gaining access to 
information. 
14 Ministerial Order No 712, 25/7/96 
15 Act No 468,12/6/96 
Finland 
The Telecommunications Market Act16 imposes a general duty of  confidentiality on telecommunication 
network operators, their staff and contractors. The wider duties under the Personal Data Act also prevent 
disclosure. There are criminal sanctions for breach of  these duties, unless the disclosure is, with the consent 
of  the subscriber, to appropriate authorities to prevent misuse of  the telecommunication system. 
Law enforcement officials may demand disclosure of  information or recordings of  calls if  investigating 
certain crimes listed in the Coercive Measures Act17. Telecommunications network operators are required 
to provide the necessary facilities, which are funded by Government. 
16 Telemarkinalaki 1997/396. 
17 Pakokeinokai. 
France 
Telecommunications network operators are required to respect the secrecy of  correspondence  18 and there 
are criminal sanctions for deliberate violation  19. Private conversations may only be intercepted under 
certain conditions, when authorised by the judiciary or administration20. 
The UK approach of  permitting the use encryption for transmission over public networks is shared by all 
other Member States except France. The current law in France21  permits the use of  cryptography for 
authentication but requires confidentiality systems to be authorised and for keys to be deposited with a 
State-designated key escrow. Until recently only 40 bit codes were permitted but, in January 1999, the 
French government announced that all restrictions would be lifted. 
18 L 32-3 PTC. 
19 Articles 226-13,226-15 and 432-9 of  the penal code. 
20 Law of 10 July 1991. 
21  Loi de Ia Reglementation des telecommunications, 18/6/96. 
Germany 
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Privacy of  the content of  telecommunications is guaranteed by the constitution and operators authorised by 
the TKo22 are subject to criminal sanctions (s85 TKO) if  they breach this duty. The operators must also 
take appropriate technical precautions or other measures to protect the privacy of  telecommunications and 
personal data. Security requirements are specified by the regulatory authority23. 
22 Telekommunikationsgesetz 25/7/1996. 
23 Bundersanzeiger 208(a) 7/11197. 
The operators are required, by s88 TKO, to set up (at their own expense) facilities to support legally 
prescribed interception. 
Greece 
The right to privacy of  telephone and other telecommunications is protected by Article 19 of  the 
Constitution. This right may be withdrawn on application to the Court of  Appeal judge prosecutor from the 
courts or civil, military or police authorities in the interests of  national security or in the detection of 
specified crimes. Applications are overseen by the National Commission for the Protection of  Privacy in 
Communication24. 
24 Ethniki Epitropi Prostasias tou Aporritou ton Epikoinonion. 
Ireland 
There is protection for personal data within the Data Protection Act 1988 but there is no specific provision 
in Irish law to protect the security and confidentiality of  telecommunications services. 
Italy 
Like Ireland, the only protection is within the implementation of  the Data Protection Directive in Italian 
law25. This does however extend to data about entities and associations as well as individuals and might 
provide some protection against unlawful interception. 
25 Law 675/96. 
Luxembourg 
Again there is only protection in terms of  data protection, concerning the storage and transmission of  data 
about an individua126. 
26 Law of  31  March 1979. 
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Netherlands 
There is a general duty on telecommunications network operators to abide by the rules of  personal data set 
out in the Data Protection Act27. More detailed rules are given in the Telecommunications Act28 which 
was expected to become law late in 1998. This gives effect to Directive 97  /66/EC. Article 11.2 of  that Act 
imposes a general duty on telecommunications network operators and service providers to protect the 
privacy of  their users. This is interpreted by Article 11.3 to require them to have a level of  security which is 
appropriate to the state of  technology and implementation costs, and in proportion to the level of  threat. 
27 Wet Persoonsregistraties, 28 December 1988, 665. 
28 The Bill for the Telecommunications Act (Regels inzake de telecommunicatie (Telecommunicatwiet) - Voorstel 
van wet) of 15 September 1997, TK 1996/97,25533, 1-2. 
Portugal 
Personal data is protected29 but there is no explicit protection for the privacy of  communications. 
29 Law 10/91,24/4/91, amended by Law 28/94,29/8/94. 
Spain 
The only specific protection is the general data protection law30 but the telecommunication legislation31  32 
contain statements on the duty to preserve the confidentiality and secrecy of  communications. 
30 Ley Organica de Regulaci6n del Tratamiento Automatizado de los Datos de Can'lcter Personal, 1992 (known as 
LOR  TAD) 
31  Ley de Ordenaci6n de las Telecommunicaciones (LOT). 
32 Legislation Proyecto de Ley General de Telecommunicaciones (Draft-LGT) June 1997. 
Sweden 
The Telecommunications Act 198733 imposes an obligation of  confidentiality on individuals who obtain 
access to telecommunications messages in the course of  their duties. There are well-defined circumstances 
under which this obligation may lawfully be breached. 
The Data Protection Act34 also applies to data transmitted by telecommunications systems. 
33 Swedish Telecommunications Act 1993:597. 
34 1973:289. 
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4.2 Third countries 
United States of  America 
Interception is generally illegal in the United States but is permitted in most States under stringent rules 
designed to protect privacy but allow the investigation of  crime, including a requirement to obtain a court 
order before conducting an interception. There are two basic pieces of  Federal legislation: ECPA35 which 
concerns criminal investigations and FISA  36 which concerns intelligence and counterintelligence 
operations. 
ECP  A works like many European legal frameworks, in that it sets in place a procedure to authorise lawful 
interception. Network operators and service providers are required by CALEA37 to have the necessary 
technical facilities and to render assistance to law enforcement agencies. The requirements of  CLEA are 
similar to those of  the Council Resolution (see section 3.2 above). 
FISA authorises electronic surveillance of  foreign powers and agents of  foreign powers to obtain foreign 
intelligence information. FISA defines this in terms of  U.S. national security, including defence against 
attack, sabotage, terrorism, and clandestine intelligence activities. The targeted communications need not 
relate to any crime. FISA surveillance actions are implemented operationally by the FBI. Electronic 
surveillance conducted under FISA is classified. 
There are two limbs to FISA: 
•  Communications to or from US persons (natural or legal) but not U.S. persons who are overseas 
(unless the communications are with a U.S. person who is inside the U.S.). A court order is required to 
authorise interception; 
•  Communications exclusively between or among foreign powers or involving technical intelligence 
other than spoken communications from a location under the open and exclusive control of  a foreign 
power. An intercept may be authorised by a Presidential order. 
35 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986, amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968. 
36 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978. 
37 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 1994. 
Australia 
Australia is of  interest to Europe because it has recently examined in some detail the requirements for 
lawful interception capability. The Barrett Review38 concluded that telecommunications interception is 
highly cost-effective when compared with other forms of  surveillance. The Review supported the 
development of  "international user requirements" as the most effective means of  international cooperation 
to ensure that law enforcement's needs are taken into account in the development of  new technology. The 
conclusions were similar to those of  the Council Recommendation (see section 3.2 above) in that they call 
for network operators to be required to support lawful interception whilst at the same time strengthening 
the duty of  the operators to protect confidentiality against unlawful interception. 
The Review calls for international agreed standards. It concludes that unilateral action by Australia to 
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demand interceptable and secure national technology might lead to less than world-class technology being 
used and hence to a major economic disadvantage. It continues "the sooner an international requirement for 
interception is standardised and accepted, the more likely there will be the automatic provision of  a 
telecommunications intercept capability in new technology with similar implications for all users". 
38 Review of  the long-term cost effectiveness of  telecommunications interception, report of  the Security Committee 
of  the Federal Cabinet, March 1994. 
5 Observations 
Several main points and trends are clear: 
•  Human rights legislation, particularly ECHR, clearly provides a robust protection for natural persons 
against unlawful interception by the State of  communications. It is not clear to what extent this 
legislation would protect legal persons; 
•  Most EU Member States have, and it might be expected that all soon will have, a procedure to 
authorise lawful interception by the State; 
•  The EU, USA and Australia appear to be converging on a common set of  interception requirements 
which ensure that network operators do everything necessary to permit lawful interception; 
•  Many EU Member States already require telecommunications network operators to take technical 
precautions to protect privacy of  communications (ie against unlawful interception); 
•  The economic benefits of  encryption to allow secure e-commerce are seen as outweighing the social 
losses to law enforcement, and soon all EU Member States will have no restrictions on the use of 
encryption. 
The position is less clear with regard to interception by foreign powers, particularly because of  the 
fundamental technological change from switched circuits to packet switching. The former allows the 
network operator to control the route by which communications pass between subscribers. The latter 
reflects the underlying principle of  the Internet, in that packets of  data go by whatever route is convenient. 
It may for example be easier to route a packet from the south to the north of  France via the USA at 09.30 
French Time if  most US assets are underused at that time and the French national network is at peak 
demand. 
Consider two subscribers within country A, communicating with each other via a network operating in 
country A. Interception of  communications by a person in country B while the communications are passing 
within country A would appear to be unlawful. Under these circumstances the subscribers would have a 
right of  recourse to ECHR and country B would be in breach ofiCCPR. Even if  the interception is lawful in 
country B (for example FISA could make the interception lawful if  country B is the USA), it is not lawful 
in country A unless country B has express permission by the authorisation procedure of  country A. 
Now consider the case where their communication is routed via country B. It is possible that the lawful 
procedure for interception could be followed in country B. In particular, FISA could make the interception 
lawful if  country B is the USA; the network operator in the USA would be obliged to comply with a lawful 
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request to support that interception. Similarly IOCA could make it lawful if  country B was UK. 
It is claimed that some countries have the technological capability to intercept communications been carried 
entirely on a network within another country and it is the policy of  many countries to be able to do so when 
the communication is (even temporarily) within that country. Legal protection against the former is weak or 
inconvenient; against the latter it is non-existent. 
A possible course of  action for the EU to protect privacy without compromising law enforcement would be 
to extend and enforce the requirement for network operators to protect the privacy of  communications. 
Technical means exist which could achieve this at three levels: 
1. Telecommunications network operators to apply strong encryption to the content of 
communications. As the operators would hold the keys to this encryption, they could meet the 
Requirements of  the Council Resolution. 
2. Anonymous re-routing services to provide encryption of  the addresses of  communications. 
Again they could meet the Requirements but this would provide additional protection against 
unlawful interception leading to what is known in military intelligence as "traffic analysis" --
even where the content of  messages cannot be decrypted, the names of  the sender and recipient 
can provide valuable intelligence. 
3. Readily available private encryption to allow those who require greater security to encrypt their 
messages with a private key. An approach to reconciling this with law enforcement has been 
proposed in Denmark39. This in effect reverses the burden of  proof  in criminal cases. Where 
there is: 
•  circumstantial evidence of  guilt; 
•  encrypted material which might prove guilt; 
•  the defendant chooses not to decrypt that material; then the Court may draw an inference of 
guilt. This is analogous to the UK law on the right to remain silent40 when questioned. 
39 Andersen MB and P Landrock, Juristen [1995] 306, summarised in English in Computer Law and Security Report 
[1996112 CLSR 342 at 348. 
40 ss 34 to 37, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
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6.3 Web sites 
Information derived from web sites should be treated with caution. Although those of  reputable bodies are 
probably reliable, there is no quality assurance and many of  the web sites concerned with privacy and 
interception do not appear to come up to even the lowest standards of  objectivity. A few of  the sites 
examined in the course of  this study are listed below; search engines yield many more. 
OECD has a site with several relevant pages; including http:/  /www.oecd.org/news and events and 
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur . 
•  A useful survey of  cryptographic policies around the world is offered on the site of  the Global Internet 
Liberty Campaign http://www.gilc.org/crypto/crypt-survey . 
•  The Electronic Privacy Information Centre provides what appears to be objective and valuable 
information on http://www.epic.org. 
•  EU law and announcements are on http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/dataprot/dataprot.html. 
•  There is a thorough review of  the US legislation on http://www.cdt.org/digi  tele. 
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Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance: a survey 
of the technology assessment issues 
Summary 
The aims of  this report are: 
•  to remind Members of  the European Parliament of  the risks, in terms of  electronic surveillance, 
inherent in the use of  modem means of  communication; 
•  to provide Members with a reference document on encryption technologies and the current status of 
the standardisation procedures for these techniques; 
•  to outline potential developments with regard to both secure communications and electronic 
surveillance methods; 
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•  to provide Members with a synopsis, in language that is precise and yet accessible to non-specialists, 
of  recent technical documents on security of  information which represent the latest developments in 
the practice and principles of  international control bodies; 
•  to propose to Members options which are in the best interests of  European citizens, businesses and 
organisations. 
The report is divided into six main sections. 
The  first  is  a brief description of modern means  of communication and the  risks their use  entails; the 
second  provides  an  overview of current  cryptographic  techniques:  secret-key  cryptography,  public-key 
cryptography and quantum cryptography; these techniques are  explained in detail in the three following 
sections. The third section gives a precise description of secret-key cryptography, outlines the state of the 
art  as  regards  the  data  security  of widely-used  protocols  and  gives  an  update  on the  standardisation 
procedures for  the  future  US  federal  standard,  which is  likely to  become a world standard.  The  fourth 
section describes public-key cryptography in very clear terms, outlines the state of  the art with regard to the 
standardisation procedures for  public-key protocols worldwide and gives  a technical  interpretation of a 
Commission  DG XIII  document.  The  practical  implementation of quantum  cryptanalysis  and  quantum 
cryptography may have a particularly significant international impact in political, diplomatic and financial 
terms:  the fifth section outlines the latest developments in these two areas.  The Wassenaar Arrangement 
concerns export controls for conventional arms and sensitive technological products. Thirty-three countries 
are party to the Agreement, including all the EU countries and the signatories to the UKUSA agreement. 
The sixth section consists of  a technical interpretation of  the amendments to the Wassenaar Arrangement of 
3 December 1998, regarding data security. The final part ofthe report makes a number of  proposals, with a 
view to protecting European citizens and the interests of  European firms and organisations. It also provides 
a  list of complementary research projects; with the  aim  of measuring  more  effectively the  impact that 
certain  international  agreements  are  having  in  terms  of electronic  surveillance  in  Europe.  The  report 
includes a bibliography, listing the documents referred to. 
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Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance: a survey 
of the technology assessment issues 
FRANCK LEPREVOST 
1. Introduction 
Electronic  surveillance is  generally considered to  be  a  weapon with which to fight  organised crime or 
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terrorism ([32], Foreword, p.  iii). It can, however, have a darker side, namely that of industrial espionage, 
violation of  privacy, or both. 
The report [35] published by STOA in January 1998 refers to the role played by the ECHELON network in 
electronic surveillance (see [8] for a list of links to this subject). It is a global network which can intercept 
all telephone, fax or e-mail communications. 
Although it is  very difficult to  quantify the  losses  caused by industrial  espionage (many cases are  not 
reported, either because the company fears losing face or simply because the damage goes undetected), the 
losses incurred by firms in the European Union can reasonably be put at several billion euros per year. The 
extent of the problem can be  surmised from a study published by PricewaterhouseCoopers Investigation 
LLC ([27]) on 22 March 1999; the study shows that over 59% of  all firms with a significant presence on the 
Internet were  spied on in 1998.  Furthermore,  it is  quite  conceivable that information acquired by such 
means  is  exploited  by  the  international  stock  markets.  It is  an  issue  which thus  affects  shareholders, 
companies and national economies alike. 
The  initial  purpose of this  report  is  to  illustrate  the  main techniques  whereby EU citizens,  firms  and 
institutions  can  protect  themselves,  to  a  certain  extent,  against  what  is  now  known  as  economic 
intelligence. 
In Section 2, we outline the various means of communication generally used. We also describe some of  the 
techniques,  of varying  degrees  of sophistication,  by  means  of which  information  can  be  unlawfully 
accessed,  and some  countermeasures  which can be  taken.  Technological  measures  allowing data to be 
transmitted confidentially require  the  use of cryptosystems,  which are  briefly defined and illustrated in 
Section 3. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we outline the latest developments in secret-key, public-key and quantum 
cryptographic  protocols.  As  regards  the  first  two,  we  give  an update  on standardisation procedures.  In 
Section  7  we  conduct  a  technical  appraisal  of the  information  security  aspects  of the  Wassenaar 
Arrangement, which concerns export controls for conventional arms and sensitive technological products. 
We conclude the report by making recommendations to the European bodies. 
This document does not necessarily represent the views of the European Parliament. Nevertheless, in this 
report commissioned by STOA, and particularly in Sections 2,  7 and 8, we systematically viewed things 
from a standpoint which we judged to be the most favourable vis-a-vis the defence of  European interests. 
--------------------------
2. Means of communication used and risks involved 
In this  section  we  look  at  relatively  hi-tech  methods  of communication;  direct  oral  transmission  and 
traditional mail are therefore not dealt with. For the sake of  clarity and in keeping with standard practice in 
this field, we have designated Alice and Bob as two hypothetical individuals wishing to communicate. 
2.1  Standard telephones.  Standard telephone systems can be tapped without any technical difficulties:  a 
microphone can be placed inside the telephone set; alternatively, the wires of  the telephone exchange of  the 
building  where  the  target  is  located  can be  tapped,  as  can  those  of the  telephone  company's  central 
exchange. These techniques are largely undetectable by the target. 
2.2 Voice-scrambling telephones.  Secure telephones and fax  machines are now available on the market. 
Their level of security may be very modest, depending on the legislation currently in force in their country 
of  origin (see Section 7). 
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2.3  Fax  machines.  As  things  stand,  fax  machines  should  be  considered  as  insecure  as  telephones. 
Fax-encrypting machines do exist, but their security level is contingent on legislation in their country of  I  origin, as above. 
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2.4 Cordless telephones. Some older models transmit just above the AM broadcasting band and can thus be 
easily  intercepted.  Commercially-available  scanners  enable  the  more  recent  models  to  be  tapped. 
Sometimes certain sound wave  inversion techniques  are  recommended in order to  combat tapping,  but 
these solutions only provide a very low level of  confidentiality. As regards cellular phones, the situation is 
more  complex. Early models transmit in the same way as  radios and so do not provide a high level of 
confidentiality,  since  conversations  can be  intercepted  using  inexpensive  scanners  (equally  low-priced 
equipment can be purchased to increase the frequencies accessible to the scanners currently on the market). 
It is worth mentioning here the US Administration's attempt to impose the Clipper standard on all portable 
phones  developed  in  the  United  States.  This  would  have  allowed  government agencies  to  retain keys 
enabling them to eavesdrop on conversations.  Moreover, details of the encryption algorithm 'Skipjack', 
developed by the NSA, have not been made public. 
The GSM system, the international standard for digital cellular phones, was developed by the GSM MoU 
Association (which became the GSM Association on 30 November 1998) in collaboration with the 
European Telecommunications Standard Institute ([13]), an international umbrella organisation bringing 
together public authorities, operator networks, manufacturers, service providers and users. GSM uses 
cryptographic techniques at various levels. As regards identification, GSM uses several algorithms, 
although in practice most operators use a protocol named COMP 128. However, in April 1998 the 
Smartcard Developer Association ([28]), in collaboration with David Wagner and Ian Goldberg, researchers 
at UC Berkeley (USA), announced that it had developed a system whereby phones using the GSM standard 
could be cloned . But on 27 April 1998, Charles Brookson, chairman of  the security group of  the GSM 
MoU Association, stated that this would not be of  any practical use to fraudsters. 
With regard to confidentiality, GSM uses a protocol known as AS.  There are two versions of this system: 
A5/1  and AS/2,  which meet different needs.  According to  some experts, A5/2  is  less secure than AS/1, 
which we will now discuss. The A5/1  protocol in theory uses 64 bits. But Wagner told us that in practice 
([33 ]), in every phone he had seen, 10 bits had been systematically replaced with zeros, thus reducing the 
theoretical  security of the  system to  54  bits.  The  system is  therefore even less secure than the  56  bits 
offered by DES, which can now be cracked all too easily (see 4.4). Work conducted before this discovery 
([ 11]) had already reduced the real security of the system to 40 bits. It is therefore quite possible that by 
using similar methods, i.e. assuming that 10 bits are equal to zero, the actual security level of A5/1  - and 
hence the confidentiality of  conversations - can be reduced even further. 
On 24 February 1999, at the GSM World Congress in Cannes (France), Charles Brookson announced that 
GSM security had been reviewed and in particular that COMP 128 had been revised. 
2.5  ISDN.  It is  technically possible to  tap  an ISDN telephone with the  help of software  that remotely 
activates the monitoring function via the D channel, obviously without physically lifting the receiver. It is 
therefore easy to eavesdrop on certain conversations in a given room. 
2.6 Internet communications. In a nutshell, the traditional mail equivalent of  an e-mail on the Internet is a 
postcard without an envelope. Basically, such messages can be read. If  they are in plaintext, they can be 
understood and any 'secret reader' can take measures which are detrimental to the two parties wishing to 
communicate. For example, if  Alice sends a message to Bob and if  Charles is a passive attacker, Charles 
knows what message has been sent but he cannot modify it. If, on the other hand, he is an active attacker, 
he can modify it. One way of  circumventing this problem is by encrypting the messages (see Section 3). 
However, the solutions developed by Microsoft, Netscape and Lotus for encrypting e-mails are configured 
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in such a way that the NSA can systematically read all e-mails thus exchanged outside the United States 
(although it is probably the only agency that is able to do so). 
2. 7 The TEMPEST effect. TEMPEST is the acronym for Temporary Emanation and Spurious 
Transmission, i.e. emissions from electronic components of  electromagnetic radiation in the form of  radio 
signals. These emissions can be picked up by AM/FM radio receivers within a range varying from a few 
dozen to a few hundred metres. Building on these data it is then possible to reconstruct the original 
information. Protective measures against such risks consist of  placing the source of  the emissions (central 
processors, monitors, but also cables) in a Faraday cage, or jamming the electromagnetic emissions. The 
NSA has published several documents on TEMPEST (see [25]). 
All  computers work by  means of a micro-processor (chip).  The  PC  chip market is  dominated by Intel,  • 
which has a market share of over 80%. On 20 January 1999 Intel unveiled its new PSN-equipped Pentium 
III processor. 
2.8 PSNs. Pentium III processors have a unique serial number called PSN (Processor Serial Number). Intel 
devised this technique in order to promote electronic commerce. The aim of  the serial number is to enable 
anybody ordering goods via the Internet to be identified. Intel maintains that all users will be able to retain 
control over whether or not to allow their serial number to be read. However, software techniques enabling 
the number to be read have already been discovered (see [26]) . It is therefore possible to obtain the PSN 
secretly and to track the user without his or her knowledge. 
The PSN is very different from the IP (Internet Protocol) address, even though a user's IP  address can be 
revealed to any webpage he or she chooses to visit. IP addresses are not as permanent as PSNs: many users 
have no fixed IP address that can be used to track their movements, as they may use masks via the proxy 
servers of Internet service providers. ISPs normally assign a different IP number per session and per user. 
Users can also change ISP, use a service which guarantees their anonymity, etc. 
As it stands, the PSN can therefore be used for electronic surveillance purposes. 
Moreover,  it is  still not known for  sure whether PSNs  can be  cloned.  If so,  their use  for  identification 
purposes in electronic commerce would have to be ruled out. 
3. An overview of cryptographic techniques 
Cryptography is the study of  the techniques used to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of 
information  and  its  origin.  Cryptography  can  be  broadly  divided  into  three  categories:  private-key, 
public-key and quantum cryptography. Several of these techniques make extensive use of hash functions. 
Here  we  give  a brief outline of the  techniques, explaining them in more detail  in Sections 4,  5 and 6. 
However, it should be stressed that a high degree of  confidentiality can be attained only by combining these 
techniques  with  measures  to  counter  TEMPEST effects.  Basically,  it  is  no  use  encrypting  data  if,  for 
example, they can be read in plaintext while being transferred from the keyboard to the central processor. 
Assuming that the  information to  be  processed is  in binary code,  the  fundamental  unit of information 
referred to  in all sections of this report is  the bit, apart from  in Sections 3,  4 and 6,  where its quantum 
equivalent, the qubit, is used. 
3.1  Hash functions.  These are tools which have multiple applications; amongst other things, they can be 
used to create secret keys and electronic signatures. Their basic function is to rapidly map a file  (of any 
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size) to a fixed-size value, such as 160 bits, as in the European hash function RIPEMD-160. If  the value is 
known it should be impossible to reconstruct an initial text that would match the hash value. Essentially, it 
is  very hard to  invert.  A  hash function  should also  avoid  collisions.  In other words,  it  should not be 
possible to construct two distinct files giving the same hash values. 
3.2 Secret-key cryptography. With this method, a single key is used both for encrypting and decrypting. 
This key should be known only to Alice and Bob. It can be of  varying length. Secret-key cryptography can 
be divided into two categories: Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers. With Stream Ciphers the length of  the 
key is the same as that of  the message to be transmitted. The 'right' size, i.e. that which can be used as a 
basis for recreating a key the same size as the message, can be reduced to a fixed size with the help of 
cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generators. These generators have to pass very stringent 
statistical tests. As regards Block Ciphers, the size of  the key is fixed (56 bits for DES, 128 bits for AES, 
see 4.3, 4.4). The main problems with this technique lie in the management and distribution of  the keys. 
3.3 Public-key cryptography. Unlike the secret-key algorithms, public-key algorithms require two keys per 
user. Alice (and Bob respectively) chooses a secret key, XA (respectively X8 ) and publishes (e.g. in a 
directory) a public key Y  A (respectively Y  8). Bob encodes his message with Y  A and sends it to Alice. Only 
Alice, with her secret key XA, can decode the message. The security of  public-key algorithms has a 
mathematical basis (see Section 5). 
See [21] and [23] for details of  a report (updated to 31  December 1998) on the standardisation procedures 
for AES secret-key protocols (see 4.5) and IEEE-P1363 public-key protocols (see 5.3). 
3.4 Quantum cryptography. This method is dealt with in 6.2. 
3.5 Cryptanalysis. Cryptanalysis is the perfection of  techniques or attacks to reduce the theoretical security 
of  cryptographic algorithms. This should not be confused with the hackers' approach, since they, as a rule, 
exploit weaknesses not in the algorithms themselves, but in the security architecture. In 4.4 we describe a 
number of  attacks on secret-key cryptosystems and in 5.1 and 6.1  on public-key cryptosystems. 
3.6 Security quantification. In general security is evolutive, as it often depends on the scientific knowledge 
of  a given period. It may be absolute. For example, the only known form of  attack for breaking various 
Block Ciphers is that of  trying out all possible keys (Brute-Force Attack). Hence, if  such a system uses a 
56-bit key, security equals 256 operations. It can also be relative: theoretically, a cryptosystem is considered 
to be insecure if  it can be cryptanalysed in polynomial time according to the size of  the data. Its degree of 
security can be considered satisfactory if  it takes a sub-exponential, or better still, exponential period of 
time to cryptanalyse. More precise measurements can be provided in terms ofMIPS/year. This unit of 
measurement is equivalent to a computer's computational capacity, carrying out a million instructions per 
second over a year (approximately 3.1013 instructions in all). 
-----------------· 
4. Secret-key cryptography 
Secret-key cryptography can be divided into two categories: Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers. 
4.1  Stream Ciphers. These technologies are only rarely published. Where Block Ciphers encrypt in blocks, 
Stream Ciphers encrypt on a bit-by-bitbasis. The most well-known of  these, and the most cryptographically 
secure, is the One-Time Pad, which requires a key of  the same length as the message to be transmitted. This 
key must also be created randomly. For practical purposes, the One-Time Pad is often simulated by means 
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of  cyptographically secure pseudorandom bit generators, often abbreviated to CSPRBG (Cryptographically 
Strong Pseudo-Random Bit Generator).  Starting with an initial data item X0  (seed), CSPRBG is used to 
create deterministically bits which appear to  be  random.  This  is  then double-checked by subjecting the 
CSPRBG candidate to extremely stringent statistical tests. 
4.2  Block Ciphers.  With Block Ciphers  a message  is  cut into  fixed-length  blocks.  With the  aid of an 
algorithm and secret key K of fixed length, but possibly of a different length to the blocks, each block is 
encrypted and sent. The recipient decrypts each block with the same key K. All he or she then has to do is 
to 'stick' the blocks back together to recover the original message. The de facto standard for algorithms in 
the Block Cipher category is DES (see 4.4). 
4.3 Problems. At least two problems may arise with these methods (Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers): 
•  (a) How do Alice and Bob communicate the secret key K to each other? 
•  (b) In a network with n users where n(n- 1))/2 secret keys are needed (e.g. 499 500 secret keys in a 
network of 1 000 users), obvious problems of  storage and security need to be addressed. 
Public-key (see 5, particularly 5.2) and quantum (see 6.2) cryptography techniques provide partial solutions 
to these problems. 
4.4 DES: state of  the art. The symmetric algorithm most widely used at present is undoubtedly DES (Data 
Encryption Standard). In 1997 it was recognised as an FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) and 
registered as FIPS 46-2. DES uses a 56-bit key. There are therefore 2  56 possible keys. The block length is 
64 bits. 
DES has enjoyed the political backing of the United States for a very long time. As recently as  17 March 
1998, for example, Robert S.  Litt (Principal Associate Deputy Attorney-General) maintained that the FBI 
did not have the technological and financial  capacity to decrypt a message encrypted with a symmetric 
56-bit secret-key algorithm. He concluded by stating that 14 000 Pentium PCs would need to be used for 
four months in order to achieve such a feat (see also statements by Louis J. Freeh (Director of  the FBI) and 
William P. Crowell (Deputy Director of  the NSA, [10], p.  1-2). 
Nevertheless,  the  Electronic  Frontier Foundation built  a  DES  cracker and presented  it  at  an  informal 
(Rump)  session of the  Crypto  '98  conference  in  Santa  Barbara.  The  machine  (worth  USD  250  000, 
including the design) is described in [  10]. Better still, the book explains how to scan the plans in order to 
reproduce the machine for a maximum outlay of  USD 200 000 (basically there is no need to pay over again 
for the design). This machine is capable of finding a secret DES key in an average of  four days. In January 
1999 a team led by the Electronic Frontier Foundation won the RSA Laboratories' Challenge (pocketing 
USD 10 000 for their efforts) by managing, with the aid of  a large computer network, to break a 56-bit key 
in 23  hours  15  minutes.  This  has  both political and  diplomatic  implications:  it appears  that it is  now 
financially feasible for all nations to decode all DES-encoded records that may have been built up over the 
years. From now on all DES-based systems should therefore be considered insecure. In practice, it is now 
advisable to use Triple-DES at the very least (though even here caution is  needed). The NIST (National 
Institute  for  Standards  and  Technology),  mindful  of the  risks  relating  to  DES,  has  called  on  the 
cryptographic community to work on its successor-AES (Advanced Encryption Standard [24]). 
4.5  AES.  The required features  for  AES  are:  a)  the algorithm should be a secret-key Block Cipher type 
algorithm, and (b) it should support the following combinations of  cryptographic key-block sizes: 128-128, 
192-128  and 256-128  bits.  The  algorithms  used  in AES  will be  royalty-free  worldwide.  The  algorithm 
should also  be  sufficiently flexible,  for  example, to  allow other combinations (  64-bit block lengths);  it 
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should be  efficient on various platforms  and  in various  applications  (8-bit processors,  A  TM networks, 
satellite  communications,  HDTV,  B-ISDN,  etc.)  and  it  should  be  usable  as  a  Stream  Cipher,  MAC 
(Message Authentication Code) generator, Pseudo-Random Number Generator, etc. 
The first AES conference was held on 20 August 1998 Gust before the Crypto '98 conference). During the 
conference, presentations were given of the  15  (out of 21) candidates that had been accepted: CAST-256, 
CRYPTON, DEAL, DFC, E2, FROG, HPC, LOK197, MAGENTA, MARS, RC6, RIJNDAEL, SAFER+, 
SERPENT and TWOFISH. 
At  present,  it  seems  that the  DEAL,  LOK197,  FROG,  MAGENTA  and MARS  (in the  extra-long key 
version) proposals are subject to attacks of  varying intensity. 
The second AES conference will be held in Rome on 22-23 March 1999, after which five algorithms will 
be chosen out of the 15  candidates. The debate on the 15 candidates has already begun ([3]). A third AES 
conference will be held from  six to nine months later, when the winner will be announced. Following a 
final examination period of another six to nine months, the winning algorithm will be put forward as an 
FIPS. It is likely that AES will become an FIPS in around 2001. 
·------------
5. Public-key cryptography 
5.1  A description of public-key cryptography. The  security of public-key algorithms has  a mathematical 
basis: 
•  Factoring of  large integers: RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and Rabin-Williams. 
•  Discrete Log Problem: DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm), Diffie-Hellman key exchange,  El Gamal 
cryptosystem and electronic signature and Schnorr and Nyberg-Rueppel electronic signatures. 
•  Discrete Log Problem for elliptic curves: the above algorithm equivalents also apply to elliptic curves. 
Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fp or F2n, it is essential to be able to rapidly 
calculate the number of  rational points on the elliptic curve over the finite field in question. The 
Schoof-Elkies-Atkin method (now known as SEA) is normally used for this purpose. In some cases 
(Koblitz curves or complex multiplication curves) this number is very easy to calculate. 
Public-key cryptosystems are prone to attacks: 
•  Factoring of  large integers: the ECM (Elliptic Curve Factoring Method) is used to find small factors. 
At present QFS (Quadratic Field Sieve) or NFS (Number Field Sieve) are used to find large factors. 
There is a limit to the numbers that can be considered. Very recently, Professor Shamir of  the 
Weizmann Institute perfected an approach known as the 'Twinkle Attack' which enables 512-bit 
numbers to be factored with great rapidity. The cost of  the attack is also very modest. At present, 
therefore, RSA-512 bits should no longer be considered secure. 
•  Discrete Log Problem: to solve this problem, the index-calculus method or the NFS method can be 
used. There is a limit to the numbers that can be considered. 
•  Discrete Log Problem for elliptic curves: a well-known attack is Pollard's rho method (which can also 
be parallelised). Here too, only certain curves can be considered: the so-called supersingular or 
anomalous elliptic curves should be avoided (a very rapid practical test can show whether a given 
elliptic curve is suitable). 
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The techniques based on the problem of  factoring, on the one hand, and the discrete logarithm, on the other, 
are fundamentally different. For the former, large prime numbers have to be secretly produced and stored. 
As  it is  not humanly possible to  remember large  prime numbers, they have to be  stored on a physical 
medium, which could give rise to security problems. 
The approach to the discrete logarithm problem is different. For example, the user can freely choose a text 
that is  easy to  memorise  (e.g.  a poem).  The text is  then translated into binary code and hashed with a 
tried-and-tested hash function, such as the European proposal RIPEMD 160, which has an output of 160 
bits (see. 3.1). These 160 bits, being impossible to memorise, form the user's secret key. This approach has 
the advantage of  limiting storage problems. 
These two approaches solve different problems, according to the parameters involved. Elliptic curve-based 
techniques are now the focus of  attention, since unlike other proposals, no subexponential algorithm has as 
yet  been discovered to  resolve  the  discrete  logarithm  problem for  these  groups.  Consequently,  elliptic 
curves over fixed-size fields provide the same degree of security as other algorithms for fields or modules 
of a larger size. For example, the security provided by elliptic curves for a 163-bit module is equivalent to 
that provided by RSA for 1024 bits. 
5.2  Symmetric  or public-key cryptography?  Symmetric  and public-key cryptosystems  are  not mutually 
exclusive  . On the  contrary,  for  the  secure  transmission of a  document through an open channel  (e.g. 
Internet), they are most useful if  combined. 
For example, Alice  lives  in Paris  and wishes to  send a  15-page report by e-mail to Bob, who lives in 
Brussels. It is out of  the question for Alice to go to Brussels to give a secret AES key to Bob. If  she were to 
choose this expensive method, she might just as well deliver the document in person! Naturally, Alice and 
Bob could choose to communicate using public-key cryptographic techniques, as described above, the only 
problem being that encryption with these techniques is  about  1000 times  slower than encryption using 
secret-key cryptosystems. 
The most practical solution could be the following: 
•  Alice sends a 128-bit message K to Bob using public-key cryptography. The use of  public-key 
techniques is warranted, as the message is very short (128 bits). Alice and Bob thus share the secret K. 
•  As agreed between them according to standard practice, K is the secret key to a secret-key algorithm, 
AES. 
•  Alice and Bob forget the public-key technology. To continue communicating they use AES with the K 
key. Alice can now send her 15-page document to Bob for the price of  a phone call. 
Alice's and Bob's systems  must,  however, be compatible:  indeed,  the  aim of the  standardisation drive 
described below is to harmonise communications. 
5.3  IEEE-P1363  and other standards.  The P1363 project began in 1993  under the auspices of the IEEE 
(Institute  of Electrical  and  Electronics  Engineers)  Standardisation  Committee.  Its  aim  is  to  improve 
communications between several  families  of public-key cryptosystems:  RSA,  El Gamal, Diffie-Hellman 
and elliptic curves. Since the end of 1996, the techniques considered by P 1363 have changed little and have 
been summarised in ([16]). The P1363A project contains additional techniques. 
The  standard project (draft version 9)  is  now ready to be revised by a group of experts from  the IEEE 
Standards Association. The group started its work in February 1999 and will deliver its initial conclusions 
on 2 April 1999. According to the most optimistic estimate, the draft will be approved as a standard on 25 
June 1999. 
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The IEEE-P1363 standard will have a huge influence on other standards, such as ANSI X9.42, ANSI X9.62 
and ANSI X9.63 in the banking industry. It will also be the cornerstone ofthe X.509 ([17]) and S-MIME 
([18]) protocols. These multiple protocols are essential for electronic commerce. 
5.4 A technical interpretation of  the Commission (DG XIII) document COM(97) 503. This document [12] 
sets out Community-wide requirements with regard to secure electronic communications. It focuses on both 
electronic  signatures  and  confidential  methods  of electronic  communication.  Below we  suggest  a  few 
updates to Technical Annexes I (Digital Signature) and II (Symmetric and asymmetric encryption) to this 
document. 
Annex I. It would be preferable to avoid citing MD2 and MD5 as examples, since cases of collision in the 
former and pseudo-collision in the latter have been brought to light. It would also be advisable to replace 
SHA by SHA  -1  (based on [ 14]) and to write RIPEMD-160 (based on [ 7]) instead of RIP  EM 160. It is 
currently recommended that one of these two hash functions be used to replace the MD2, MD4 and MD5 
functions wherever possible. 
Annex II. Symmetric encryption systems. It would be preferable to avoid citing DES and SAFER as 
examples. We suggest that IDEA, which so far has shown no serious flaws, be retained and that the 
candidates that passed the first AES round be mentioned. 
Annex II. Asymmetric encryption systems. Once again, as regards the examples provided, it would be 
advisable to be more specific, e.g. by taking up the approach described at the start of  5.1, which is currently 
being standardised. 
Annexe II. Systems security. We suggest deleting the last sentence of  the second paragraph: 'In a symmetric 
system like DES or IDEA, keys of  56 to 128 bits provide similar protection as a 1  024-bit public key'. This 
assertion is totally false. 
------------~--~~~--------------
6. Quantum cryptanalysis and quantum cryptography 
Quantum  cryptanalysis  and  quantum  cryptography  may  have  a  considerable  impact  in  the  political, 
diplomatic and financial terms. 
6.1  Quantum cryptanalysis.  The term quantum cryptanalysis refers to the set of techniques whereby the 
secret keys of  cryptographic protocols can be found by means of  quantum computers. It is an area in which 
research is thriving, as in August 1998 one of  the system's founders, Peter Shor of  AT & T Bell Labs, won 
the Nevanlinna Prize, which was awarded to him at the International Congress of  Mathematicians in Berlin. 
He has developed methods based on quantum physics to factor large numbers in polynomial time ([29], 
[ 30]) or to solve the Discrete Log Problem even when formulated within the general context of Abelian 
varieties ([31], see [32] for a summary ofthese results). 
Consequence: if  these results were to be put into practice, the immediate consequence would be that the 
security of  the public-key cryptographic protocols described in Section 5 would be permanently 
undermined. In addition, cryptosystems based on Abelian varieties would then be cryptanalysed via 
quantum computing. A parallel can be drawn between these consequences and the comments in 7.3 relating 
to the Wassenaar Arrangement. 
Despite this, IEEE-P1363 is still valid: the Shor algorithms require a powerful quantum computer, whose 
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existence is  still hypothetical.  Various experimental proposals have been made  (  qubits are  the quantum 
equivalent of  bits and are basically dual-state quantum systems): 
•  To use the electronic states of  ions as qubits in an electromagnetic ion trap and to manipulate them 
with lasers (see [4]). 
•  To use nuclear atom spins in a complex molecule as qubits, and to manipulate them using nuclear 
magnetic resonance (see [6] and [9]). 
•  To use the nuclear spins of  silicon chip impurities as qubits and to manipulate them using the chip's 
electronics (see [19]). 
None of  these proposals has been tested for anything other than small numbers of  qubits. 
This field of research is particularly well-regarded in the United States and is funded by the DARPA, the 
Pentagon's research department. A similar project has been set up in Europe: nine research groups have 
joined together to form the Quantum Information European Research Network. Nonetheless, according to 
Shor ([31]) it would be unreasonable to expect a quantum coprocessor to be developed within the next few 
years. 
Should such a quantum computer ever exist, the public-key cryptography described in Section 5 would 
become obsolete. Nevertheless, there is a theory of quantum cryptography, more specifically of quantum 
key-sharing ([ 1 ], see  [ 2] for  a bibliography on the  subject),  which offers an alternative to  public-key 
cryptography. 
6.2 Quantum cryptography. The problems are similar to those described in 5.2: Alice and Bob once again 
wish to share a secret, which they can then use as a secret key for a symmetric protocol (such as AES). If 
they use only a telephone line, they have no choice but to employ public-key cryptography. If  an attacker 
with a powerful quantum computer eavesdrops on their conversation, they are open to the attacks described 
earlier. However, if  they can use an optical fibre to transmit quantum states, they can employ quantum 
cryptography. It can be designed in such a way that an attacker listening in on the conversation can capture 
only one 'bit' of  the conversation at the most. Furthermore, any information that he does manage to capture 
will disturb the states, so Alice and Bob will immediately know what is happening. All they would then 
have to do then is reject the states in question. 
Although the theory dates back to  1982-84 ([ 1  ]), it was not put into practice until the 1990s. In 1990-92 
IBM began an initial free-space experiment over a 30 em length. In 1993-95 British Telecom conducted an 
experiment  on  optical  fibres  over  a  10-30  km  length.  In  1996  Swiss  Telekom  conducted  similar 
experiments on a 23 km fibre under Lake Leman. In 1997 Los Alamos National Lab successfully conducted 
the same experiments on a 48 km optical fibre, and in 1998 it conducted an experiment through free space 
over 1 km. 
7. A technical interpretation of Category 5 of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
7.1  The Wassenaar Arrangement. Acknowledging the end of the Cold War, on 16 November 1993 in The 
Hague representatives of  the 1  7 member states of COCOM decided to abolish the committee and replace it 
with  a  body  which reflected  the  new political  developments.  The  decision to  wind  up  COCOM  was 
confirmed in Wassenaar (Netherlands) on 29-30 March 1994 and came into effect on 31  March 1994. 
The folUldations of  the agreement on COCOM's successor were laid on 19 December 1995, once again in 
Wassenaar, and the inaugural meeting was held on 2-3 April 1996 in Vienna, which since then has become 
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the site of  the Permanent Representation of  the Wassenaar Agreements. 
The  Arrangement concerns  export controls  for  conventional arms  and sensitive technological products. 
Participating countries are:  Germany, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, 
United  States,  Russian  Federation,  Finland,  France,  Spain,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan, 
Luxembourg,  Norway,  New  Zealand,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  Republic  of Korea,  Slovak 
Republic, Czech Republic, Romania, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 
This list of  33 countries includes, in particular, those of  the European Community and the signatories to the 
UKUSA agreement. 
The Arrangement is open to those countries which fulfil certain criteria (see [34] for a full description) and 
decisions are based on consensus. Observers are not admitted. 
As regards the security of information, some important amendments were made during the last meeting of 
the representatives of  the signatory countries to the Arrangement on 2-3 December 1998 in Vienna ([34]). 
These amendments, of which we give a technical interpretation below, concern Category 5, part 2, entitled 
Information Security. 
7.2  Category  5,  part 2:  Information  Security.  Part 5.A.2  stipulates  in particular that controls  are  to  be 
imposed on systems, equipment and components using the following (either directly or after modification): 
1. a symmetric algorithm using a key longer than 56 bits; or 
2. a public-key algorithm, in which the security of  the algorithm is based on one of  the following: 
•  (a) the factorisation of  integers higher than 512 bits (e.g. RSA); 
•  (b) discrete log computations in the multiplicative group of  a finite field larger than 512 bits; 
•  (c) discrete log computations in a group other than those mentioned above, and which is larger than 
112 bits. 
However  (Note  5.A.2.d),  cryptographic  equipment  specially  designed and intended solely for  use  in 
machines for banking or money transactions is not subject to controls. 
7.3  Comments. The gist of Point (1) is that unrestricted exports are  authorised only for those techniques 
which offer the  same degree of security as  DES.  As  explained in 4.3, this type  of system offers a very 
limited degree of  security. 
The techniques referred to in Point (2) were illustrated in 5.1. The main groups targeted in (2c) are those 
associated with elliptic  curves.  However,  in actual  fact  (2c)  covers a far  vaster area,  as  it concerns all 
groups. It thus includes, inter alia, rational points of  Abelian varieties over a fnite field (in particular elliptic 
curves, which are Abelian varieties of dimension  1  ),  which are  known (see 6.1) to be  open to quantum 
cryptanalysis. 
As  stated  in  5.1,  according to  current know-how elliptic  curves  over fixed-size  fields  offer equivalent 
security to that provided by RSA with far larger modules or with the discrete logarithm over a far larger 
finite field. In other words, (2a), (2b) and (2c) offer equivalent degrees of  security, in that, on average, more 
or less the same effort is required to recover the secret data from the different algorithms. This explains the 
slight difference in size between (2a, 2b) and (2c). Moreover, as  seen in 5.2, these public-key techniques 
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are generally combined with secret-key cryptosystems. 
7.4 Note. Watermark techniques are not included in the systems subject to controls. Such techniques, which 
are also known as data hiding or steganography, enable one piece of information to be hidden in another, 
e.g. a fax, photo, video or sound files. The hidden information generally protects the intellectual ownership 
of the data (see  [20]), but nothing prevents users from  hiding other things,  such as  a  128-bit key for a 
symmetric system, which the two correspondents have agreed on in advance (possibly via information that 
has  been  embedded  in  another  document  using  a  stenographic  method).  The  state  of the  art  is  that 
documents which contain information hidden using steganographic techniques  cannot - without special 
software  - be  distinguished  from  the  original;  moreover,  the  information  can  withstand  numerous 
compressions/decompressions (necessary for the rapid transmission of such documents over the Internet) 
and can only be recovered by means of a special software product and a password. This technique is also 
very cheap.  It seems that it is  not therefore  subject to  export restrictions,  but in practice  it does  allow 
confidential  data  to  be  exchanged.  Likewise,  the  approach  entitled  'Chaffing  and  Winnowing: 
Confidentiality  without  Encryption',  developed  by  Professor  Rivest,  also  enables  a  high  degree  of 
confidentiality to be achieved, whilst avoiding any entanglement with the Wassenaar Arrangement. 
7.5 Impact on criminal organisations. It would be naive to imagine that criminal or terrorist organisations 
conduct their business in compliance with international import/export rules, or that they do not have not the 
means to perfect highly confidential methods of  communication. Algorithms do not stop at borders. 
Moreover, numerous algorithms are freely accessible. It is also difficult to see how the authorities could 
prove that a suspect binary sequence was created using an unauthorised system if, for example, it was 
actually created with a public-key cryptosystem using a 4096-bit module. Just because an intercepted 
binary sequence does not make sense, even if  it has hypothetically used a 'lawful' cryptographic system 
(which can be ascertained, but at considerable cost), this does not mean that it has been created 
'unlawfully' (which, above a certain level of  sophistication, cannot be ascertained). Lastly, even if 
cryptographic products are subject to tight export controls, the fact remains that they are still freely used in 
many countries, including the United States. However, it does not appear that criminal or terrorist 
organisations operate only outside these countries; but neither do the authorities of  these countries appear 
to lack effective means of  investigation on their national territory. 
7.6 Impact on the European Union. From a Community point of  view, the consequences of  the Wassenaar 
amendments are manifold. 
Prior to the amendments, EU firms were free to conquer the data security market as long as the laws of  their 
country  of origin  authorised  them  to  do  so.  In particular,  European firms  in this  sector  could export 
solutions  with  a  very  high  degree  of security,  the  only  restrictions  being  those  imposed  by  national 
legislation (which could nevertheless be extremely tight, as in the case of  France until recently). 
Now, however, the only products that European data security firms are allowed to export without restriction 
are of  a far lower quality. 
By virtue of these amendments, at the time of publication of the agreement European data security firms, 
unlike their US  counterparts, could not automatically realise economies of scale and target large markets. 
Even if, from the viewpoint of  the Wassenaar Arrangement, they were on an equal footing with US firms, 
this apparent equality was deceptive and overall they were at a disadvantage. 
Fortunately,  bilateral  agreements  reached  in  Europe  now  allow  European  firms  to  sell  high-quality 
solutions  freely  throughout  the  continent.  However,  this  freedom  ends  abruptly  at  Europe's  external 
borders. 
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But even if the  use of cryptography is  such as  to  prevent industrial  espionage by bodies with limited 
financial clout, the Wassenaar Arrangement resolutions do not protect firms from all risks. In the light of 
the existence of the DES Cracker, it is not unreasonable to estimate that an institution with a USD 300 
million budget could recover a 56-bit key within a few seconds. With the same budget, it would take a few 
tenthousandths of  a second (see 2.4, where this is the maximum level of security provided by several GSM 
cellphones) to find a secret 40-bit key. Hence those firms, bodies or individuals that equip themselves with 
a cryptosystem which fulfils the criteria set out in 7.2 should be fully aware that the Echelon network is in 
all likelihood still able to intercept and decode their information. 
8. Recommendations 
It is our view that the recommendations (Section 4.5, p.  21-22) contained in the previous report [35] are 
still valid. Here, however, we seek to provide the European Parliament with some alternative solutions. 
•  A.  - Experts should be commissioned to provide updates on a regular basis, or as  required, to the 
technical documents published by Community bodies. For example, it would be advisable to examine 
whether and to what extent the comments made in 5.4 (which are by no means exhaustive) have been 
taken into consideration; it would also be advisable to monitor the conferences on AES, IEEE-P1363 
and P1363A concerning secret-key and public-key cryptography and the experimental developments 
with regard to quantum processors. 
•  B. -Bearing in mind the legal risks run by European telephone industries (groups of users could be 
roused to action by the fact that the level of security provided does not systematically correspond to 
the  level  claimed),  European  bodies  should  encourage  European  telephone  operators  to: 
- update their implementation of  the COMP  128 authentication algorithm; 
- clearly specify the actual level of  security of  their implementation of  the encryption algorithm AS. 
•  C - In view of  the fact that the NSA has managed to bring about a considerable reduction in the degree 
of security offered to  non-US  users  of solutions developed by Microsoft, Netscape and Lotus for 
encrypting electronic messages, with the  express intention of being systematically able to read the 
messages exchanged by these users (and probably being the only agency in the world able to do so), 
the European Parliament should actively promote the use, amongst European organisations, firms and 
citizens, of  e-mail encrypting solutions that actually provide the confidentiality promised. At the same 
time, Proposal 5 of the 'Policy issues for the European Parliament' contained in the STOA IC 2000 
report by Duncan Campbell should be taken into consideration. 
•  D.-In view of: 
- the launch of  the worldwide advertising campaign for the PSN* -equipped Pentium III by the market 
leader (80%+) for PC chips, 
- the risks of  the PSN being used for electronic surveillance purposes, 
- the  concern  shown  by the  highest  US  authorities  with  regard  to  this  precise  subject  (see  the 
declaration [ 15] made  on 25  January  1999 by Mr AI  Gore,  Vice-President of the  United States), 
- the risk that PSNs may be cloned and be unsuitable fore-commerce, hence the risk that this new 
industry may be held back, particularly in Europe, 
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the relevant committees of  the European Parliament should: 
-call on American government agencies, including the NSA and FBI, to provide information on their 
role in the creation of  the PSN developed by Intel, 
- at  the  same  time  commission  a  group  of independent  technical  experts  to  conduct  a  precise 
assessment of the risks connected to this product: electronic surveillance, PSN falsification, etc. The 
group should issue its report as soon as possible. 
Building on the initial results of the above, if appropriate, the relevant committees of the European 
Parliament, should be asked to consider legal measures to prevent PSN-equipped (or PSN-equivalent) 
chips from being installed in the computers of  European citizens, firms and organisations. We wish to 
underline most strongly that the above suggestions have no connection whatsoever with any particular 
firm, but are motivated purely by the characteristics of  a product which, unless rapid action is taken at 
Community level, may become a de facto industrial standard in Europe within the next few months. 
•  E.  - As  regards  Category 5,  Part 2 of the  Wassenaar Arrangement,  dealt with in Section 7 of  thi~ 
report, the following should be noted: 
- Since high-security secret-key and public-key algorithms are freely accessible, for example via 
the  Internet,  and  in view of Note  7.4  and the  implications  of such accessibility (see  7  .5),  it 
appears  that export restrictions  in no  way  constitute  a  serious  impediment  for  criminal  and 
terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, by following the example of  the United States the police can 
take effective action, even when top-quality cryptographic products are freely used. 
-However, in the light of 7.6, such export restrictions pose a serious obstacle to European data 
security firms and hinder the development of  the international e-commerce industry. 
- On  19  January  1999,  following  the  inter-ministerial  committee  meeting  on the  information 
society ([5]), the French Government, in agreement with President Chirac, pledged to liberalise 
the use of cryptography by raising from 40 bits to  128 bits the security threshold which may be 
freely used. This latest development is apparently only the first step towards a total deregulation 
of  the use of  cryptography on French territory. Until then, French rules on cryptography had been 
among the most stringent in the world. 
- The Echelon network is most probably able to intercept, decode and process the information 
transmitted with products on the market that fulfil the criteria mentioned in 7  .2. 
In order to strengthen Community cohesion, the European Parliament should strive initially to 
persuade  EU  countries  to  adopt  a  common  position  at  the  meetings  organised  under  the 
Wassenaar Arrangement.  Subsequently,  in view of the aforementioned points, and in order to 
boost electronic commerce on a worldwide scale, it should suggest that the Community simply 
with from  Category 5,  Part 2 of the  list of products  subject to  controls under the  Wassenaar 
Arrangement. 
•  F. - The committee should commission a more detailed report on the implications of  the risks in terms 
of electronic surveillance that the  Wassenaar Arrangement brings with it.  For example, under Item 
5.B.l.b.1  (Part  1,  on Telecommunications)  certain equipment using ATM  (Asynchronous  Transfer 
Mode) digital techniques is subject to controls. This data transfer technology is far more difficult (but 
not impossible,  see  [ 32 ],  part 2,  and  the  aforementioned  STOA  report  by  Duncan Campbell)  to 
monitor electronically than conventional TCPIIP  systems.  It would also be very useful to ascertain 
whether products that are authorised for export provide effective responses to TEMPEST (see 2.7 and 
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introduction to point 3), since the usefulness of cryptosystems is somewhat limited if the data can be 
read in plaintext before encryption or after decryption, with the aid of  electromagnetic radiation. 
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Summary 
1. Communications intelligence (Comint) involving the covert interception of foreign communications has been 
practised by almost every advanced nation since international telecommunications became available. Comint is a 
large-scale industrial activity providing consumers with intelligence on diplomatic, economic and scientific 
developments. The capabilities of and constraints on Comint activity may usefully be considered in the framework of 
the "intelligence cycle" (section 1  ). 
2. Globally, about 15-20 billion Euro is expended annually on Comint and related activities. The largest component of 
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this expenditure is incurred by the major English-speaking nations of the UKUSA alliance  .  .(ll This report describes 
how Comint organisations have for more than 80 years made arrangements to obtain access to much of the world's 
international communications. These include the unauthorised interception of commercial satellites, of long distance 
communications from space, of undersea cables using submarines, and of the Internet. In excess of 120 satellite 
systems are currently in simultaneous operation collecting intelligence (section 2). 
3. The highly automated UKUSA system for processing Comint, often known as ECHELON, has been widely 
discussed within Europe following a 1997 STOA report.@ That report summarised information from the only two 
primary sources then available on ECHELON.Q} This report provides original new documentary and other evidence 
about the ECHELON system and its involvement in the interception of communication satellites (section 3). A 
technical annexe give a supplementary, detailed description of Comint processing methods. 
4. Comint information derived from the interception of international communications has long been routinely used to 
obtain sensitive data concerning individuals, governments, trade and international organisations. This report sets out 
the organisational and reporting frameworks within which economically sensitive information is collected and 
disseminated, summarising examples where European commercial organisations have been the subject of 
surveillance (section 4). 
5.  This report identifies a previously unknown international organisation- "I LETS"- which has, without parliamentary 
or public discussion or awareness, put in place contentious plans to require manufacturers and operators of new 
communications systems to build in monitoring capacity for use by national security or law enforcement organisations 
(section 5). 
6.  Comint organisations now perceive that the technical difficulties of collecting communications are increasing, and 
that future production may be costlier and more limited than at present. The perception of such difficulties may 
provide a useful basis for policy options aimed at protective measures concerning economic information and effective 
encryption (section 6). 
7. Key findings concerning the state of the art in Co  mint include : 
o  Comprehensive systems exist to access, intercept and process every important modern form of 
communications, with few exceptions (section 2, technical annexe); 
o  Contrary to reports in the press, effective "word spotting" search systems automatically to select telephone 
calls of intelligence interest are not yet available, despite 30 years of research. However, speaker 
recognition systems- in effect, "voiceprints"- have been developed and are deployed to recognise the 
speech of targeted individuals making international telephone calls; 
o  Recent diplomatic initiatives by the United States government seeking European agreement to the "key 
escrow" system of cryptography masked intelligence collection requirements, and formed part of a 
long-term program which has undermined and continues to undermine the communications privacy of 
non-US nationals, including European governments, companies and citizens; 
o  There is wide-ranging evidence indicating that major governments are routinely utilising communications 
intelligence to provide commercial advantage to companies and trade. 
1. Organisations and  methods 
What is communications intelligence? 
1. Communications intelligence (Comint) is defined by NSA, the largest agency conducting such operations as 
"technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than their intended recipient". 
ffiComint is a major component of Sigint (signals intelligence), which also includes the collection of 
non-communications signals, such as radar emissions. ill  Although this report deals with agencies and systems 
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whose overall task may be Sigint, it is concerned only with Comint. 
2.  Comint has shadowed the development of extensive high capacity new civil telecommunications systems, and has 
in consequence become a large-scale industrial activity employing many skilled workers and utilising exceptionally 
high degrees of automation. 
3. The targets of Comint operations are varied. The most traditional Comint targets are military messages and 
diplomatic communications between national capitals and missions abroad. Since the 1960s, following the growth of 
world trade, the collection of economic intelligence and information about scientific and technical developments has 
been an increasingly important aspect of Comint. More recent targets include narcotics trafficking, money laundering, 
terrorism and organised crime. 
4. Whenever access to international communications channels is obtained for one purpose, access to every other 
type of communications carried on the same channels is automatic, subject only to the tasking requirements of 
agencies. Thus, for example, NSA and its British counterpart GCHQ, used Comint collected primarily for other 
purposes to provide data about domestic political opposition figures in the United States between 1967 and 1975. 
UKUSA alliance 
5. The United States Sigint System (USSS) consists of the National Security Agency (NSA), military support units 
collectively called the Central Security Service, and parts of the CIA and other organisations. Following wartime 
collaboration, in  1947 the UK and the US made a secret agreement to continue to conduct collaborative global 
Comint activities. Three other English-speaking nations, Canada, Australia and New Zealand joined the UKUSA 
agreement as "Second Parties". The UKUSA agreement was not acknowledged publicly until March 1999, when the 
Australian government confirmed that its Sigint organisation, Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) "does co-operate 
with counterpart signals intelligence organisations overseas under the UKUSA relationship".@ The UKUSA 
agreement shares facilities, tasks and product between participating governments. 
6. Although UKUSA Comint agency staffs and budgets have shrunk following the end of the cold war, they have 
reaffirmed their requirements for access to all the world's communications. Addressing NSA staff on his departure in 
1992, then NSA director Admiral William Studeman described how "the demands for increased global access are 
growing". The "business area" of "global access" was, he said, one of "two, hopefully strong, legs upon which NSA 
must stand" in the next century  .  .(l). 
Other Comint organisations 
7.  Besides UKUSA, there at least 30 other nations operating major Comint organisations. The largest is the Russian 
FAPSI, with 54,000 employees.([) China maintains a substantial Sigint system, two stations of which are directed at 
Russia and operate in collaboration with the United States. Most Middle Eastern and Asian nations have invested 
substantially in Sigint, in particular Israel, India and Pakistan. 
How intelligence works 
8.  In the post cold war era, Comint interception has been constrained by recognisable industrial features, including 
the requirement to match budgets and capabilities to customer requirements. The multi-step process by means of 
which communications intelligence is sought, collected, processed and passed on is similar for all countries, and is 
often described as the "intelligence cycle". The steps of the intelligence cycle correspond to distinct organisational 
and technical features of Comint production. Thus, for example, the administration of NSA's largest field station in the 
world, at Menwith Hill in England and responsible for operating over 250 classified projects, is divided into three 
directorates: OP, Operations and Plans; CP, Collection Processing; and EP, Exploitation and Production. 
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INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
Planning. 
Requirements ~--­
&Direction 
Planning 
9.  Planning first involves determining 
customer requirements. Customers include 
the major ministries of the sponsoring 
government - notably those concerned with 
defence, foreign affairs, security, trade and 
home affairs. The overall management of 
Comint involves the identification of 
requirements for data as well as translating 
requirements into potentially achievable tasks, 
prioritising, arranging analysis and reporting, 
and monitoring the quality of Comint product. 
10. Once targets have been selected, specific 
existing or new collection capabilities may be 
tasked, based on the type of information required, the susceptibility of the targeted activity to collection, and the likely 
effectiveness of collection. 
Access and collection 
11. The first essential of Comint is access to the desired communications medium so that communications may be 
intercepted. Historically, where long-range radio communications were used, this task was simple. Some important 
modern communications systems are not "Comint friendly" and may require unusual, expensive or intrusive methods 
to gain access. The physical means of communication is usually independent of the type of information carried. For 
example, inter-city microwave radio-relay systems, international satellite links and fibre optic submarine cables will all 
usually carry mixed traffic of television, telephone, fax, data links, private voice, video and data. 
12. Collection follows interception, but is a distinct activity in that many types of signals may be intercepted but will 
receive no further processing save perhaps technical searches to verify that communications patterns remain 
unchanged. For example, a satellite interception station tasked to study a newly launched communications satellite 
will set up an antenna to intercept all that the satellite sends to the ground. Once a survey has established which 
parts of the satellite's signals carry, say, television or communications of no interest, these signals will not progress 
further within the system. 
13. Collection includes both acquiring information by interception and passing information of interest downstream for 
processing and production. Because of the high information rates used in many modern networks, and the 
complexity of the signals within them, it is now common for high speed recorders or "snapshot" memories temporarily 
to hold large quantities of data while processing takes place. Modern collection activities use secure, rapid 
communications to pass data via global networks to human analysts who may be a continent away. Selecting 
messages for collection and processing is in most cases automated, involving large on-line databanks holding 
information about targets of interest. 
Processing 
14. Processing is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for analysis or the production of 
intelligence, either automatically or under human supervision. Incoming communications are normally converted into 
standard formats identifying their technical characteristics, together with message (or signal) related information 
(such as the telephone numbers of the parties to a telephone conversation). 
15. At an early stage, if it is not inherent in the selection of the message or conversation, each intercepted signal or 
channel will be described in standard "case notation". Case notation first identifies the countries whose 
communications have been intercepted, usually by two letters. A third letter designates the general class of 
communications: C for commercial carrier intercepts, D for diplomatic messages, P for police channels, etc. A fourth 
letter designates the type of communications system (such asS for multi-channel). Numbers then designate 
particular links or networks. Thus for example, during the 1980s NSA intercepted and processed traffic designated as 
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.. FRO  ..  (French diplomatic) from Chicksands, England, while the British Comint agency GCHQ deciphered .. lTD  .. 
(Italian diplomatic) messages at its Cheltenham headquarters. (2} 
16. Processing may also involve translation or .. gisting  ..  (replacing a verbatim text with the sense or main points of a 
communication). Translation and gisting can to some degree be automated. 
Production and dissemination 
17. Comint production involves analysis, evaluation, translation and interpretation of raw data into finished 
intelligence. The final step of the intelligence cycle is dissemination, meaning the passing of reports to the 
intelligence consumers. Such reports can consist of raw (but decrypted and/or translated) messages, gists, 
commentary, or extensive analyses. The quality and relevance of the disseminated reports lead in turn to the 
re-specification of intelligence collection priorities, thereby completing the intelligence cycle. 
18. The nature of dissemination is highly significant to questions of how Comint is exploited to obtain economic 
advantage. Comint activities everywhere are highly classified because, it is argued, knowledge of the success of 
interception would be likely to lead targets to change their communications methods to defeat future interception. 
Within the UKUSA system, the dissemination of Comint reports is limited to individuals holding high-level security 
.. SCI  .. clearances  .  .{lQ} Further, because only cleared officials can see Comint reports, only they can set requirements 
and thus control tasking. Officials of commercial companies normally neither have clearance nor routine access to 
Comint, and may therefore only benefit from commercially relevant Comint information to the extent that senior, 
cleared government officials permit. The ways in which this takes place is described in Section 5,  below. 
19. Dissemination is further restricted within the UKUSA organisation by national and international rules generally 
stipulating that the Sigint agencies of each nation may not normally collect or (if inadvertently collected) record or 
disseminate information about citizens of, or companies registered in, any other UKUSA nation. Citizens and 
companies are collectively known as "legal persons  ...  The opposite procedure is followed if the person concerned has 
been targeted by their national Comint organisation. 
20. For example, Hager has described QD how New Zealand officials were instructed to remove the names of 
identifiable UKUSA citizens or companies from their reports, inserting instead words such as "a Canadian citizen  .. or 
.. a US company  ...  British Comint staff have described following similar procedures in respect of US citizens following 
the introduction of legislation to limit NSA's domestic intelligence activities in 1978.01). The Australian government 
says that "DSD and its counterparts operate internal procedures to satisfy themselves that their national interests and 
policies are respected by the others ... the Rules [on Sigint and Australian persons] prohibit the dissemination of 
information relating to Australian persons gained accidentally during the course of routine collection of foreign 
communications; or the reporting or recording of the names of Australian persons mentioned in foreign 
communications".@ The corollary is also true; UKUSA nations place no restrictions on intelligence gathering 
affecting either citizens or companies of any non-UKUSA nation, including member states of the European Union 
(except the UK). 
2. Intercepting international 
communications 
International Leased Carrier (ILC) communications 
21. It is a matter of record that foreign communications to and from, or passing through the United Kingdom and the 
United States have been intercepted for more than 80 years  .  .c..M} Then and since, most international 
communications links have been operated by international carriers, who are usually individual national PTTs or 
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private companies. In either case, capacity on the communication system is leased to individual national or 
international telecommunications undertakings. For this reason, Comint organisations use the term ILC (International 
Leased Carrier) to describe such collection. 
High frequency radio 
22. Save for direct landline connections between geographically contiguous nations, high frequency (HF) radio 
system were the most common means of international telecommunications prior to 1960, and were in use for ILC, 
diplomatic and military purposes. An important characteristic of HF radio signals is that they are reflected from the 
ionosphere and from the earth's surface, providing ranges of thousands of miles. This enables both reception and 
interception. 
Microwave radio relay 
23. Microwave radio was introduced in the 1950s to provide high capacity inter-city communications for telephony, 
telegraphy and, later, television. Microwave radio relay communications utilise low power transmitters and parabolic 
dish antennae placed on towers in high positions such as on hilltops or tall buildings. The antennae are usually 1-3m 
in diameter. Because of the curvature of the earth, relay stations are generally required every 30-50km. 
Subsea cables 
24. Submarine telephone cables provided the first major reliable high capacity international communications 
systems. Early systems were limited to a few hundred simultaneous telephone channels. The most modern optical 
fibre systems carry up to 5 Gbps (Gigabits per second) of digital information. This is broadly equivalent to about 
60,000 simultaneous telephone channels. 
Communications satellites 
25. Microwave radio signals are not reflected from the ionosphere and pass directly into space. This property has 
been exploited both to provide global communications and, conversely, to intercept such communications in space 
and on land. The largest constellation of communications satellites (COMSATs) is operated by the International 
Telecommunications Satellite organisation (lntelsat), an international treaty organisation. To provide permanent 
communications from point to point or for broadcasting purposes, communications satellites are placed into so-called 
"geostationary" orbits such that, to the earth-based observer, they appear to maintain the same position in the sky. 
26. The first geostationary lntelsat satellites were orbited in 1967. Satellite technology developed rapidly. The fourth 
generation of lntelsat satellites, introduced in 1971, provided capacity for 4,000 simulataneous telephone channels 
and were capable of handling all forms of communications simultaneously -telephone, telex, telegraph, television, 
data and facsimile. In 1999, lntelsat operated 19 satellites of its 5th to 8th generations. The latest generation can 
handle the equivalent to 90,000 simultaneous calls. 
Communications techniques 
27. Prior to 1970, most communications systems (however carried) utilised analogue or continuous wave techniques. 
Since 1990, almost all communications have been digital, and are providing ever higher capacity. The highest 
capacity systems in general use for the Internet, called STM-1 or OC-3, operates at a data rate of 155Mbs. (Million 
bits per second; a rate of 155 Mbps is equivalent to sending 3 million words every second, roughly the text of one 
thousand books a minute.) For example, links at this capacity are used to provide backbone Internet connections 
between Europe and the United States. Further details of communications techniques are given in the technical 
annexe. 
ILC communications collection 
Access 
28. Comint collection cannot take place unless the collecting agency obtains access to the communications channels 
they wish to examine. Information about the means used to gain access are, like data about code-breaking methods, 
the most highly protected information within any Comint organisation. Access is gained both with and without the 
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complicity or co-operation of network operators. 
Op•ation SHAMROCK 
29. From 1945 onwards in the United States the NSA and predecessor agencies systematically obtained cable traffic 
from the offices of the major cable companies. This activity was codenamed SHAMROCK. These activities remained 
unknown for 30 years, until enquiries were prompted by the Watergate affair. On 8 August 1975, NSA Director Lt 
General Lew Allen admitted to the Pike Committee of the US House of Representatives that : 
"NSA systematically intercepts international communications, both voice and cable". 
30.  He also admitted that "messages to and from American citizens have been picked up in the course of gathering 
foreign intelligence". US legislators considered that such operations might have been unconstitutional. During 1976, a 
Department of Justice team investigated possible criminal offences by NSA. Part of their report was released in 
1980. It described how intelligence on US citizens: 
"was obtained incidentally in the course of  NSA 's interception of  aural and non-aural (e.g.,  telex) 
international communications and the receipt of  GCHQ-acquired telex and ILC (International Leased 
Carrier) cable traffic (SHAMROCK)" (emphasis in original).@ 
High frequency radio interception antenna (ANIFLR9) 
High frequency radio interception 
31. High frequency radio signals are relatively easy to intercept, requiring only a suitable area of land in,  ideally, a 
"quiet" radio environment. From 1945 until the early 1980s, both NSA and GCHQ operated HF radio interception 
systems tasked to collect European ILC communications in Scotland  .  .Q..Q} 
32. The most advanced type of HF monitoring system deployed during this period for Comint purposes was a large 
circular antenna array known as AN/FLR-9. AN/FLR-9 antennae are more than 400 metres in diameter. They can 
simultaneously intercept and determine the bearing of signals from as many directions and on as many frequencies 
as may be desired. In 1964, AN/FLR-9 receiving systems were installed at San Vito dei Normanni, Italy; Chicksands, 
England, and Karamursel, Turkey. 
33. In August 1966, NSA transferred ILC collection activities from its Scottish site at Kirknewton, to Menwith Hill in 
England. Ten years later, this activity was again transferred, to Chicksands. Although the primary function of the 
Chicksands site was to intercept Soviet and Warsaw Pact air force communications, it was also tasked to collect ILC 
and "NDC" (Non-US Diplomatic Communications). Prominent among such tasks was the collection of FRO traffic 
(i.e., French diplomatic communications). Although most personnel at Chicksands were members of the US Air 
11/15/99 2:58PM Interception capabilities 2000  http://www.gn.apc.org/duncan/ic2kreport.htm 
of40 
Force, diplomatic and ILC interception was handled by civilian NSA employees in a unit called DODJOCC.Q.Zl 
34. During the 1970s, British Comint units on Cyprus were tasked to collect HF communications of allied NATO 
nations, including Greece and Turkey. The interception took place at a British army unit at Ayios Nikolaos, eastern 
Cyprus  .  .{.1ID In the United States in 1975, investigations by a US Congressional Committee revealed that NSA was 
collecting diplomatic messages sent to and from Washington from an army Comint site at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia. 
The targets of this station included the United Kingdom.U2). 
Space interception of inter-city networks 
35.  Long distance microwave radio relay links may require dozens of intermediate stations to receive and re-transmit 
communications. Each subsequent receiving station picks up only a tiny fraction of the original transmitted signal; the 
remainder passes over the horizon and on into space, where satellites can collect it. These principles were exploited 
during the 1960s to provide Comint collection from space. The nature of microwave "spillage" means that the best 
position for such satellites is not above the chosen target, but up to 80 degrees of longitude away. 
36. The first US Comint satellite, CANYON, was launched In August 1968, followed soon by a second. The satellites 
were controlled from a ground station at Bad Aibling, Germany. In order to provide permanent coverage of selected 
targets, CANYON satellites were placed close to geostationary orbits. However, the orbits were not exact, causing 
the satellites to change position and obtain more data on ground targets.(20) Seven CANYON satellites were 
launched between 1968 and 1977. 
37. CANYON's target was the Soviet Union. Major Soviet communications links extended for thousands of miles, 
much of it over Siberia, where permafrost restricted the reliable use of underground cables. Geographical 
circumstances thus favoured NSA by making Soviet internal communications links highly accessible. The satellites 
performed better than expected, so the project was extended. 
38. The success of CANYON led to the design and deployment of a new class of Comint satellites, CHALET. The 
ground station chosen for the CHALET series was Menwith Hill, England. Under NSA project P-285, US companies 
were contracted to install and assist in operating the satellite control system and downlinks (RUNWAY) and ground 
processing system (SILKWORTH). The first two CHALET satellites were launched in June 1978 and October 1979. 
After the name of the first satellite appeared in the US press, they were renamed VORTEX. In 1982, NSA obtained 
approval for expanded "new mission requirements" and were given funds and facilities to operate four VORTEX 
satellites simultaneously. A new 5,000m2 operations centre (STEEPLEBUSH) was constructed to house processing 
equipment. When the name VORTEX was published in 1987, the satellites were renamed MERCURY.all 
39. The expanded mission given to Menwith Hill after 1985 included MERCURY collection from the Middle East. The 
station received an award for support to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1988. In  1991, a 
further award was given for support of the Iraqi war operations, Desert Storm and Desert Shield.(22) Menwith Hill is 
now the major US site for Comint collection against its major ally, Israel. Its staff includes linguists trained in Hebrew, 
Arabic and Farsi as well as European languages. Menwith Hill has recently been expanded to include ground links for 
a new network of Sigint satellites launched in 1994 and 1995 (RUTLEY). The name of the new class of satellites 
remains unknown. 
Sigint satellites 
40. The CIA developed a second class of Sigint satellite with complementary capabilities over the period from 1967 
to 1985. Initially known as RHYOLITE and later AQUACADE, these satellites were operated from a remote ground 
station in central Australia, Pine Gap. Using a large parabolic antenna which unfolded in space, RHYOLITE 
intercepted lower frequency signals in the VHF and UHF bands. Larger, most recent satellites of this type have been 
named MAGNUM and then ORION. Their targets include telemetry, VHF radio, cellular mobile phones, paging 
signals, and mobile data links. 
41. A third class of satellite, known first as JUMPSEAT and latterly as TRUMPET, operates in highly elliptical 
near-polar orbits enabling them to "hover" for long period over high northern latitudes. They enable the United States 
to collect signals from transmitters in high northern latitudes poorly covered by MERCURY or ORION, and also to 
intercept signals sent to Russian communications satellites in the same orbits. 
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Inter-city microwave 
radio relay tower 
pills" signals into 
space 
42. Although precise details of US space-based Sigint satellites launched after 1990 remain obscure, it is apparent 
from observation of the relevant ground centres that collection systems have expanded rather than contracted. The 
main stations are at Buckley Field, Denver, Colorado; Pine Gap, Australia; Menwith Hill, England; and Bad Aibling, 
Germany. The satellites and their processing facilities are exceptionally costly (of the order of $1  billion US each). In 
1998, the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) announced plans to combine the three separate classes of 
Sigint satellites into an Integrated Overhead Sigint Architecture (IOSA) in order to" improve Sigint performance and 
avoid costs by consolidating systems, utilising ...  new satellite and data processing technologies". an 
43. It follows that, within constraints imposed by budgetary limitation and tasking priorities, the United States can if it 
chooses direct space collection systems to intercept mobile communications signals and microwave city-to-city traffic 
anywhere on the planet. The geographical and processing difficulties of collecting messages simultaneously from all 
parts of the globe suggest strongly that the tasking of these satellites will be directed towards the highest priority 
national and military targets. Thus, although European communications passing on inter-city microwave routes can 
be collected, it is likely that they are normally ignored. But it is very highly probable that communications to or from 
Europe and which pass through the microwave communications networks of Middle Eastern states are collected and 
processed. 
44. No other nation (including the former Soviet Union) has deployed satellites comparable to CANYON, RHYOLITE, 
or their successors. Both Britain (project Zl RCON) and France (project ZENON) have attempted to do so, but neither 
persevered. After 1988 the British government purchased capacity on the US VORTEX (now MERCURY) 
constellation to use for unilateral national purposes.(24) A senior UK Liaison Officer and staff from GCHQ work at 
Menwith Hill NSA station and assist in tasking and operating the satellites. 
COMSAT ILC collection 
45. Systematic collection of COMSAT ILC communications began in 1971. Two ground stations were built for this 
purpose. The first at Morwenstow, Cornwall, England had two 30-metre antennae. One intercepted communications 
from the Atlantic Ocean lntelsat; the other the Indian Ocean lntelsat. The second lntelsat interception site was at 
Yakima, Washington in the northwestern United States. NSA's "Yakima Research Station" intercepted 
communications passing through the Pacific Ocean lntelsat satellite. 
46. ILC interception capability against western-run communications satellites remained at this level until the late 
1970s, when a second US site at Sugar Grove, West Virginia was added to the network. By 1980, its three satellite 
antenna had been reassigned to the US Naval Security Group and were used for COMSAT interception. Large-scale 
expansion of the ILC satellite interception system took place between 1985 and 1995, in conjunction with the 
enlargement of the ECHELON processing system (section 3). New stations were constructed in the United States 
(Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico), Canada (Leitrim, Ontario), Australia (Kojarena, Western Australia) and New Zealand 
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(Waihopai, South Island). Capacity at Yakima, Morwenstow and Sugar Grove was expanded, and continues to 
expand. 
Based on a simple count of the number of antennae currently installed at each COMSAT interception or satellite 
SIGINT station, it appears that the UKUSA nations are between them currently operating at least 120 satellite 
based collection systems. The approximate number of antennae in each category are: 
- Tasked on western commercial communications satellites (ILC)  40 
- Controlling space based signals intelligence satellites  30 
- Currently or formerly tasked on Soviet communications  50 
satellites 
Systems In the third category may have been reallocated to ILC tasks since the end of the cold war.@ 
47. Other nations increasingly collect Comint from satellites. Russia's FAPSI operates large ground collection sites at 
Lourdes, Cuba and at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.(26) Germany's BND and France's DGSE are alleged to collaborate 
in the operation of a COMSAT collection site at Kourou, Guyana, targeted on "American and South American satellite 
communications". DGSE is also said to have COMSAT collection sites at Domme (Dordogne, France), in New 
Caledonia, and in the United Arab Emirates.(27) The Swiss intelligence service has recently announced a plan for 
two COMSAT interception stations.QID. 
Satellite ground terminal at Etam,  West Virginia 
connecting Europe and the US via lntelsat IV 
Submarine cable interception 
GCHQ constructed an identical "shadow" station in 
1972 to intercept lntelsat messages for UKUSA 
48. Submarine cables now play a dominant role in international telecommunications, since - in contrast to the limited 
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bandwidth available for space systems - optical media offer seemingly unlimited capacity. Save where cables 
terminate in countries where telecommunications operators provide Comint access (such as the UK and the US), 
submarine cables appear intrinsically secure because of the nature of the ocean environment. 
49. In October 1971, this security was shown not to exist. A US submarine, Halibut, visited the Sea of Okhotsk off the 
eastern USSR and recorded communications passing on a military cable to the Khamchatka Peninsula. Halibut was 
equipped with a deep diving chamber, fully in view on the submarine's stern. The chamber was described by the US 
Navy as a "deep submergence rescue vehicle". The truth was that the "rescue vehicle" was welded immovably to the 
submarine. Once submerged, deep-sea divers exited the submarine and wrapped tapping coils around the cable. 
Having proven the principle, USS Halibut returned in 1972 and laid a high capacity recording pod next to the cable. 
The technique involved no physical damage and was unlikely to have been readily detectable.(29) 
50. The Okhotsk cable tapping operation continued for ten years, involving routine trips by three different specially 
equipped submarines to collect old pods and lay new ones; sometimes, more than one pod at a time.  New targets 
were added in 1979. That summer, a newly converted submarine called USS Parche travelled from San Francisco 
under the North Pole to the Barents Sea, and laid a new cable tap near Murmansk. Its crew received a presidential 
citation for their achievement. The Okhotsk cable tap ended in 1982, after its location was compromised by a former 
NSA employee who sold information about the tap, codenamed IVY BELLS, to the Soviet Union. One of the IVY 
BELLS pods is now on display in the Moscow museum of the former KGB. The cable tap in the Barents Sea 
continued in operation, undetected, until tapping stopped in 1992. 
51.  During 1985, cable-tapping operations were extended into the Mediterranean, to intercept cables linking Europe 
to West Africa . .Q.Ql After the cold war ended, the USS Parche was refitted with an extended section to 
accommodate larger cable tapping equipment and pods. Cable taps could be laid by remote control, using drones. 
USS Parche continues in operation to the present day, but the precise targets of its missions remain unknown. The 
Clinton administration evidently places high value on its achievements, Every year from 1994 to 1997, the submarine 
crew has been highly commended .  .Q.D Likely targets may include the Middle East, Mediterranean, eastern Asia, and 
South America. The United States is the only naval power known to have deployed deep-sea technology for this 
purpose. 
52. Miniaturised inductive taps recorders have also been used to intercept underground cables.Q2} Optical fibre 
cables, however, do not leak radio frequency signals and cannot be tapped using inductive loops. NSA and other 
Comint agencies have spent a great deal of money on research into tapping optical fibres, reportedly with little 
success. But long distance optical fibre cables are not invulnerable. The key means of access is by tampering with 
optoelectronic "repeaters" which boost signal levels over long distances. It follows that any submarine cable system 
using submerged optoelectronic repeaters cannot be considered secure from interception and communications 
intelligence activity  . 
.---.. ..,--... ·-----····-··----·-··-·-----·---·--...................  .  ... ·-----·---~-·-·-·-·-·-····-·---·--·--·-·---··- -------------····-···-·- -
·  USS halibut with disguised chamber for diving  1  Cable tapping pod laid by US submarine off  Khamchatka 
Intercepting the Internet 
53. The dramatic growth in the size and significance of the Internet and of related forms of digital communications 
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has been argued by some to pose a challenge for Comint agencies. This does not appear correct. During the 1980s, 
NSA and its UKUSA partners operated a larger international communications network than the then Internet but 
based on the same technology  .  .Q.J} According to its British partner "all GCHQ systems are linked together on the 
largest LAN (Local Area Network] in Europe, which is connected to other sites around the world via one of the largest 
WANs [Wide Area Networks] in the world ... its main networking protocol is Internet Protocol (IP)  .  .Q.il This global 
network, developed as project EMBROIDERY, includes PATHWAY, the NSA's main computer communications 
network. It provides fast, secure global communications for ECHELON and other systems. 
54. Since the early 1990s, fast and sophisticated Comint systems have been developed to collect, filter and analyse 
the forms of fast digital communications used by the Internet. Because most of the world's Internet capacity lies 
within the United States or connects to the United States, many communications in "cyberspace" will pass through 
intermediate sites within the United States. Communications from Europe to and from Asia, Oceania, Africa or South 
America normally travel via the United States. 
55. Routes taken by Internet "packets" depend on the origin and destination of the data, the systems through which 
they enter and leaves the Internet, and a myriad of other factors including time of day. Thus, routers within the 
western United States are at their most idle at the time when central European traffic is reaching peak usage. It is 
thus possible (and reasonable) for messages travelling a short distance in a busy European network to travel instead, 
for example, via Internet exchanges in California. It follows that a large proportion of international communications on 
the Internet will by the nature of the system pass through the United States and thus be readily accessible to NSA. 
56.Standard Internet messages are composed of packets called "datagrams" . Datagrams include numbers 
representing both their origin and their destination, called "IP addresses". The addresses are unique to each 
computer connected to the Internet. They are inherently easy to identify as to country and site of origin and 
destination. Handling, sorting and routing millions of such packets each second is fundamental to the operation of 
major Internet centres. The same process facilitates extraction of traffic for Comint purposes. 
57.  Internet traffic can be accessed either from international communications links entering the United States, or 
when it reaches major Internet exchanges. Both methods have advantages. Access to communications systems is 
likely to be remain clandestine -whereas access to Internet exchanges might be more detectable but provides easier 
access to more data and simpler sorting methods. Although the quantities of data involved are immense, NSA is 
normally legally restricted to looking only at communications that start or finish in a foreign country. Unless special 
warrants are issued, all other data should normally be thrown away by machine before it can be examined or 
recorded. 
58. Much other Internet traffic (whether foreign to the US or not) is of trivial intelligence interest or can be handled in 
other ways. For example, messages sent to "Usenet" discussion groups amounts to about 15 Gigabytes (GB) of data 
per day; the rough equivalent of 10,000 books. All this data is broadcast to anyone wanting (or willing) to have it.  Like 
other Internet users, intelligence agencies have open source access to this data and store and analyse it.  In the UK, 
the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency maintains a 1 Terabyte database containing the previous 90 days of 
Usenet messages  .  .Qi). A similar service, called "Deja News", is available to users of the World Wide Web (WWW). 
Messages for Usenet are readily distinguishable. It is pointless to collect them clandestinely. 
59. Similar considerations affect the World Wide Web, most of which is openly accessible. Web sites are examined 
continuously by "search engines" which generate catalogues of their contents. "Alta Vista" and "Hotbot" are 
prominent public sites of this kind. NSA similarly employs computer "bats" (robots) to collect data of interest. For 
example, a New York web site known as JYA.COM (http://www.jya.com/crypto.htm) offers extensive public 
information on Sigint, Comint and cryptography. The site is frequently updated. Records of access to the site show 
that every morning it is visited by a "bot" from NSA's National Computer Security Centre, which looks for new files 
and makes copies of any that it finds  .  .Q.Q). 
60. It follows that foreign Internet traffic of communications intelligence interest- consisting of e-mail, file transfers, 
"virtual private networks" operated over the internet, and some other messages - will form at best a few per cent of 
the traffic on most US Internet exchanges or backbone links. According to a former employee, NSA had by 1995 
installed ''sniffer" software to collect such traffic at nine major Internet exchange points (IXPs).Qll The first two such 
sites identified, FIX East and FIX West, are operated by US government agencies. They are closely linked to nearby 
commercial locations, MAE East and MAE West (see table). Three other sites listed were Network Access Points 
originally developed by the US National Science Foundation to provide the US Internet with its initial "backbone". 
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Table 1 NSA Internet Comint access at IXP sites (1995) (38) 
61. The same article alleged that a leading US Internet and telecommunications company had contracted with NSA 
to develop software to capture Internet data of interest, and that deals had been struck with'" the leading 
manufacturers Microsoft, Lotus, and Netscape to alter their products for foreign use. The latter allegation has proven 
correct (see technical annexa). Providing such features would make little sense unless NSA had also arranged 
general access to Internet traffic. Although NSA will not confirm or deny such allegations, a 1997 court case in Britain 
involving alleged .. computer hacking  .. produced evidence of NSA surveillance of the Internet. Witnesses from the US 
Air Force component of NSA acknowledged using packet sniffers and specialised programmes to track attempts to 
enter US military computers. The case collapsed after the witnesses refused to provide evidence about the systems 
they had used.Q2). 
Covert collection of high capacity signals 
62. Where access to signals of interest is not possible by other means, Comint agencies have constructed special 
purpose interception equipment to install in embassies or other diplomatic premises, or even to carry by hand to 
locations of special interest. Extensive descriptions of operations of this kind have been published by Mike Frost, a 
former official of CSE, the Canadian Sigint agency.(  40) Although city centre embassy premises are often ideally 
situated to intercept a wide range of communications, ranging from official earphone services to high capacity 
microwave links, processing and passing on such information may be difficult. Such collection operations are also 
highly sensitive for diplomatic reasons. Equipment for covert collection is therefore specialised, selective and 
miniaturised. 
63. A joint NSA/CIA .. Special Collection Service  ..  manufactures equipment and trains personnel for covert collection 
activities One major device is a suitcase-sized computer processing system. ORATORY. ORATORY is in effect a 
miniaturised version of the Dictionary computers described in the next section, capable of selecting non-verbal 
communications of interest from a wide range of inputs, according to pre-programmed selection criteria. One major 
NSA supplier (
11The IDEAS Operation") now offers micro-miniature digital receivers which can simultaneously 
process Sigint data from 8 independent channels. This radio receiver is the size of a credit card. It fits in a standard 
laptop computer. IDEAS claim, reasonably, that their tiny card .. performs functions that would have taken a rack full of 
equipment not long ago  ... 
New satellite networks 
64. New network operators have constructed mobile phone systems providing unbroken global coverage using 
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satellites in low or medium level earth orbits. These systems are sometimes called satellite personal communications 
systems (SPCS). Because each satellite covers only a small area and moves fast, large numbers of satellites are 
needed to provide continuous global coverage. The satellites can relay signals directly between themselves or to 
ground stations. The first such system to be completed, Iridium, uses 66 satellites and started operations in 1998. 
Iridium appears to have created particular difficulties for communications intelligence agencies, since the signals 
down from the Iridium and similar networks can only be received in a small area, which may be anywhere on the 
earth's surface. 
3.  ECHELON  and  Comint  production 
65. The ECHELON system became well known following publication of the previous STOA report. Since then, new 
evidence shows that ECHELON has existed since the 1970s, and was greatly enlarged between 1975 and 1995. Like 
ILC interception, ECHELON has developed from earlier methods. This section includes new information and 
documentary evidence about ECHELON and satellite interception. 
The "Watch List" 
66. After the public revelation of the SHAMROCK interception programme, NSA Director Lt General Lew Allen 
described how NSA used "'watch lists" as an aid to watch for foreign activity of reportable intelligence interest".@ 
"We have been providing details ... of any messages contained in the foreign communications we intercept that bear 
on named individuals or organisations. These compilations of names are commonly referred to as 'Watch Lists"', he 
said.(  42) Until the 1970s, Watch List processing was manual. Analysts examined intercepted ILC communications, 
reporting, "gisting" or analysing those which appeared to cover names or topics on the Watch List. 
New information about ECHELON sites and systems 
67. It now appears that the system identified as ECHELON has been in existence for more than 20 years. The need 
for such a system was foreseen in the late 1960s, when NSA and GCHQ planned ILC satellite interception stations at 
Mowenstow and Yakima. It was expected that the quantity of messages intercepted from the new satellites would be 
too great for individual examination. According to former NSA staff, the first ECHELON computers automated Comint 
processing at these sites.(  43) 
68. NSA and CIA then discovered that Sigint collection from space was more effective than had been anticipated, 
resulting in accumulations of recordings that outstripped the available supply of linguists and analysts. Documents 
show that when the SILKWORTH processing systems was installed at Menwith Hill for the new satellites, it was 
supported by ECHELON 2 and other databanks (see illustration). 
69. By the mid 1980s, communications intercepted at these major stations were heavily sifted, with a wide variety of 
specifications available for non-verbal traffic. Extensive further automation was planned in the mid 1980s as NSA 
Project P-415. Implementation of this project completed the automation of the previous Watch List activity. From 
1987 onwards, staff from international Comint agencies travelled to the US to attended training courses for the new 
computer systems. 
70.  Project P-415/ECHELON made heavy use of NSA and GCHQ's global Internet-like communication network to 
enable remote intelligence customers to task computers at each collection site, and receive the results automatically. 
The key component of the system are local "Dictionary" computers, which store an extensive database on specified 
targets, including names, topics of interest, addresses, telephone numbers and other selection criteria. Incoming 
messages are compared to these criteria; if a match is found, the raw intelligence is forwarded automatically. 
Dictionary computers are tasked with many thousands of different collection requirements, described as "numbers" 
(four digit codes). 
71. Tasking and receiving intelligence from the Dictionaries involves processes familiar to anyone who has used the 
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Internet. Dictionary sorting and selection can be compared to using search engines, which select web pages 
containing key words or terms and specifying relationships. The forwarding function of the Dictionary computers may 
be compared to e-mail. When requested, the system will provide lists of communications matching each criterion for 
review, analysis, "gisting" or forwarding. An important point about the new system is that before ECHELON, different 
countries and different stations knew what was being intercepted and to whom it was sent. Now, all but a fraction of 
the messages selected by Dictionary computers at remote sites are forwarded to NSA or other customers without 
being read locally. 
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Westminster, London - Dictionary computer 
72.  In 1991, a British television programme reported on the operations of the Dictionary computer at GCHQ's 
Westminster, London office. The system "secretly intercepts every single telex which passes into, out of or through 
London; thousands of diplomatic, business and personal messages every day. These are fed into a programme 
known as 'Dictionary'. It picks out keywords from the mass of Sigint, and hunts out hundreds of individuals and 
corporations".(44) The programme pointed out that the Dictionary computers, although controlled and tasked by 
GCHQ, were operated by security vetted staff employed by British Telecom (BT), Britain's dominant 
telecommunications operator.~  The presence of Dictionary computers has also been confirmed at Kojarena, 
Australia; and at GCHQ Cheltenham, England.(46) 
Sugar Grove, Virginia - COMSAT interception at ECHELON site 
73. US government documents confirm that the satellite receiving station at Sugar Grove, West Virginia is an 
ECHELON site, and that collects intelligence from COMSATs. The station is about 250 miles south-west of 
Washington, in a remote area of the Shenandoah Mountains. It is operated by the US Naval Security Group and the 
US Air Force Intelligence Agency. 
74. An upgraded system called TIMBERLINE II, was installed at Sugar Grove in the summer of 1990. At the same 
time, according to official US documents, an "ECHELON training department" was established.(47) With training 
complete, the task of the station in 1991  became "to maintain and operate an ECHELON site". ( 48) 
75. The US Air Force has publicly identified the intelligence activity at Sugar Grove: its "mission is to direct satellite 
communications equipment [in support of] consumers of COM  SAT information ... This is achieved by providing a 
trained cadre of collection system operators, analysts and managers".(  49) In 1990, satellite photographs showed 
that there were 4 satellite antennae at Sugar Grove. By November 1998, ground inspection revealed that this had 
expanded to a group of 9. 
Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico and Leitrim, Canada - COMSAT interception sites 
11115/99 2:59PM Interception capabilities 2000  http://www .gn.apc.org/duncan/ic2kreport.htm 
of40 
76. Further information published by the US Air Force identifies the US Naval Security Group Station at Sabana 
Seca, Puerto Rico as a COMSAT interception site. Its mission is "to become the premier satellite communications 
processing and analysis field station".0.Q) 
77. Canadian Defence Forces have published details about staff functions at the Leitrim field station of the Canadian 
Sigint agency CSE. The station, near Ottawa, Ontario has four satellite terminals, erected since 1984. The staff 
roster includes seven Communications Satellite Analysts, Supervisors and lnstructors  .  .(lli 
78. In a publicly available resume, a former Communication Satellite Analyst employed at Leitrim describes his job as 
having required expertise in the "operation and analysis of numerous Comsat computer systems and associated 
subsystems ... [utilising] computer assisted analysis systems ... [and] a broad range of sophisticated electronic 
equipment to intercept and study foreign communications and electronic transmissions.G2}. Financial reports from 
CSE also indicate that in 1995/96, the agency planned payments of $7 million to ECHELON and $6 million to Cray 
(computers). There were no further details about ECHELON  .  .(ill 
Wallopai, New Zealand - lntelsat interception at ECHELON site 
79. New Zealand's Sigint agency GCSB operates two satellite interception terminals at Waihopai, tasked on lntelsat 
satellites covering the Pacific Ocean. Extensive details have already been published about the station's Dictionary 
computers and its role in the ECHELON network.(54) After the book was published, a New Zealand TV station 
obtained images of the inside of the station operations centre. The pictures were obtained clandestinely by filming 
through partially curtained windows at night. The TV reporter was able to film close-ups of technical manuals held in 
the control centre. These were lntelsat technical manuals, providing confirmation that the station targeted these 
satellites Strikingly, the station was seen to be virtually empty, operating fully automatically. One guard was inside, 
but was unaware he was being filmed .  .G2} 
ILC processing techniques 
80. The technical annexe describes the main systems used to extract and process communications intelligence. The 
detailed explanations given about processing methods are not essential to understanding the core of this report, but 
are provided so that readers knowledgeable about telecommunications may fully evaluate the state of the art. 
81. Fax messages and computer data (from modems) are given priority in processing because of the ease with 
which they are understood and analysed. The main method of filtering and analysing non-verbal traffic, the Dictionary 
computers, utilise traditional information retrieval techniques, including keywords. Fast special purpose chips enable 
vast quantities of data to be processed in this way. The newest technique is "topic spotting". The processing of 
telephone calls is mainly limited to identifying call-related information, and traffic analysis. Effective voice 
"wordspotting" systems do not exist are not in use, despite reports to the contrary. But "voiceprint" type speaker 
identification systems have been in use since at least 1995. The use of strong cryptography is slowly impinging on 
Comint agencies' capabilities. This difficulty for Comint agencies has been offset by covert and overt activities which 
have subverted the effectiveness of cryptographic systems supplied from and/or used in Europe. 
82. The conclusions drawn in the annexe are that Comint equipment currently available has the capability, as tasked, 
to intercept, process and analyse every modern type of high capacity communications system to which access is 
obtained, including the highest levels of the Internet. There are few gaps in coverage. The scale, capacity and speed 
of some systems is difficult fully to comprehend. Special purpose systems have been built to process pager 
messages, cellular mobile radio and new satellites. 
4. Comint  and  Law  Enforcement 
83. In 1990 and 1991, the US government became concerned that the marketing of a secure telephone system by 
AT&T could curtail Comint activity. AT&T was persuaded to withdraw its product. In its place the US government 
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offered NSA "Clipper'' chips for incorporation in secure phones. The chips would be manufactured by NSA, which 
would also record built-in keys and pass this information to other government agencies for storage and, if required, 
retrieval. This proposal proved extremely unpopular, and was abandoned. In its place, the US government proposed 
that non government agencies should be required to keep copies of every user's keys, a system called "key escrow" 
and, later, "key recovery". Viewed in retrospect, the actual purpose of these proposals was to provide NSA with a 
single (or very few) point(s) of access to keys, enabling them to continue to access private and commercial 
communications. 
Misrepresentation of law enforcement interception reguirements 
84.  Between 1993 to 1998, the United States conducted sustained diplomatic activity seeking to persuade EU nations 
and the OECD to adopt their "key recovery" system. Throughout this period, the US government insisted that the 
purpose of the initiative was to assist law enforcement agencies. Documents obtained for this study suggest that 
these claims wilfully misrepresented the true intention of US policy. Documents obtained under the US Freedom of 
Information Act indicate that policymaking was led exclusively by NSA officials, sometimes to the complete exclusion 
of police or judicial officials. For example, when the specially appointed US "Ambassador for Cryptography", David 
Aaron, visited Britain on 25 November 1996, he was accompanied and briefed by NSA's most senior representative 
in Britain, Dr James J Hearn, formerly Deputy Director of NSA. Mr Aaron had did not meet or consult FBI officials 
attached to his Embassy. His meeting with British Cabinet officials included NSA's representative and staff from 
Britain's GCHQ, but police officers or justice officials from both nations were excluded. 
85. Since 1993, unknown to European parliamentary bodies and their electors, law enforcement officials from many 
EU countries and most of the UKUSA nations have been meeting annually in a separate forum to discuss their 
requirements for intercepting communications. These officials met under the auspices of a hitherto unknown 
organisation, I  LETS (International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar). I  LETS was initiated and founded 
by the FBI. Table 21ists ILETS meetings held between 1993 and 1997. 
86. At their 1993 and 1994 meetings, I  LETS participants specified law enforcement user requirements for 
communications interception. These appear in a 1974 I  LETS document called "IUR 1.0". This document was based 
on an earlier FBI report on "Law Enforcement Requirements for the Surveillance of Electronic Communications", first 
issued in July 1992 and revised in June 1994. The IUR requirement differed little in substance from the FBI's 
requirements but was enlarged, containing ten requirements rather than nine. IUR did not specify any law 
enforcement need for "key escrow" or "key recovery". Cryptography was mentioned solely in the context of network 
security arrangements. 
87. Between 1993 and 1997 police representatives from ILETS were not involved in the NSA-Ied policy making 
process for "key recovery", nor did I  LETS advance any such proposal, even as late as 1997. Despite this, during the 
same period the US government repeatedly presented its policy as being motivated by the stated needs of law 
enforcement agencies. At their 1997 meeting in Dublin, I  LETS did not alter the IUR. It was not until1998 that a 
revised IUR was prepared containing requirements in respect of cryptography. It follows from this that the US 
government misled EU and OECD states about the true intention of its policy. 
88. This US deception was, however, clear to the senior Commission official responsible for information security. In 
September 1996, David Herson, head of the EU Senior Officers' Group on Information Security, stated his 
assessment of the US "key recovery" project : 
"'Law Enforcement' is a protective shield for all the other governmental activities ...  We're 
talking about foreign intelligence, that's what all this is about.  There is no question [that] 'law 
enforcement' is a smoke screen".(56) 
89. It should be noted that technically, legally and organisationally, law enforcement requirements for 
communications interception differ fundamentally from communications intelligence. Law enforcement agencies 
(LEAs) will normally wish to intercept a specific line or group of lines, and must normally justify their requests to a 
judicial or administrative authority before proceeding. In contract, Comint agencies conduct broad international 
communications "trawling" activities, and operate under general warrants. Such operations do not require or even 
suppose that the parties they intercept are criminals. Such distinctions are vital to civil liberty, but risk being eroded it 
the boundaries between law enforcement and communications intelligence interception becomes blurred in future. 
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Table 2/LETS meetings,  1993-1997 
Law enforcement communications interception - policy development in 
Europe 
90.  Following the second I  LETS meeting in Bonn in 1994, IUR 1.0 was presented to the Council of Ministers and was 
passed without a single word being altered on 17  January 1995.a1} During 1995, several non EU  members of the 
I  LETS group wrote to the Council to endorse the (unpublished) Council resolution. The resolution was not published 
in the Official Journal for nearly two years, on 4 November 1996. 
91. Following the third I  LETS meeting in Canberra in 1995, the Australian government was asked to present the IUR 
to International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Noting that "law enforcement and national security agencies of a 
significant number of ITU member states have agreed on a generic set of requirements for legal interception", the 
Australian government asked the ITU to advise its standards bodies to incorporate the IUR requirements into future 
telecommunications systems on the basis that the "costs of [providing] legal interception capability and associated 
disruptions can be lessened by providing for that capability at the design stage".QID 
92. It appears that ILETS met again in 1998 and revised and extended its terms to cover the Internet and Satellite 
Personal Communications Systems such as Iridium. The new IUR also specified "additional security requirements for 
network operators and service providers", extensive new requirements for personal information about subscribers, 
and provisions to deal with cryptography. 
93. On 3 September 1998, the revised IUR was presented to the Police Co-operation Working Group as ENFOPOL 
98. The Austrian Presidency proposed that, as in 1994, the new IUR be adopted verbatim as a Council Resolution on 
interception "in respect of new technology".~  The group did not agree. After repeated redrafting, a fresh paper has 
been prepared by the German Presidency, for the eventual consideration of Council Home and Justice 
ministers.(60) 
5. Co mint and  economic  intelligence 
94. During the 1998 EP debate on "Transatlantic relations/ECHELON system" Commissioner Bangeman observed 
on behalf of the Commission that "If this system were to exist, it would be an intolerable attack against individual 
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liberties, competition and the security of the states".(Qll The existence of ECHELON was described in section 3, 
above. This section describes the organisational and reporting frameworks within which economically sensitive 
information collected by ECHELON and related systems is disseminated, summarising examples where European 
organisations have been the subject of surveillance. 
Tasking economic intelligence 
95.  US officials acknowledge that NSA collects economic information, whether intentionally or otherwise. Former 
military intelligence attache Colonel Dan Smith worked at the US Embassy, London until 1993. He regularly received 
Comint product from Menwith Hill. In 1998, he told the BBC that at Menwith Hill: 
"In terms of  scooping up communications, inevitably since their take is broadband, there will be 
conversations or communications which are intercepted which have nothing to do with the 
military, and probably within those there will be some information about commercial dealings" 
''Anything would be possible technically.  Technically they can scoop all this information up, sort 
through it and find out what it is that might be asked for . .. But there is not policy to do this 
specifically in response to a particular company's interes@ 
96.  In general, this statement is not incorrect. But it overlooks fundamental distinctions between tasking and 
dissemination, and between commercial and economic intelligence. There is no evidence that companies in any of 
the UKUSA countries are able to task Comint collection to suit their private purposes. They do not have to. Each 
UKUSA country authorises national level intelligence assessment organisations and relevant individual ministries to 
task and receive economic intelligence from Comint. Such information may be collected for myriad purposes, such 
as: estimation of future essential commodity prices; determining other nation's private positions in trade negotiations; 
monitoring international trading in arms; tracking sensitive technology; or evaluating the political stability and/or 
economic strength of a target country. Any of these targets and many others may produce intelligence of direct 
commercial relevance. The decision as to whether it should be disseminated or exploited is taken not by Comint 
agencies but by national government organisation(s). 
Disseminating economic intelligence 
97. In 1970, according to its former Executive Director, the US Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended 
that "henceforth economic intelligence be considered a function of the national security, enjoying a priority equivalent 
to diplomatic, military, technological intelligence".@) On 5 May 1977, a meeting between NSA, CIA and the 
Department of Commerce authorised the creation of secret new department, the "Office of Intelligence Liaison". Its 
task was to handle "foreign intelligence" of interest to the Department of Commerce. Its standing orders show that it 
was authorised to receive and handle SCI intelligence - Comint and Sigint from NSA. The creation of this office 
THUS provided a formal mechanism whereby NSA data could be used to support commercial and economic 
interests. After this system was highlighted in a British TV programme in 1993, its name was changed to the "Office 
of Executive Support". ( 64) Also in 1993, President Clinton extended US intelligence support to commercial 
organisations by creating a new National Economic Council, paralleling the National Security Council. 
98. The nature of this intelligence support has been widely reported. "Former intelligence officials and other experts 
say tips based on spying ... regularly flow from the Commerce Department to U.S. companies to help them win 
contracts overseas.~  The Office of Executive Support provides classified weekly briefings to security officials. One 
US newspaper obtained reports from the Commerce Department demonstrating intelligence support to US 
companies: 
One such document consists of  minutes from an August 1994 Commerce Department meeting 
[intended] to identify major contracts open for bid in Indonesia in order to help U.S.  companies 
win the work. A CIA employee ... spoke at the meeting; five of  the 16 people on the routine 
distribution list for the minutes were from the CIA. 
99.  In the United Kingdom, GCHQ is specifically required by law (and as and when tasked by the British government) 
to intercept foreign communications "in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom ... in relation to 
the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands". Commercial interception is tasked and analysed by 
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GCHQ's K Division. Commercial and economic targets can be specified by the government's Overseas Economic 
Intelligence Committee, the Economic Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Treasury, or the Bank of 
England.(66) According to a former senior JIC official, the Comint take routinely includes "company plans, telexes, 
faxes, and transcribed phone calls. Many were calls between Europe and the South[  ern Hemisphere]".(67) 
100. In Australia, commercially relevant Comint is passed by DSD to the Office of National Assessments, who 
consider whether, and if so where, to disseminate it. Staff there may pass information to Australian companies if they 
believe that an overseas nation has or seeks an unfair trade advantage. Targets of such activity have included 
Thomson-CSF, and trade negotiations with Japanese purchasers of coal and iron ore. Similar systems operate in the 
other UKUSA nations, Canada and New Zealand. 
The use of Comint economic intelligence product 
Panavia European Fighter Aircraft consortium and Saudi Arabia 
101. In 1993, former National Security Council official Howard Teicher described in a programme about Menwith Hill 
how the European Panavia company was specifically targeted over sales to the Middle East. "I  recall that the words 
'Tornado' or 'Panavia'- information related to the specific aircraft- would have been priority targets that we would 
have wanted information about".~ 
Thomson CSF and Brazil 
102. In  1994, NSA intercepted phone calls between Thomson-CSF and Brazil concerning SIVAM, a $1.3 billion 
surveillance system for the Amazon rain forest. The company was alleged to have bribed members of the Brazilian 
government selection panel. The contract was awarded to the US Raytheon Corporation- who announced 
afterwards that "the Department of Commerce worked very hard in support of U.S. industry on this project".(69) 
Raytheon also provide maintenance and engineering services to NSA's ECHELON satellite interception station at 
Sugar Grove. 
Airbus lndustrie and Saudi Arabia 
103. According to a well-informed 1995 press report :"from a commercial communications satellite, NSA lifted all the 
faxes and phone calls between the European consortium Airbus, the Saudi national airline and the Saudi 
government. The agency found that Airbus agents were offering bribes to a Saudi official. It passed the information to 
U.S. officials pressing the bid of Boeing Co and McDonnell Douglas Corp., which triumphed last year in the $6 billion 
competition." (70) 
International trade negotiations 
104. Many other accounts have been published by reputable journalists and some firsthand witnesses citing frequent 
occasions on which the US government has utlitised Comint for national commercial purposes. These include 
targeting data about the emission standards of Japanese vehicles;.{lll1995 trade negotiations the import of 
Japanese luxury cars;(72) French participation in the GATT trade negotiations in 1993; the Asian-Pacific Economic 
Conference (APEC), 1997. 
Targeting host nations 
105. The issue of whether the United States utilises communications intelligence facilities such as Menwith Hilll or 
Bad Aibling to attack host nations' communications also arises. The available evidence suggests that such conduct 
may normally be avoided. According to former National Security Council official Howard Teicher, the US government 
would not direct NSA to spy on a host governments such as Britain: 
"[But]/ would never say never in this business because, at the end of  the day,  national 
interests are national interests ... sometimes our interests diverge.  So never say never-
especially in this business" 
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6. Comint  capabilities  after 2000 
Developments in technology 
106. Since the mid-1990s, communications intelligence agencies have faced substantial difficulties in maintaining 
global access to communications systems. These difficulties will increase during and after 2000. The major reason is 
the shift in telecommunications to high capacity optical fibre networks. Physical access to cables is required for 
interception. Unless a fibre network lies within or passes through a collaborating state, effective interception is 
practical only by tampering with optoelectronic repeaters (when installed). This limitation is likely to place many 
foreign land-based high capacity optical fibre networks beyond reach. The physical size of equipment needed to 
process traffic, together with power, communications and recording systems, makes clandestine activity impractical 
and risky. 
107. Even where access is readily available (such as to COMSATs), the proliferation of new systems will limit 
collection activities, partly because budgetary constraint will restrict new deployments, and partly because some 
systems (for example, Iridium) cannot be accessed by presently available systems. 
108. In the past 15 years the substantial technological lead in computers and information technology once enjoyed by 
Comint organisations has all but disappeared. Their principal computer systems are bought "off the shelf' and are the 
equal of or even inferior to those used by first rank industrial and academic organisations. They differ only in being 
"TEMPEST shielded", preventing them emitting radio signals which could be used to analyse Sigint activity. 
109. Communications intelligence organisations recognise that the long war against civil and commercial 
cryptography has been lost. A thriving academic and industrial community is skilled in cryptography and cryptology. 
The Internet and the global marketplace have created a free flow in information, systems and software. NSA has 
failed in its mission to perpetuate access by pretending that that "key escrow" and like systems were intended to 
support law enforcement (as opposed to Comint) requirements. 
110. Future trends in Comint are likely to include limits on investment in Comint collection from space; greater use of 
human agents to plant collection devices or obtain codes than in the past; and an intensified effort to attack foreign 
computer systems, using the Internet and other means (in particular, to gain access to protected files or 
communications before they are encrypted). 
111. Attempts to restrict cryptography have nevertheless delayed the large-scale introduction of effective 
cryptographic security systems. The reduced cost of computational power has also enabled Comint agencies to 
deploy fast and sophisticated processing and sorting tools. 
112. Recent remarks to CIA veterans by the head of staff of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, ex CIA officer John Millis illustrate how NSA views the same issues: 
"Signals intelligence is in a crisis  . ...  Over the last fifty years ... In the past, technology has been 
the friend of  NSA, but in the last four or five years technology has moved from being the friend 
to being the enemy of  Sigint. 
The media of  telecommunications is no longer Sigint-friendly. It used to be.  When you were 
doing RF signals, anybody within range of  that RF signal could receive it  just as clearly as the 
intended recipient.  We moved from that to microwaves, and people figured out a great way to 
harness that as well.  Well,  we're moving to media that are very difficult to get to. 
Encryption is here and it's going to grow very rapidly.  That is bad news for Sigint .  .  . It is going to 
take a huge amount of  money invested in new technologies to get access and to be able to 
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break out the information that we still need to get from Sigint". 
Policy  issues  for the  European 
Parl,iament 
1.  The 1998 Parliamentary resolution on "Transatlantic relations/ECHELON system".(U). called for "protective 
measures concerning economic information and effective encryption". Providing such measures may be facilitated by 
developing an in-depth understanding of present and future Comint capabilities. 
2.  At the technical level, protective measures may best be focused on defeating hostile Comint activity by denying 
access or, where this is impractical or impossible, preventing processing of message content and associated traffic 
information by general use of cryptography. 
3.  As the SOGIS group within the Commission has recognised,(74) the contrasting interests of states is a complex 
issue. Larger states have made substantial investments in Comint capabilities. One member state is active in the 
UKUSA alliance, whilst others are either "third parties" to UKUSA or have made bilateral arrangements with NSA. 
Some of these arrangements were a legacy of the cold war; others are enduring. These issues create internal and 
international conflicts of interest. Technical solutions are not obvious. It should be possible to define a shared interest 
in implementing measures to defeat future external Comint activities directed against European states, their citizens 
and commercial activities. 
4.  A second area of apparent conflict concerns states' desires to provide communications interception for legitimate 
law enforcement purposes. The technical and legal processes involved in providing interception for law enforcement 
purpose differ fundamentally from those used in communications intelligence. Partly because of the lack of 
parliamentary and public awareness of Comint activities, this distinction is often glossed over, particularly by states 
that invest heavily in Comint. Any failure to distinguish between legitimate law enforcement interception requirements 
and interception for clandestine intelligence purposes raises grave issues for civil liberties. A clear boundary between 
law enforcement and "national security" interception activity is essential to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
5.  At the present time, Internet browsers and other software used in almost every personal computer in Europe is 
deliberately disabled such that "secure" communications they send can, if collected, be read without difficulty by NSA. 
US manufacturers are compelled to make these arrangements under US export rules. A level playing field is 
important. Consideration could be given to a countermeasure whereby, if systems with disabled cryptographic 
systems are sold outside the United States, they should be required to conform to an "open standard" such that third 
parties and other nations may provide additional applications which restore the level of security to at least enjoyed by 
domestic US customers. 
6.  The \YOrk of I  LETS has proceeded for 6 years without the involvement of parliaments, and in the absence of 
consultation with the industrial organisations whose vital interests their work affects. It is regrettable that, prior to the 
publication of this report, public information has not been available in states about the scope of the policy-making 
processes, inside and outside the EU, which have led to the formulation of existing and new law enforcement "user 
requirements". As a matter of urgency, the current policy-making process should be made open to public and 
parliamentary discussion in member states and in the EP,  so that a proper balance may be struck between the 
security and privacy rights of citizens and commercial enterprises, the financial and technical interests of 
communications network operators and service providers, and the need to support law enforcement activities 
intended to suppress serious crime and terrorism. 
Technical annexe 
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Broadband (high capacity multi-channel) communications 
1.  From 1950 until the early 1980s, high capacity multi-channel analogue communications systems were usually 
engineered using separate communications channels carried at different frequencies The combined signal, which 
could include 2,000 or more speech channels, was a "multiplex". The resulting "frequency division multiplex" (FDM) 
signal was then carried on a much higher frequency, such as by a microwave radio signal. 
2.  Digital communications have almost universally taken over from analogue methods. The basic system of digital 
multi-channel communications is time division multiplexing (TOM). In a TOM telephony system, the individual 
conversational channels are first digitised. Information concerning each channel is then transmitted sequentially 
rather than simultaneously, with each link occupying successive time "slots". 
3.  Standards for digital communications evolved separately within Europe and North America. In the United States, 
the then dominant public network carrier (the Bell system, run by AT&T) established digital data standards. The basic 
building block, a T-1  link, carries the equivalent of 24 telephone channels at a rate of 1.544 Mbps. Higher capacity 
systems operate at greater data transmission rates Thus, the highest transmission rate, T  -5, carries the equivalent of 
8,000 speech channels at a data rate of 560 Mbps. 
4.  Europe adopted a different framework for digital communications, based on standards originally agreed by the 
CEPT. The basic European standard digital link, E-1, carries 30 telephone channels at a data rate of 2 Mbps. Most 
European telecommunications systems are based on E-1  links or (as in North America), multiples thereof. The 
distinction is significant because most Comint processing equipment manufactured in the United States is designed 
to handle intercepted communications working to the European forms of digital communications. 
5.  Recent digital systems utilise synchronised signals carried by very high capacity optical fibres. Synchronising 
signals enables single channels to be easily extracted from high capacity links. The new system is known in the US 
as the synchronous optical network (SONET), although three equivalent definitions and labels are in use.@ 
Communications intelligence eguipment 
6. Dozens of US defence contractors, many located in Silicon Valley (California) or in the Maryland "Beltway" area 
near Washington, manufacture sophisticated Sigint equipment for NSA. Major US corporations, such as Lockheed 
Martin, Space Systems/Lora!, TRW, Raytheon and Bendix are also contracted by NSA to operate major Sigint 
collection sites. A full report on their products and services is beyond the scope of this study. The state of the art in 
contemporary communications intelligence may usefully be demonstrated, however, by examining some of the 
Comint processing products of two specialist NSA niche suppliers: Applied Signal Technology Inc (AST}, of 
Sunnyvale, California, and The IDEAS Operation of Columbia, Maryland (part of Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC)}.(76) 
7.  Both companies include senior ex-NSA staff as directors. When not explicitly stated, their products can be 
identified as intended for Sigint by virtue of being "TEMPEST screened". AST states generally that its "equipment is 
used for signal reconnaissance of foreign telecommunications by the United States government". One leading 
cryptographer has aptly and and engagingly described AST as a "one-stop ECHELON shop". 
Wideband extraction and signal analysis 
8. Wide  band (or broadband) signals are normally intercepted from satellites or tapped cables in the form of multiplex 
microwave or high frequency signals. The first step in processing such signals for Comint purposes is "wideband 
extraction". An extensive range of Sigint equipment is manufactured for this purpose, enabling newly intercepted 
systems to be surveyed and analysed. These include transponder survey equipment which identify and classify 
satellite downlinks, demodulators, decoders, demultiplexers, microwave radio link analysers, link survey units, carrier 
analysis systems, and many other forms of hardware and software. 
9. A newly intercepted communications satellite or data link can be analysed using the AST Model 196 "Transponder 
characterisation system". Once its basic communications structure has been analysed, the Model195 "Wideband 
snapshot analyser", also known as SNAPPER, can record sample data from even the highest capacity systems, 
sufficient to analyse communications in  minute detail. By the start of 1999, operating in conjunction with the Model 
11/15/99 2:59PM Interception capabilities 2000  http://www.gn.apc.org/duncan/ic2kreport.htm 
of40 
990 "Flexible Data Acquisition Unit", this systems was able to record, playback and analyse at data rates up to 2.488 
Gbps (SONET OC-48). This is 16 times faster than the largest backbone links in general use on the Internet; larger 
than the telephony capacity of any current communications satellite; and equivalent to 40,000 simultaneous 
telephone calls. It can be fitted with 48 Gbyte of memory (500-1000 times larger than found in an average personal 
computer), enabling relatively lengthy recordings of high-speed data links. The 2.5 Gbps capacity of a single 
SNAPPER unit exceeds the current daily maximum data rate found on a typical large Internet exchange.(77) 
10. Both AST and IDEAS offer a wide range of recorders, demultiplexers, scanners and processors, mostly designed 
to process European type (CEPT) E-1, E-3 (etc) signals at data rates of up to 160 Mbps. Signals may be recorded to 
banks of high-speed tape recorders, or into high capacity "RAID"(78) hard disk networks. Intercepted optical signals 
can be examined with the AST Modei257E "SONET analyser''. 
11. Once communications links have been analysed and broken down to their constituent parts, the next stage of 
Comint collection involves multi-channel processors which extract and filter messages and signals from the desired 
channels. There are three broad categories of interest: "voice grade channels", normally carrying telephony; fax 
communications; and analogue data modems. A wide selection of multi-channel Comint processors are available. 
Almost all of them separate voice, fax and data messages into distinct "streams" for downstream processing and 
analysis. 
12. The AST Model 120 multi-channel processor - used by NSA in different configurations known as STARQUAKE, 
COBRA and COPPERHEAD - can handle 1,000 simultaneous voice channels and automatically extract fax, data and 
voice traffic. Model128, larger still, can process 16 European E-3 channels (a data rate of 500 Mbps) and extract 
480 channels of interest. The 1999 giant of AST's range, the Model132 "Voice Channel Demultiplexer", can scan up 
to 56,700 communications channels, extracting more than 3,000 voice channels of interest. AST also provides Sigint 
equipment to intercept low capacity VSA  T(79) satellite services used by smaller businesses and domestic users. 
These systems can be intercepted by the AST Model285 SCPS processor, which identifies and extracts up to 48 
channels of interest, distinguished between voice, fax and data. 
13. According to US government publications, an early Wideband Extraction system was installed at NSA's Vint Hill 
Farms field station in 1970, about the time that systematic COMSAT interception collection began. That station is 
now closed. US publications identify the NSA/CSS Regional Sigint Operations Centre at San Antonio, Texas, as a 
site currently providing a multi-channel Wideband Extraction service. 
Filtering, data processing, and facsimile analysis 
14. Once communications channels have been identified and signals of interest extracted, they are analysed further 
by sophisticated workstations using special purpose software. AST's ELVIRA Signals Analysis Workstation is typical 
of this type of Sigint equipment. This system, which can be used on a laptop computer in covert locations, surveys 
incoming channels and extracts standard Comint data, including technical specifications (STRUM) and information 
about call destinations (SRI, or signal related information). Selected communications are relayed to distant locations 
using NSA standard "Collected Signals Data Format" (CSDF).{80) 
15. High-speed data systems can also be passed toAST's TRAILMAPPER software system, which works at a data 
rate of up to 2.5 Gbps. It can interpret and analyse every type of telecommunications system, including European, 
American and optical standards. TRAILMAPPER appears to have been designed with a view to analysing ATM 
(asynchronous transfer mode) communications. ATM is a modern, high-capacity digital communications system. It is 
better suited than standard Internet connections to carrying multimedia traffic and to providing business with private 
networks (VPN, LAN or WAN). TRAILMAPPER will identify and characterise such business networks. 
16. In the next stage downstream, intercepted signals are processed according to whether they are voice, fax or 
data. AST's "Data Workstation" is designed to categorise all aspects of data communications, including systems for 
handling e-mail or sending files on the lnternet.L8.ll Although the very latest modem systems (other than ISDN) are 
not included in its advertised specification, it is clear from published research that AST has developed the technology 
to intercept and process the latest data communications systems used by individuals and business to access the 
lnternet.(82) The Data Workstation can stored and automatically process 10,000 different recorded signals. 
17. Fax messages are processed by AST's Fax Image Workstation. This is described as a "user friendly, interactive 
analysis tool for rapid examination images stored on disk. Although not mentioned in AST's literature, standard fax 
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pre-processing for Dictionary computers involves automatic "optical character recognition" (OCR) software. This 
turns the typescript into computer readable (and processable) text. The  effectiveness of these systems makes 
fax-derived Comint an important collection subsystem. It has one drawback. OCR computer systems that can reliably 
recognise handwriting do not exist. No one knows how to design such a system. It follows that, perversely, 
hand-written fax messages may be a secure form of communication that can evade Dictionary surveillance criteria, 
provided always that the associated "signal related information" (calling and receiving fax numbers) have not been 
recognised as being of interest and directed to a Fax Image Workstation. 
18. AST also make a "Pager Identification and Message Extraction" system which automatically collects and 
processes data from commercial paging systems. IDEAS offer a Video Teleconferencing Processor that can 
simultaneously view or record two simultaneous teleconferencing sessions. Sigint systems to intercept cellular mobile 
phone networks such as GSM are not advertised by AST or IDEAS, but are available from other US contractors. The 
specifications and ready availability of such systems indicate how industrialised and pervasive Comint has became. It 
has moved far from the era when (albeit erroneously), it was publicly associated only with monitoring diplomatic or 
military messages. 
NSA "Trailmapper software showing atomatic detection of  private networks inside 
intercepted high capacity STM-1 digital communications system 
Traffic analysis, keyword recognition, text retrieval, and topic analysis 
19. Traffic analysis is a method of obtaining intelligence from signal related information, such as the number dialled 
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on a telephone call, or the Calling Line Identification Data (CLIO) which identifies the person making the call. Traffic 
analysis can be used where message content is not available, for example when encryption is used. By analysing 
calling patterns, networks of personal associations may be analysed and studied. This is a principal method of 
examining voice communications. 
20. Whenever machine readable communications are available, keyword recognition is fundamental to Dictionary 
computers, and to the ECHELON system. The Dictionary function is straightforward. Its basic mode of operation is 
akin to web search engines. The differences are of substance and of scale. Dictionaries implement the tasking of 
their host station against the entire mass of collected communications, and automate the distribution of selected raw 
product. 
21. Advanced systems have been developed to perform very high speed sorting of large volumes of intercepted 
information. In the late 1980s, the manufacturers of the RHYOLITE Sigint satellites, TRW, ~esigned and 
manufactured a Fast Data Finder (FDF) microchip for NSA. The FDF chip was declassified in 1972 and made 
available for commercial use by a spin-off company, Paracel. Since then Paracel has sold over 150 information 
filtering systems, many of them to the US government. Paracel describes its current FDF technology as the .. fastest, 
most accurate adaptive filtering system in the world  .. : 
A single TextFinder application may involve trillions of  bytes of  textual archive and thousands of 
online users, or  gigabytes of  live data stream per day that are filtered against tens of  thousands 
of  complex interest profiles ...  the TextFinder chip implements the most comprehensive 
character-string comparison functions of  any text retrieval system in the world. 
Devices like this are ideal for use in ECHELON and the Dictionary system. 
22. A lower capacity system, the PRP-9800 Pattern Recognition Processor, is manufactured by IDEAS. This is a 
computer card which can be fitted to a standard PC.  It can analyse data streams at up to 34 Mbps (the European E-3 
standard), matching every single bit to more than 1  000 pre-selected patterns. 
23. Powerful though Dictionary methods and keyword search engines may be,  however, they and their giant 
associated intelligence databases may soon seem archaic. Topic analysis is a more powerful and intuitive technique, 
and one that NSA is developing and promoting with confidence. Topic analysis enables Comint customers to ask 
their computers to .. find me documents about subject X  ...  X might be .. Shakespeare in love  .. or .. Arms to Iran  ... 
24. In a standard US test used to evaluate topic analysis systems,~  one task the analysis program is given is to 
find information about .. Airbus subsidies  ...  The traditional approach involves supplying the computer with the key 
terms, other relevant data, and synonyms. In this example, the designations A-300 or A-320 might be synonymous 
with .. Airbus  ...  The disadvantage of this approach is that it may find irrelevant intelligence (for example, reports about 
export subsidies to goods flown on an Airbus) and miss relevant material (for example a financial analysis of a 
company in the consortium which does not mention the Airbus product by name). Topic analysis overcomes this and 
is better matched to human intelligence. 
25. The main detectable thrust of NSA research on topic analysis centres on a method called N-gram analysis. 
Developed inside NSA's Research group - responsible for Sigint automation - N-gram analysis is a fast, general 
method of sorting and retrieving machine-readable text according to language and/or topic. The N-gram system is 
claimed to work independently of the language used or the topic studied. NSA patented the method in  1995.~ 
26. To use N-gram analysis, the operator ignores keywords and defines the enquiry by providing the system with 
selected written documents concerning the topic of interest. The system determines what the topic is from the seed 
group of documents, and then calculates the probability that other documents cover the same topic. In  1994, NSA 
made its N-gram system available for commercial exploitation. NSA's research group claimed that it could be used 
on .. very large data sets (millions of documents)", could be quickly implemented on any computer system and that it 
could operate effectively .. in text containing a great many errors (typically 10-15% of all characters)". 
27. According to former NSA Director William Studeman, .. information management will be the single most important 
problem for the (US) Intelligence Community  ..  in the future.~  Explaining this point in 1992, he described the type of 
filtering involved in systems like ECHELON: 
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One [unidentified] intelligence collection system alone can generate a million inputs per half 
hour; filters throw away all but 6500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs 
are normally selected by analysts and only one report Is produced. These are routine statistics 
for a number of  intelligence collection and analysis systems which collect technical intelligence. 
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The "Data Workstation" Comint software system analyses up to 10,000 recorded messages, 
identifying Internet traffic, e-mail messages and attachments 
Speech recognition systems 
28. For more than 40 years, NSA, ARPA, GCHQ and the British government Joint Speech Research Unit have 
conducted and sponsored research into speech recognition. Many press reports (and the previous STOA report) 
have suggested that such research has provided systems which can automatically select telephone communications 
of intelligence interest based on the use of particular "key words" by a speaker. If available, such systems would 
enable vastly more extensive Comint information to be gathered from telephone conversations than is available from 
other methods of analysis. The contention that telephone word-spotting systems are readily available appears to by 
supported by the recent availability of a string of low-cost software products resulting from this research. These 
products permit PC users to dictate to their computers instead of entering data through the keyboard. 00 
29. The problem is that for Comint applications, unlike personal computer dictation products, speech recognition 
systems have to operate in a multi-speaker, multi-language environment where numerous previously never heard 
speakers may each feature physiological differences, dialect variations, and speech traits. Commercial PC systems 
usually require one or more hours of training in order reliably to recognise a single speaker. Even then, such systems 
may mis1ranscribe 1  0% or more of the words spoken. 
30.  In PC dictation applications, the speaker can correct mistranscriptions and continually retrain the recognition 
system, making a moderate error rate acceptable. For use in Comint, where the interception system has no prior 
knowledge of what has been said (or even the language in use), and has to operate in the poorer signal environment 
of a telephone speech channel, such error rates are unachievable. Worse still, even moderate error rates can make 
a keyword recognition system worthless by generating both false positive outputs (words wrongly identified as 
keywords) and false negative outputs (missing genuine keywords). 
31. This study has found no evidence that voice keyword recognition systems are currently operationally deployed, 
nor that they are yet sufficiently accurate to be worth using for intelligence purposes. 
11115/99 2:59 PM Interception capabilities 2000  http://www .gn.apc.org/duncan/ic2kreport.htm 
of40 
Continuous speech recognition 
32. The fundamental technique in many speech recognition applications is a statistical method called Hidden Markov 
Modelling (HMM). HMM systems have been developed at many centres and are claimed academically to offer "good 
word spotting performance ... using very little or no acoustic speech training"  .  .{]l} The team which reported this 
result tested its system using data from the US Department of Defense "Switchboard Data", containing recordings of 
thousand of different US telephone conversations. On a limited test the probabilities of correctly detecting the 
occurrences of 22 keywords ranged from 45-68% on settings which allowed for 10 false positive results per keyword 
per hour. Thus if 1000 genuine keywords appeared during an hour's conversation, there would be at least 300 
missed key words, plus 220 false alarms. 
33. At about the same time, (February 1990), the Canadian Sigint organisation CSE awarded a Montreal-based 
computer research consultancy the first of a series of contracts to develop a Comint wordspotting system.@ The 
goal of the project was to build a word-spotter that worked well even for noisy calls. Three years later, CRIM reported 
that "our experience has taught us that, regardless of the environmental conditions, wordspotting remains a difficult 
problem". The key problem, which is familiar to human listeners, is that a single word heard on its own can easily be 
misinterpreted, whereas in continuous speech the meaning may be deduced from surrounding words. CRIM 
concluded in 1993 that "it is probable that the most effective way of building a reliable wordspotter is to build a large 
vocabulary continuous speech recognition (CSR) system". 
34. Continuous speech recognition software working in real time needs a powerful fast, processor. Because of the 
lack of training and the complex signal environment found in intercepted telephone calls, it is likely that even faster 
processors and better software than used in modern PCs would yield poorer results than are now provided by 
well-trained commercial systems. Significantly, an underlying problem is that voice keyword recognition is, as with 
machine-readable messages, an imperfect means to the more useful intelligence goal- topic spotting. 
35. In 1993, having failed to build a workable wordspotter, CRIM suggesting "bypassing" the problem and attempting 
instead to develop a voice topic spotter. CRIM reported that "preliminary experiments reported at a recent meeting of 
American defense contractors ... indicate that this may in fact be an excellent approach to the problem". They offered 
to produce an "operational topic spotting" system by 1995. They did not succeed. Four years later, they were still 
experimenting on how to built a voice topic spotter  .  .(82). They received a further research contract. One method 
CRIM proposed was NSA's N-gram technique. 
Speaker identification and other voice message selection techniques 
36.  In  1993, CRIM also undertook to supply CSE with an operational speaker identification module by March 1995. 
Nothing more was said about this project, suggesting that the target may have been met. In the same year, according 
to NSA documents, the IDEAS company supplied a 'Voice Activity Detector and Analyser", Model TE464375-1, to 
NSA's offices inside GCHQ Cheltenham. The unit formed the centre of a 14-position computer driven voice 
monitoring system. This too may have been an early speaker identification system. 
37. In  1995, widely quoted reports suggested that NSA speaker identification had been used to help capture the drug 
cartel leader Pablo Escobar. The reports bore strong resemblance to a novel by Tom Clancy, suggesting that the 
story may have owed more to Hollywood than high tech. In 1997, the Canadian CRE awarded a contract to another 
researcher to develop "new retrieval algorithms for speech characteristics used for speaker identification", suggesting 
this method was not by then a fully mature technology. According to Sigint staff familiar with the current use of 
Dictionary, it can be programmed to search to identify particular speakers on telephone channels. But speaker 
identification is still not a particularly reliablr or effective Comint technique.(90) 
38. In the absence of effective wordspotting or speaker identification techniques, NSA has sought alternative means 
of automatically analysing telephone communications. According NSA's classification guide, other techniques 
examined include Speech detection - detecting the presence or absence of speech activity; Speaker discrimination -
techniques to distinguish between the speech of two or more speakers; and Readability estimation - techniques to 
determine the quality of speech signals. System descriptions must be classified "secret" if NSA "determines that they 
represent major advances over techniques known in the research community"  .  .(2D 
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"Workfactor reduction": the subversion of cryptographic systems 
39.  From the 1940s to date, NSA has undermined the effectiveness of cryptographic systems made or used in 
Europe. The most important target of NSA activity was a prominent Swiss manufacturing company, Crypto AG. 
Crypto AG established a strong position as a supplier of code and cypher systems after the second world war. Many 
governments would not trust products offered for sale by major powers. In contrast, Swiss companies in this sector 
benefited from Switzerland's neutrality and image of integrity. 
40. NSA arranged to rig encryption systems sold by Crypto AG, enabling UKUSA agencies to read the coded 
diplomatic and military traffic of more than 130 countries. NSA's covert intervention was arranged through the 
company's owner and founder Boris Hagelin, and involved periodic visits to Switzerland by US "consultants" working 
for NSA. One was Nora L MacKabee, a career NSA employee. A US newspaper obtained copies of confidential 
Crypto AG documents recording Ms Mackebee's attendance at discussion meetings in 1975 to design a new Crypto 
AG machine".(92) 
41. The purpose of NSA's interventions were to ensure that while its coding systems should appear secure to other 
cryptologists, it was not secure. Each time a machine was used, its users would select a long numerical key, 
changed periodically. Naturally users wished to selected their own keys, unknown to NSA. If Crypto AG's machines 
were to appear strong to outside testers, then its coding system should work, and actually be strong. NSA's solution 
to this apparent condundrum was to design the machine so that it broadcast the key it was using to listeners. To 
prevent other listeners recognising what was happening, the key too had also to be sent in code- a different code, 
known only to NSA. Thus, every time NSA or GCHQ intercepted a message sent using these machines, they would 
first read their own coded part of the message, called the "hilfsinformationen" (help information field) and extract the 
key the target was using. They could then read the message itself as fast or even faster than the intended 
recipient(21) 
42. The same technique was re-used in  1995, when NSA became concerned about cryptographic security systems 
being built into Internet and E-mail software by Microsoft, Netscape and Lotus. The companies agreed to adapt their 
software to reduce the level of security provided to users outside the United States. In the case of Lotus Notes, which 
includes a secure e-mail system, the built-in cryptographic system uses a 64 bit encryption key. This provides a 
medium level of security, which might at present only be broken by NSA in months or years. 
43. Lotus built in an NSA "help information" trapdoor to its Notes system, as the Swedish government discovered to 
its embarrassment in 1997. By then, the system was in daily use for confidential mail by Swedish MPs, 15,000 tax 
agency staff and 400,000 to 500,000 citizens. Lotus Notes incorporates a "workfactor reduction field" (WRF) into all 
e-mails sent by non US users of the system. Like its predecessor the Crypto AG "help information field" this device 
reduces NSA's difficulty in reading European and other e-mail from an almost intractable problem to a few seconds 
work. The WRF broadcasts 24 of the 64 bits of the key used for each communication. The WRF is encoded, using a 
"public key" system which can only be read by NSA. Lotus, a subsidiary of IBM, admits this. The company told 
Svenska Dagbladet: 
"The difference between the American Notes version and the export version lies in degrees of 
encryption. We deliver 64 bit keys to all customers, but 24 bits of  those in the version that we 
deliver outside of  the United States are deposited with the American government". (94) 
44. Similar arrangements are built into all export versions of the web "browsers" manufactured by Microsoft and 
Netscape. Each uses a standard 128 bit key.  In the export version, this key is not reduced in length. Instead, 88 bits 
of the key are broadcast with each message; 40 bits remain secret. It follows that almost every computer in Europe 
has, as a built-in standard feature, an NSA workfactor reduction system to enable NSA (alone) to break the user's 
code and read secure messages. 
45. The use of powerful and effective encryption systems will increasingly restrict the ability of Comint agencies to 
process collected intelligence. "Moore's law" asserts that the cost of computational power halves every 18 months. 
This affects both the agencies and their targets. Cheap PCs can now efficiently perform complex mathematical 
calculations need for effective cryptography. In the absence of new discoveries in physics or mathematics Moore's 
law favours codemakers, not codebreakers. 
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Illustrations: D Campbell; US Air  Force; IPTV Ltd; Stephen King; Charles V Pick; IPTV Ltd; 
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Glossary and definitions 
ATM  Asynchronous Transfer Mode; a high speed form of digital communications increasingly used for on 
BND  Bundesachrichtendienst; the foreign intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Germany. Its func 
include Sigint 
CCITT  Consultative Committee for International Telephony and Telegraphy; United Nations agency develop 
standards and protocols for telecommunications; part of the ITU; also known as ITU-T 
CEPT  Conference Europeene des Postes et des Telecommunications 
CLIO  Calling Line Identification Data 
Comint  Comint Communications Intelligence 
COMSAT  (Civil or commercial) communications satellite; for military communications usage, the phraseology i: 
commonly reversed, i.e., SATCOM. 
CRIM  GRIM Centre de Recherche lnformatique de Montreal 
CSDF  CSDF Collected Signals Data Format; a term used only in Sigint 
CSE  CSE Communications Security Establishment, the Sigint agency of Canada 
CSS  CSS Central Security Service; the military component of NSA 
DARPA  DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (United States Department of Defense) 
DGSE  Directorate General de Securite Exteriere, the foreign intelligence agency of France. Its functions inc 
DSD  DSD Defence Signals Directorate, the Sigint agency of the Commonwealth of Australia 
DODJOCC  DODJOCC Department of Defense Joint Operations Centre Chicksands 
E1, E3 (etc)  Standard for digital or TDM communications systems defined by the CEPT, and primarily used withir 
and outside North America 
ENFOPOL  EU designation for documents concerned with law enforcement matters/police 
FAPSI  Federalnoe Agenstvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i lnformatsii, the Federal Agency for Government 
Communications and Information of Russia. Its functions include Sigint 
FBI  FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation; the national law enforcement and counter-intelligence agency o· 
States 
FDF  FDF Fast Data Finder 
FDM  FDM Frequency Division Multiplex; a form of multi-channel communications based on analogue sign 
FISA  FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (United States) 
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FISINT 
Gbps 
GCHQ 
GHz 
Gisting 
HDLC 
HF 
HMM 
I  LETS 
lntelsat 
lOS  A 
Iridium 
ISDN 
ISP 
ITU 
IUR 
IXP 
LAN 
LES 
Mbps 
MHz 
Microwave 
Modem 
MIME 
N-gram 
analysis 
NSA 
OCR 
PC 
PCS 
POP/ POP3 
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FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence, the third branch of Sigint 
Gigabits per second 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters; the Sigint agency of the United Kingdom 
GigaHertz 
Within Sigint, the analytical task of replacing a verbatim text with the sense or main points of a comn 
HDLC High-level Data Link Control 
HF High Frequency; frequencies from 3MHz to 30MHz 
HMM Hidden Markov Modelling, a technique widely used in speech recognition systems. 
I  LETS International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar 
International Telecommunications Satellite 
IOSA Interim Overhead Sigint Architecture 
Satellite Personal Communications System involving 66 satellites in low earth orbit, providing global 
communications from mobile telephones 
ISDN Integrated Services Data Network 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ITU International Telecommunications Union 
IUR International User Requirements (for communications interception); IUR 1.0 was prepared by IL 
1994 
IXP Internet Exchange Point 
LAN Local Area Network 
LEA Law Enforcement Agency (American usage) 
Megabits per second 
MegaHertz 
Radio signals with wavelengths of 1  Ocm or shorter; frequencies above 1  GHz 
Modem Device for sending data to and from (e.g.) a computer; a "modulator-demodulator) 
MIME Multipurpose Internet Message Extension; a systems used for sending computer files, images 
documents and programs as "attachments" to an e-mail message 
A system for analysing textual documents; in this context, a system for matching a large group of do1 
a smaller group embodying a topic of interest. The method depends on counting the frequency with ' 
character groups of length N appear in each document; hence N-gram 
NSA National Security Agency, the Sigint agency of the United States 
Optical Character Recognition 
Personal Computer 
Personal Communications Systems; the term includes mobile telephone systems, paging systems a1 
wide area radio data links for personal computers, etc 
Post Office Program; a system used for receiving and holding e-mail 
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PTT 
RAID 
SCI 
SCPC 
SMTP 
Sigint 
SO NET 
SMDS 
SMO 
SPCS 
SRI 
STOA 
T1,T3 (etc) 
TCP/IP 
TOM 
Traffic 
analysis 
UK  USA 
VPN 
VSAT 
WAN 
WRF 
www 
Posts Telegraph and Telephone (Administration or Authority) 
Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks 
Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence; used to limit access to Comint information according to "com 
Single Channel Per Carrier; low capacity satellite communications system 
Standard Mail Transport Protocol 
Signals Intelligence 
Synchronous Optical Network 
Switched Multi-Megabit Data Service 
Support for Military Operations 
Satellite Personal Communications Systems 
Signal Related Information; a term used only in Sigint 
Science and Technology Assessments Office of the European Parliament; the body commissioning 1 
Digital or TDM communications systems originally defined by the Bell telephone system in North Amt 
primarily used there 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
Time Division Muliplex; a form of multi-channel communications normally based on digital signals 
Within Sigint, a method of analysing and obtaining intelligence from messages without reference to t 
content; for example by studying the origin and destination of messages with a view to eliciting there 
between sender and recipient, or groups thereof 
UK-USA agreement 
Virtual Private Network 
Very Small Aperture Terminal; low capacity satellite communications system serving home and busir 
Wide Area Network 
Workfactor Reduction Field 
World Wide Web 
X.25, V.21, V.34, V.90, V.100 (etc) are CCITT telecommunications standards 
Notes 
1.UKUSA refers to the 1947 United Kingdom- United States agreement on Signals intelligence. The nations of the 
UKUSA alliance are the United States (the "First Party"), United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (the 
"Second Parties"). 
2."An appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control", Steve Wright, Omega Foundation, European Parliament 
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(STOA), 6 January 1998. 
3."They've got it taped", Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 12 August 1988. "Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in 
the International Spy Network", Nicky Hager, Craig Patton Publishing, PO Box 555, Nelson, New Zealand, 1996. 
4.National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 6,  National Security Council of the United States, 17 February 
1972 (first issued in 1952). 
5.SIGINT is currently defined as consisting of COM  I  NT, ELl NT (electronic or non-communications intelligence and 
FISINT (Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence). 
6.Statement by Martin Brady, Director of DSD, 16 March 1999. To be broadcast on the Sunday Programme, Channel 
9 TV (Australia), May 1999. 
?."Farewell", despatch to all NSA staff, William Studeman, 8 April1992. The two business areas to which Studeman 
referred were "increased global access" and "SMO" (support to military operations). 
8.Federalnoe Agenstvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i lnformatsii, the (Russian) Federal Agency for Government 
Communications and Information. FAPSI's functions extend beyond Comint and include providing government and 
commercial communications systems. 
9.Private communications from former NSA and GCHQ employees. 
1  O.Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence. 
11. See note 1  . 
12. Private communications from former GCHQ employees; the US Act is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA). 
13. See note 6. 
14. In 1919, US commercial cable companies attempted to resist British government demands for access to all 
cables sent overseas. Three cable companies testified to the US Senate about these practices in  December 1920. In 
the same year, the British Government introduced legislation (the Official Secrets Act, 1920, section 4) providing 
access to all or any specified class of communications. The same power was recodified in 1985, providing lawful 
access for Comint purposes to all "external communications", defines as any communications which are sent from or 
received outside the UK (Interception of Communication Act 1984, Section 3(2)). Similar requirements on 
telecommunications operators are made in the laws of the other UKUSA countries. See also "Operation 
SHAMROCK", (section 3). 
15."The Puzzle Palace", James Bamford, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982, p331. 
16.Personal communications from former NSA and GCHQ employees. 
17."Dispatches: The Hill", transmitted by Channel4 Television (UK), 6 October 1993. DODJOCC stood for 
Department of Defense Joint Operations Centre Chicksands. 
18."The Justice Game", Geoffrey Robertson, Chapter 5, Chatto and Windus, London, 1998 
19.Fink report to the House Committee on Government Operations, 1975, quoted in "NSA spies on the British 
government", New Statesman, 25 July 1980 
20. "Amerikanskiye sputniki radioelektronnoy razvedki na Geosynchronnykh orbitakh" ("American Geosynchronous 
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SIGINT Satellites"), Major A Andronov, Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No.12, 1993, pps 37-43. 
21."Space collection", in The US Intelligence Community (fourth edition), Jeffrey Richelson, Westview, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1999, pages 185-191. 
22.See note 18. 
23.Richelson, op cit. 
24."UK Eyes Alpha", Mark Urban, Faber and Faber, London, 1996, pps 56-65. 
25. Besides the stations mentioned, a major ground station whose targets formerly included Soviet COMSATs is at 
Misawa, Japan. Smaller ground stations are located at Cheltenham, England; Shoal Bay, Australia. 
26."Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus", Jeffrey Richelson, Ballinger, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1986. 
27."Les Francais aussi ecountent leurs allies", Jean Guisnel, Le Point, 6 June 1998. 
28.1ntelligence (Paris), 93, 15 February 1999, p3. 
29."Biind mans Bluff: the untold story of American submarine espionage", Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, 
Public Affairs, New York, 1998. 
30.1bid. 
31.1bid 
32.A specimen of the IVY BELLS tapping equipment is held in the former KGB museum in Moscow. It was used on a 
cable running from Moscow to a nearby scientific and technical institution. 
33.TCP/IP. TCPIIP stands for Terminal Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. IP is the basic network layer of the 
Internet. 
34.GCHQ website at http://www.gchg.gov.uk/technol.html 
35.Personal communication from DERA. A Terabyte is one thousand Gigabytes, i.e., 1012 bytes. 
36.Personal communication from John Young. 
37."Puzzle palace conducting internet surveillance", Wayne Madsen, Computer Fraud and Security Bulletin, June 
1995. 
38.1bid. 
39."More Naked Gun than Top Gun", Duncan Campbell, Guardian, 26 November 1997. 
40."Spyworld", Mike Frost and Michel Gratton, Doubleday Canada, Toronto, 1994. 
41. The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights, Hearings before the Select Committee to Study 
Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activitities, US Senate, Washington, 1976. 
42. Letter from, Lt Gen Lew Allen, Director of NSA to US Attorney General Elliot Richardson, 4 October 1973; 
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contained in the previous document. 
43.Private communication. 
44.World in Action, Granada TV. 
45.This arrangements appears to be an attempt to comply with legal restrictions in the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985, which prohibit GCHQ from handling messages except those identified in government 
"certificates" which "describe the intercepted material which should be examined". The Act specifies that "so much of 
the intercepted material as is not certified by the certificate is not [to be] read, looked at or listened to by any person". 
It appears from this that, although all messages passing through the United Kingdom are intercepted and sent to 
GCHQ's London office, the organisation considers that by having British Telecom staff operate the Dictionary 
computer, it is still under the control of the telecommunications network operator unless and until it is selected by the 
Dictionary and passes from BT to GCHQ. 
46. Private communications. 
47."Naval Security Group Detachment, Sugar Grove History for 1990", US Navy, 1 April1991. 
48.Missions, functions and tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia", 
NAVSECGRU INSTRUCTION C5450.48A, 3 September 1991. 
49.Report on tasks of Detachment 3 , 544 Air Intelligence Group, Air Intelligence Agency Almanac, US Air Force, 
1998-99. 
50. Ibid, Detachment 2,  544 Air Intelligence Group. 
51.1nformation obtained by Bill Robinson, Conrad Grebe! College, Waterloo, Ontario. CDF and CFS documents were 
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, or published on the World Wide Web. 
52. Career resume of Patrick D Duguay, published at:  http://home.istar.ca/~pdduguay/resume.htm 
53.CSE Financial Status Report, 1 March 1996, released under the Freedom of Information Act. Further details about 
"ECHELON" were not provided. It is therefore ambiguous as to whether the expenditure was intended for the 
ECHELON computer system, or for different functions (for example telecommunications or power services). 
54."Secret Power", op cit. 
55. Twenty/Twenty, TV3 (New Zealand), October 1999. 
56. Interview with David Herson, Head of Senior Officers' Group on Information Security, EU, by staff of Engineering 
Weekly (Denmark), 25 September 1996. Published at http://www.ing.dk/arkiv/herson.htm 
57.Council Resolution on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications, 17 January 1995, (96C_329/01) 
58."1ntemational Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Legal Interception of Telecommunications", 
Resolution 1115, Tenth Plenary meeting of the ITU Council, Geneva, 27 June 1997. 
59.ENFOPOL 98, Draft Resolution of the Council on Telecommunications Interception in respect of New Technology. 
Submitted by the Austrian Presidency. Brussels, 3 September 1998. 
60.ENFOPOL 19, 13 March 1999. 
61.European Parliament, 14 September 1998. 
11115/99 2:59PM Interception capabilities 2000  http://www .gn.apc.org/duncan!ic2kreport.htm 
I 
of40 
62."Uncle Sam's Eavesdroppers", Close Up North, BBC North, 3 December 1998; reported in "Star Wars strikes 
back", Guardian, 3 December 1998 
63."Dispatches: The Hill", Channel4 Television (UK), 6 October 1993 
64.1bid. 
65."Mixing business with spying; secret information is passed routinely to U.S.", Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, 1 
November 1996. 
66."UK Eyes Alpha", op cit, p235. 
67. Private communication. 
68.See note 62. 
69.Raytheon Corp press release: published at: htt.p://www.raytheon.com/sivam/contract.html 
70."America's Fortress of Spies", Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, Baltimore Sun 3 December 1995. 
71."Company Spies", Robert Dreyfuss, Mother Jones, May/June 1994. 
72.Financial Post, Canada, 28 February 1998. 
73.European Parliament, 16 September 1998. 
74.See note 56. 
75.Equivalent communications may be known as Synchronous Transport Module (STM) signals within the 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (ITU standard); Synchronous Transport Signals (STS) within the US SONET system; 
or as Optical Carrier signals (OC). 
76.The information about these Sigint systems has been drawn from open sources (only). 
77.1n April 199, the peak data rate at MAE West was less than 1.9 Gbps. 
78.Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks. 
79.Very Small Aperture Terminal; SCPC is Single Channel Per Carrier. 
80."Collected Signals Data Format"; defined in US Signals Intelligence Directive 126 and in NSA's CSDF manual. 
Two associated NSA publications providing further guidance are the Voice Processing Systems Data Element 
Dictionary and the Facsimile Data Element Dictionary, both issued in March 1997. 
81.The Data Workstation processes TCP/IP, PP, SMTP, POP3, MIME, HDLC, X.25, V.100, and modem protocols up 
to and including V.42 (see glossary). 
82. "Practical Blind Demodulators for high-order QAM signals", J R Treichler, M G Larimore and J C Harp, Proc IEEE, 
86,  10, 1998, p1907. Mr Treichler is technical director of AST. The paper describes a system used to intercept 
multiple V.34 signals, extendable to the more recent protocols. 
83. The tasks were set in the second Text Retrieval conference(TREC) organised by the ARPA and the US National 
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Institute of Science and Technology (NIST}, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The 7th annual TREC conference took place in 
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84."Method of retrieving documents that concern the same topic"; US Patent number 5418951, issued 23 May 1995; 
inventor, Marc Damashek; rights assigned to NSA. 
85.Address to the Symposium on "National Security and National Competitiveness : Open Source Solutions" by Vice 
Admiral William Studeman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and former director of NSA, 1 December 1992, 
Mclean, Virginia. 
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